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Abstract 
It is one thing to rebuild the physical structure of society after conflict; however rebuilding 
social capital is quite another feat. Social capital is the rebuilding of social relations through 
reconciliation and cohabiting together. Effective social reintegration of former combatants, 
which is understood to mean a return of social and psychological wellbeing of citizens - is a 
complex and subtle process, which is an essential element of peace-building mechanism in 
post-conflict societies. Traditionally, reintegration was seen as impossible unless founded on 
the re-establishment of trust between members who were previously in conflict, and based 
primarily on conventional measures of reintegration like economic and political indicators. 
 
This thesis offers an alternative perspective to reintegration of former combatants by 
assessing the impacts of conflict on social capital, and exploring ways in which the effective 
social reintegration of former combatants may facilitate the restoration of social capital 
destroyed through the course of the conflict in Sierra Leone, and promote the achievement of 
sustainable reintegration and reconciliation. Using workshops and training courses, detailed 
literature review and six-month fieldwork in Sierra Leone as ethnographical research 
methods, this study investigates how civil-conflict disrupts social capital and how the 
successful social reintegration and reconciliation of former combatants can restore it. It 
shows that where reintegration occurs without reconciliation built on trust, coexisting 
peacefully might be an alternative to trust.  
 
The study finds that bridging and bonding social capital has evolved in Sierra Leone, and that 
trust appeared as some kind of transitionary mechanisms that initiated with peaceful 
coexistence at the local level. It also finds that social reintegration does not rely solely on 
conventional measures like economic and political indicators, but may also benefit from 
using alternative perspectives and methods. The study enhances current understandings of 
social capital dynamics and generates functional conclusions that can be used to create a 
fuller response to the changing dynamics of social capital as a result of civil-conflict in the 
future - and generate hope and aspiration for post-war Sierra Leone.  
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1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
0.1 Research Inspiration  
‘When I first came here, many people were afraid of me because they did not 
trust me, even to speak to me, let alone to have anything to do with me. There 
was a great deal of fear, which was generated by the civil-war. It was also very 
difficult for the civilians because some people in the community still had bad 
feelings for us. But later on, they started trusting us, and slowly we started getting 
involved in community activities like road building. Today, relations are getting 
better and better…. To come from the war-zone and start a new life in a civilian 
environment depending on yourself was not easy.’1 
 
This thesis examines the reintegration and reconciliation of former combatants in Sierra 
Leone following the termination of eleven-years of brutal conflict. Critically, the thesis 
argues that where reintegration occurs without reconciliation built on trust, peaceful 
coexistence is an alternative. In order words, coexisting peacefully in a post-conflict 
environment might be an alternative to trust. The main parameters relating to this present 
thesis include: reintegration, reconciliation, social capital, and cohabitation as an alternative 
to trust in the context of post-conflict Sierra Leonean society.  
 
This thesis will address the following research question on a conceptual and methodological 
level: 
 
How does the reintegration of former combatants link in with the reconciliation process in 
Sierra Leone? 
 
What kind of relationship do former combatants form with the community in order to coexist 
peacefully? 
 
I start this inquiry on a personal note on how and why this study came to be undertaken, why 
it is important, and how it can add to our understanding to post-conflict reintegration and 
reconciliation following the termination of the conflict in Sierra Leone.  
 
This enquiry is the culmination of a life-long personal interest in violent conflict and its 
aftermath and aspirations for a sustainable peace. Since my early academic years, I have been 
engaged in voluntary work, activism, working with Non-Governmental Organisations 
                                                          
1 An extract from this author’s interview with John Kangoma, a former RUF combatant, 22nd March 2015 in 
Mandu, eastern Sierra Leone. 
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(NGOs) and self-help projects in Sierra Leone before emigrating to the United Kingdom in 
2000. Hence, this study has its foundation in my personal desire to conduct academic 
research in the field of conflict resolution and peace management in a post-conflict 
environment. 
 
Consequently, this research aims to contribute to the emerging literature in the discipline of 
post-conflict reconstruction and development, focusing in particular on the reintegration of 
former combatants when conflict ends.  
 
Before undertaking my present research role, I returned to Sierra Leone for the first time in 
2012, the first time in more than a decade. While travelling around the devastated 
countryside, considering my PhD project potentially looking at the post-conflict relationship 
between the former combatants and the communities into which they were (re)integrated, I 
noticed the high level of animosity between the communities and the former combatants, and 
a strong ‘us’ versus ‘them’ phenomenon. On my return visit to the same communities to 
undertake fieldwork in 2015, the tension between the people and the former combatants 
remained palpable. A researcher new to the region that might see only a calm surface and 
conclude that the reintegration of former Revolutionary United Front (RUF) combatants had 
been successful, that the social capital which was destroyed by the conflict had been rebuilt 
or renewed, that the reconciliatory process engineered by the international community had 
been successful, and that social stability has been achieved. However, as a Sierra Leonean 
myself, who lived in the country before and during much of the conflict, and now as a 
researcher, it was striking to see signs of the conflict such as burned out buildings, abandoned 
armoured vehicles and other dilapidated military fighting vehicles still scattered along the 
main roads that link regions. School buildings, hospitals and other infrastructures remain 
dilapidated, not fully rebuilt since they were destroyed by the conflict. These remaining 
materials are evidences of violence and indications that Sierra Leonean society ‘has not fully 
recovered’ from the disturbances and devastation of the decade-long conflict.  
 
 In the course of my conversations with community members, comments such as ‘before the 
war every other day there was dance here or there....’, or narratives such as ‘almost every 
week, there was marriage ceremony taking place here or there, but not anymore due to the 
conflict...,’ highlighted the devastation that conflict can cause and the impact it leaves behind. 
I was also affected directly by the conflict. My family home in Segbwema was burnt down 
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and my village, Mano Menima, also in eastern Sierra Leone, was completely destroyed by the 
RUF/AFRC alliance combatants in 1998. The destruction of my village was a direct 
consequence of the actions of one of my relatives Mr Lansana Koroma, a senior Kamajor2 
commander in the region, who firmly opposing the alliances’ advances into the region. A 
culmination of these issues prompted me to investigate why Sierra Leoneans had become so 
violent during one of the most brutal conflicts in Africa’s recent memory, and whether the 
reintegration of former combatants back into civilian society had been successful and at what 
cost.  
 
Because of the devastating effect of the conflict on all sectors in the country, I hypothesised 
that Sierra Leone was a place where social capital was destroyed. It is evident from available 
literature such as Richards3 and Keen4 among others that there existed good inter-communal 
interactions, good relationships and bonding at micro-level before the onset of the conflict in 
the 1990s. References to normal life in the past usually referred to local communities where 
‘everybody knew everyone else’, and during the conflict, all of these harmonious community 
relations disappeared, allowing family and community members to turn against one another.  
 
Given the shared history of cordial social relations between communities, I am optimistic that 
the (re)establishment of social capital in post-conflict Sierra Leone will mean a return of 
social, physical, psychological and spiritual wellbeing of citizens and the Sierra Leonean 
society as a whole. Post-conflict Sierra Leonean society is frustrated, alienated and 
fragmented, due in part to the decade long civil-conflict and its corresponding effects on the 
breakdown of social relationship at various levels. Rebuilding social relations (social capital) 
through forgiveness, reconciliation and building trust,5 as well as reintegrating former 
combatants and seeking a sustainable peace requires a tailored and appropriate range of 
processes that will deal with the past and envisage a better future by generating hope and 
                                                          
2 The Kamajors are predominantly Mende militia from the south and east of Sierra Leone, the largest and most 
powerful of a heterogeneous group of ethnic paramilitaries, loosely allied under the umbrella of the Civil 
Defence Forces (CDF) during the 11 years of civil-conflict. For further details on the Kamajor militia in Sierra 
Leone, see for example Ferme, M., C. and Hoffman, D. (2004) Hunter Militias and the International Human 
Rights Discourse in Sierra Leone.  Africa Today, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 73 - 95. 
3 Richards, P. (2003) The Political Economy of Internal Conflict in Sierra Leone. Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations, pp. 37 - 38. 
4 Keen, D (2005) Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James Currey. 
5 Despite the fact that it is a fundamental concept in post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation effort, trust, or 
the lack of it, has shown to be associated with the onset of violent conflict, the instability of negotiated 
settlement, and the sustainability of peace. Despite its proven importance, the question of how trust can be built 
after violent conflicts has not received much attention and has thus remained unanswered. 
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aspiration for all Sierra Leoneans, and for a ‘new’ Sierra Leone. I am convinced that the 
reintegration of former combatants cannot successfully occur without community 
reconciliation and their willingness to cohabit, so that rebuilding social capital becomes 
crucially significant and worthy for an academic investigation.  
 
An investigation into Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process, 
particularly from the perspective of the reintegration of Sierra Leone’s former combatants 
back into civilian society following their demobilisation offers a practical and academic 
perspective to our understanding of post-conflict reintegration and the general DDR process.6 
An enquiry into post-conflict reintegration is more than merely the pursuit of understanding 
violence and human conflict, but rather explains how to promote cohabitation, reconciliation 
and durable peace and prevent the reoccurrence of conflict. From Anthropology and cultural 
studies to peace and post-conflict studies in the discipline of Politics and International 
Relations we are reminded that human conflict is a feature of all human societies.7 A 
systematic investigation into the reintegration process of former combatants in post-conflict 
societies provides us with a better knowledge and understanding of how to solve human 
conflict without resorting to further violence.  
 
This present investigation offers insights into the issues involved in the process of achieving 
durable peace through reintegration, reconciliation and cohabitation as an alternative to trust.  
 
I am convinced that the social capital approach will illustrate important issues for research 
into post-conflict context. Conventionally, studies that deal with macro human conflict have 
taken either a liberal or realist perspective,8 focussing mainly on the violent aspect of conflict 
over scarce resources or power struggles,9 rather than focusing on those who directly take 
part in conflict, be they perpetrators or combatants and their welfare in the post-conflict 
society into which they are reintegrated following their demobilisation. However, in the last 
few decades, post-conflict scholars have focused more on constructionist perspectives and 
challenged these traditional approaches for not taking into account culture, identity, and local 
                                                          
6 Humphreys, M., and Weinstein, J. (2007) Demobilisation and Reintegration of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, 
No. 4, pp. 531 -567. 
7 Eller J., D. (1999) From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International 
Conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
8 Nye, J. (2007) Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History. New York: 
Pearson Longman, pp. 6 - 7. 
9 Avruch, K. (1998) Culture and Conflict Resolution. Washington: United States Institute for Peace, p. 24. 
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norms and values as crucial factors that determine the boundaries between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’, the ways in which former combatants negotiate negative stereotypes in their 
everyday struggles after the formal conclusion of a conflict, and how the issues are linked to 
the overall project of post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation. Thus, this thesis adopts 
social capital as a theoretical framework through which to investigate the social norms, 
values and local relations that circulate and influence the reintegration of former combatants 
in the context of peace-building effort in Sierra Leone.  
 
By focusing on former RUF combatants who directly participated in the conflict we gain 
more understanding of how the conflict was experienced by those who directly participated in 
it; its protagonists. An experiential perspective - it will be argued - is important to attempt to 
understand the conflict and how to guard against its recurrence in the future. In some ways it 
is common sense to try and hear the narratives from former combatants - the RUF 
themselves, the perpetrators. And yet during the conflict, and sixteen years since the conflict 
formally ended, very little space has been provided to secure unbiased narratives from former 
RUF combatants about what they perceived their current socio-economic and political status, 
the level of reintegration and reconciliation achieved, and the challenges they now face as 
civilians.10 In fact, very little attention has been paid to experiences and interpretations of 
former combatants in general, whether they were Kamajors, Donsos, Gbinties, Kapras, 
Tamaboros,11 The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) or members of the RUF.  
 
Focusing on former RUF combatants in this thesis was not just to ‘give the voiceless a voice’, 
but to enhance our knowledge and understanding of how their reintegration through 
reconciliation and cohabitation can help cement a positive peace in the ‘new’ Sierra Leone. 
Moreover, listening to the voices, and commentaries of those who participated in fomenting 
the peace will make a useful contribution to explanations of current and future intrastate 
conflicts.12  
                                                          
10 Interview with J., A., D. Alie, Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, Freetown, April 2015. 
11Tamaboros, Donsos, Gbinties, Kapras and Kamajors all fought under the unified umbrella of the Civil Defence 
Forces (CDF), of which the Kamajors were the fiercest and most powerful. CDF fought with traditional hunter's 
guns, machetes, bows and arrows. Operated invisibly in familiar territory, CDF was a significant impediment to 
the rapidly advancing RUF forces during the civil-war. Recruited mainly from displaced and unprotected 
civilian population across the country, CDF was a means of taking up arms to defend towns, villages, families 
and homes from the ruthlessness of the RUF, due to the perceived incompetence of the Sierra Leone’s national 
army.  
12 Intrastate conflict is the most common form of conflict today. It describes sustained political violence that 
takes place between armed groups representing the state, and one or more non-state groups. Conflict of this 
6 
 
0.2 Defining the Problem 
The central aim of this research is to show that where social reintegration occurs without 
reconciliation built on trust, peaceful coexistence is an alternative. Roland Paris says that the  
nature of today’s conflict has changed from that of interstate conflict (conflicts that occur 
between states) to intrastate (conflicts that occur within  a particular state that involve various 
factions or armed groups), with a concurrent shift in the significant majority of war victims 
from combatants to civilians who endure a strategy of violence based on atrocities such  as 
high level of destruction of property, sexual slavery and systematic rape, mass executions, 
hostage-taking, and ethnic cleansing.13 This has led to dramatic increase in forced migration 
of people and the devastation of social structures. In addition, the spill-over effects of civil-
conflict have ensured a regional element to some conflicts that has contributed to sustained 
local and regional insecurity as armed groups from one country threaten the security of other 
countries in a particular region. 
 
The complexity of intrastate conflicts and the way in which they are fought has significant 
ramification for reintegration and reconciliation. The post-conflict society, characterised by 
high levels of socio-economic and political destruction, displacement of large number of 
people, high level of poverty, and diminished social cohesion - represents a melting pot of 
anger, hatred, resentment and fear in which the reconciliation of previously conflicting social 
identity groups presents the most vital and also most difficult challenge in the peace-building 
effort. As studies have shown, ‘most societies emerging from civil-conflict face a staggering 
44 percent risk of returning to full-scale violence within the first five years’,14 due in part to 
the lack of addressing the underlying factors that caused the conflict in the first place, as well 
as the inability to reintegrate and reconcile the conflicting parties. In addition, the process of 
reconciliation and reintegration in the aftermath of civil-conflicts has not received significant 
attention as compared to conflict resolution.15  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
nature is usually confined within the borders of a single state, but usually has significant regional and 
international dimensions, and holds the risk of spilling over into neighbouring states. The conflict in Sierra 
Leone was no exception. 
13 Paris, R. (2004) At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
14 Collier, P, Elliot, V., L, Hegre, H, Hoerner, A, Reynal-Querol, N, and Sambanis, M. (2003) Breaking the 
Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.83.  
15 Bar-Tal, D (2000) From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological 
Analysis, Political Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 351-365. 
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In order for a successful transition from war to peace to take place, it is essential that there is 
valid social reintegration of former combatants back into society.16 It is often argued that 
former combatants can be barrier to the achieving of sustainable peace due to the potential 
security threat they pose.17 The reintegration of former combatants has the potential to 
contribute in a positive way to conflict transformation and peace-building effort.18 
Nonetheless, despite the acknowledgment that the reintegration of former combatants can 
make positive contributions to the general peace process, little is known as to how this can be 
achieved. As Gomes Porto and his colleagues point out: 
 
‘Recognising this important point (that in the immediate post-conflict setting, 
societies may seldom have the ability to effect sustainable reconciliation) points 
us in the direction of long term reintegration as a critical component of processes 
of social reconciliation and cohabitation - and the need therefore to conduct 
deeper investigation into the underlying and subtle process by which identities 
affect and are affected by the reintegration process’.19  
 
Therefore, the central hypothesis for this research, based on our understandings of 
reconciliation and the contributions former combatants make to peace-building through their 
involvement in their own reintegration process, in terms of community development, both in 
theory and practice, is that where reintegration occurs without reconciliation built on trust, 
peaceful coexistence is an alternative. In fact, bridging and bonding social capital has evolved 
in the absence of trust, therefore, trust appears as some kind of transitionary mechanisms that 
initiates with peaceful coexistence at the local level. Thus, even without trust peaceful 
coexistence is possible, and this operates through a number of mechanisms at the local level, 
which this thesis will unravel.  
 
During data collection in Sierra Leone, it was evident in almost all the narratives that there 
was the willingness on the side of the civilian population to accept and to live again with 
former combatants in the same community as Sierra Leoneans, and to work together with 
those who were once their perpetrators. There was also little evidence identified in the 
                                                          
16 Colletta, N. J, Kostner, M, Weidehofer, I. (1996) Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The 
Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda, Washington: The 
World Bank. 
17 Ozerdem, A. (2002) Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Afghanistan: 
Lessons Learned from a Cross-cultural Perspective, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No.5, pp. 961-975. 
18 Gifiner, J. (2003) Reintegration of Ex-combatants, in Malan, M. et al (Eds) (2003), Sierra Leone: Building the 
Road to Recovery, ISS Monograph Series 80, March 2003. 
19 Gomes Porto, J, Parsons, E. and Alden, C. (2007) From Soldiers to Citizens: The Social, Economic and 
Political Reintegration of UNITA Ex-Combatants, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, p.147. 
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narratives that referred to former combatants as enemies or the unwillingness on the part of 
the general public to accept them back into society. This shows that trust can evolve through 
peaceful coexistence. 
 
0.3 The Scope of the Study and the Research Question 
As noted above, the central hypothesis of this study is that where the reintegration of former 
fighters occur without reconciliation built on trust, peaceful coexistence is an alternative. In 
addition, the thesis seeks to examine the impact civil-conflicts have on social capital, 
especially bonding and bridging social capital, and the implications this may have for 
reintegration and reconciliation in a post-conflict context. It is anticipated that an 
understanding of the ways in which such conflicts impact on social capital will facilitate a 
more comprehensive consideration of how DDR programmes may promote the rebuilding of 
social capital and the ways in which such programmes may contribute to enhance 
reintegration and reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict. In this way, this thesis will 
broaden our understanding of how DDR policies can best be designed and implemented in 
order to achieve successful reintegration and reconciliation in the aftermath of civil-conflict. 
 
This thesis adopts social capital as a concept rather than other theoretical concepts for various 
reasons. Firstly, the key doctrines of social capital - those of cooperation, communication, 
reciprocity, trust, and coordination combine in many ways to explain ways in which groups 
within communities, and the state interrelate. Thus, the application of social capital in this 
thesis is important because it serves as a linking concept between reconciliation, social 
reintegration and cohabitation. I am aware that other concepts such as clientelism20 or 
participatory approach could have been adopted; however I was convinced that social capital 
approach went beyond what other concepts could offer, as it provides an ideal way through 
which we can better understand social reintegration itself, and the links it has with 
reconciliation and cohabitation. Social reintegration, and for that matter reconciliation, entails 
far more than the patronage relationships between those in power and those not, or kinship 
networks between nuclear or extended families. The successful social reintegration of former 
combatants relies on more than just those in power or the family, although these are both 
important, and this is where social capital can provide a more appropriate lens through which 
                                                          
20 Clientelism describes the distribution of selective benefits to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange 
for political support. See for instance Hopkin, J. (2006) Conceptualizing Political Clientelism: Political 
Exchange and Democratic Theory. ‘Concept Analysis: Unpacking Clientelism, Governance and Neoliberalism’. 
Document Available on line at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41475709. Document Accessed on 29/09/2016. 
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social reintegration can be observed. Social capital as a concept enables our understanding of 
the various interactions that have an impact on social reintegration, as well as introduce 
indicators for measurement, thus making it more practical for use. Understanding how 
communities collectively function at all levels, and how they establish social cohesion, is 
important in explaining the effects of violent conflict and how such effects can be avoided or 
dealt with, in this case through the reconciliation and social reintegration of former 
combatants into civilian society. Therefore, social capital is the preferred concept in this 
thesis. 
 
Much of today’s reconciliation and reintegration initiatives are modelled on the 
understanding of Eurocentric ideologies and policies, which have limited bearing to the 
developing world where most of today’s conflicts take place. Such Eurocentric approaches do 
not necessarily capitalise on the positive attributes other approaches can bring to the table, 
nor do they always result in the most positive outcomes. By prioritising local initiatives to 
reintegration and reconciliation, both in terms of definition and methodology, we can develop 
our understanding of the process, thus making it more possible to design and implement 
reintegration and reconciliation initiatives that translate into more meaningful results. 
 
Traditionally speaking, successes of DDR programmes have been evaluated in terms of 
economic reintegration with indicators such as levels of employment or enrolment on training 
courses. This thesis criticises such an approach because it does not place enough emphasis on 
the issue of social reintegration, which is vital for effective reconciliation and, therefore, 
sustainable peace in the aftermath of civil conflicts. Thus, this thesis aims to offer an 
alternative perspective from which to view the process of reintegration and reconciliation that 
addresses the impact of civil-conflict on social capital, and considers the ways in which DDR 
policy may create and develop social capital and promote effective reconciliation, rather than 
focusing on conventional commitments to economic and political indicators.  
 
0.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
As pointed out in the preceding section, the aim of this thesis is to offer an alternative 
perspective from which to view the process of former combatants’ reintegration that does not 
rely on conventional measures of reintegration such as economic indicators, instead assessing 
the impact of conflict on social capital and exploring ways in which the effective social 
reintegration of former combatants may facilitate the restoration of social capital destroyed 
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throughout the course of the civil-conflict, and promote the achievement of sustainable 
reintegration and reconciliation. It aims to widen our knowledge of social capital dynamics 
and how it can be implemented in future DDR programmes that fully respond to the changing 
dynamics of social capital as a result of civil-conflict, and generate functional conclusions 
that develop our understanding of the reconciliation process and how this process can be 
augmented. Thus, the aim and objectives of this thesis also include: 
 
1. To explore the linkages between reintegration, reconciliation, trust and social 
capital through the analysis of data obtained from the Sierra Leone case study and 
compare them to linkages identified within the wider DDR literature. 
 
2. To investigate ways in which civil-conflict transforms social capital and how the 
successful social reintegration and reconciliation through cohabitation may restore 
social capital in a post-conflict environment. 
 
3. To show that where reintegration occurs without reconciliation built on trust, 
peaceful coexistence is an alternative. 
 
4. To illustrate that the account of former combatants who directly participate in civil-
conflict can add to our understanding of how conflict is experienced by its 
protagonists. In other words, how to understand civil-conflict from the perspective 
of those who take part in it, and how to guard against its recurrence. 
 
 
0.5 Research Methodology 
The issues central to this thesis are of a very complex and dynamic nature, and as such it 
utilises a 'composite approach'21 in order to enable an in-depth and focused understanding of 
the key issues and the factors affecting social capital, social reintegration, reconciliation and 
cohabitation in the aftermath of civil-conflict.  
 
Adopting a range of research techniques, based around ethnographic research methods, I was 
able to triangulate the results, as well as generate a richer understanding of the various 
concepts and their interactions, hence increasing the credibility of the result. 
 
The following research methods were engaged within the thesis, and they include: (1) 
workshops and training courses, (2) detailed literature review and (3) six-month fieldwork in 
Sierra Leone. During the course of my PhD, I attended various workshops and training 
courses related to the research in order to augment my understanding of the key issues. Initial 
                                                          
21 Barakat, S, Chard, M, Jacoby, T and Lume, W (2002) The Composite Approach:  Research Design in the 
Context of War and Armed Conflict, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No.5, pp. 991-1003. 
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findings have been presented at an International Development Conference in London in 2015. 
Other findings were also presented at the Doctor College Conference at the University of 
Surrey, UK in 2014. In addition, I undertook courses at the University of Surrey in Post-
conflict reintegration and development. Prior to formally starting data collection, I took part 
in some low-key fieldwork exercise in eastern Sierra Leone in 2013 just immediately before 
starting my PhD programme. This exercise empowered me to evaluate issues such as 
coexistence, how trust is built in a post-conflict environment, community interest in my 
research topic, willingness of people to participate, appropriateness of interview format and 
style (including nature of questions), and my ability to conduct the enquiry in English. All of 
these factors made me feel that this study had community and societal confirmation, and that 
there was the potential for respondents to cooperate with me during fieldwork. These were all 
useful in developing my knowledge of these issues and assisted in the development of the 
research project. 
 
The main reason for conducting detailed literature review was to further develop my personal 
and individual understanding of the central issues within this investigation - civil-conflict, 
reintegration, coexistence, reconciliation, DDR, social capital, the Sierra Leonean context and 
key research methodologies, the emphasis being to be enable to pinpoint important 
theoretical framework that could provide a structure through which it was possible to answer 
the research question. 
 
The six-month fieldwork in Sierra Leone represented the central aspect of the practical 
research in this study. Despite the various limitations encountered in the fieldwork phase, as 
discussed in chapter four, the flexibility afforded to me through the composite nature of the 
data collection methods, and my approach to the research, ensured results rich in detail and 
highly relevant to the research question and the theoretical framework. 
 
0.6 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis starts in Chapter 1, which addresses the literature associated with the economic 
dimensions of the Sierra Leone’s post-conflict recovery in relation to the reintegration of 
former combatants. For any serious investigation into any post-conflict reintegration and 
reconciliation through cohabitation, there is the need to make an enquiry into the political 
economy of the conflict and the post-conflict recovery, and how it impacts on rebuilding the 
newly emerging society. Attention is also drawn to the role played by personalised rule and 
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poor political leadership, as well as structural factors such as deteriorating terms of diamond 
trade and the irrationality of post-colonial development strategy that led to the conflict in 
Sierra Leone.  
 
The chapter presents a historical overview of the Sierra Leone conflict from the point of 
colonialism then addressing the key causes of the conflict concentrating firstly on the external 
influences and then on domestic factors. In so doing, it presents a conflict analysis of the 
Sierra Leonean case, necessary in order to fully comprehend what happened in Sierra Leone, 
and the subsequent effects of these events, in order to be in a more advantageous position 
from which to understand what can be done.  
 
Chapter 2 analyses the roles of the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) in relation to retributive and restorative justice system with regards to 
post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation. Given the high levels of crime committed 
during the conflict by all factions, it is likely that restorative justice will be seen by some as 
being ‘soft on criminals’ and criminal organisations. In an effort to illustrate the benefits of 
alternative approaches to committing crime, the chapter sets out the arguments for and 
against retributive and restorative justice system in relation to post-conflict reintegration and 
reconciliation. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces social capital as a theoretical framework in this study. Beginning by 
developing a comprehension of what social capital is and where it originated, the chapter 
considers the different approaches to the understanding of social capital in order to provide a 
vivid understanding of the concept. It goes on to analyse the transformation of social capital 
through violent conflict. The chapter is particularly important because it offers a technique 
through which we can better conduct conflict analysis, which potentially could translate into 
more effective policy. The concept is useful on questions about mechanisms that strengthen 
the reintegration of former combatants, and solidarity which create consensus and sustain the 
stable development of a post-conflict society. 
 
Chapter 4 explains the research design, based around ethnographical research methods - a 
qualitative approach drawing on snowballing technique and semi-structured interview 
methods that followed up to six months in the field. Snowballing technique was adopted in 
identifying key participants, which together with semi-structured interview complement each 
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other. The results obtained from the 36 participants through the combination of various 
research techniques was the presentation of a balanced, contextualised account of the effects 
of social relationships on the reintegration of former combatants. The chapter is concerned 
with the logistics of the study, as it examines fieldwork phase, sampling, translations, data 
collection and recording and any other such issues. It addresses the methodological problems 
encountered throughout the study.  
 
Chapter 5 presents the first important analysis of the data from fieldwork conducted as part of 
this study. The main function of this chapter is to develop an understanding of social 
reintegration and provide a foundation from which it is possible to appreciate the impact 
social reintegration may have on the restoration of social capital and reconciliation. The 
chapter is divided into two main parts: the first part looks at the experiences of reintegrating 
former combatants following their demobilisation. In other words, the difficulties they face 
after their guns are first removed. The second section looks at the ability of former 
combatants to effectively function in their ‘new’ civilian environment, and whether society is 
willing to accept and accommodate them. The chapter is subdivided into identity 
transformation: power and status; access to security, status, identity and the construction of 
self; evaluating the emotional well-being of former combatants and how reintegration is 
considered to be successful or failure. 
 
Building on the analysis in the previous chapter, chapters 6 and 7 assess the implications 
social capital has on reconciliation and reintegration in relation to cohabitation. The chapters 
argue that for any social reconciliation to be meaningful there has to be first the establishment 
of cooperation and the willingness of former enemies to coexist and to be ready and willing 
to work towards developing their community. Without these, it will be difficult for 
sustainable peace to take hold. Where former combatants get involved in community 
activities positively, they may well serve as role models for the rest of the community into 
which they are reintegrated. The chapters highlight the role of the macro and meso elements 
of former combatant’s reintegration in the ability of such reintegration in promoting 
reconciliation and reciprocity. They conclude that with increase in the restoration of social 
capital also comes increase in reconciliation, especially at local level, and that cohabiting 
promotes the regeneration of bridges and bonds that is compose of social capital. The two 
chapters are particularly important as they indicate how the social reintegration of former 
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combatants can have positive implication for reintegration and reconciliation, and thus 
underline the potential of this thesis of going some way to fill the identified knowledge gap. 
 
Having detailed how former combatants successfully socially reintegrate in chapters 5, 6 and 
7 the impacts this has on reconciliation and reintegration, the last section of the thesis seeks 
to provide a comprehensive conclusion. The first part of the conclusion draws together the 
argument running through the thesis and, relating the results back to the theories discussed in 
the literature review chapters and the theoretical framework (chapters 1- 3), provides an 
answer to the research question. The second part of the conclusion identifies potential future 
research areas arising from this investigation. 
 
0.7. Concluding Remarks 
Social reintegration, reconciliation and cohabitation all offer different lens through which 
post-conflict peace-building effort can be observed following the termination of civil-
conflict. Rather than seeing them as short-term approaches, the pursuit of reconciliation and 
reintegration are represented as the wider goals of conflict transformation and peacebuilding 
with the aim of securing sustainable peace and development in a post-war setting. In the last 
few decades in particular, the nature of conflict has changed dramatically from interstate to 
intrastate, with a concurrent shift in the significant majority of war victims from armed 
personnel to civilians, who endure a high level of violence. Thus, the need for reconciliation 
and reintegration have become greater with the changing nature of conflict. Instead of 
reconciliation and reintegration involving different states, it now involves many different 
identity groups within the same state. The challenges of reconciliation and reintegration have 
thus become more intense, and more difficult to achieve. This has led to dramatic increase in 
forced migration of people and the devastation of social structures. Sierra Leone was no 
exception. 
 
One of the ways through which we can augment our understanding of today’s conflict 
resolution is to engage in an in-depth conflict analysis as it is only through a full 
comprehension of how the conflict emerged, i.e., what broke in society, that we are able to 
design and implement effective reintegration and reconciliation initiatives to help that broken 
society that is emerging from civil-conflict. In the process of achieving durable peace and 
development in the aftermath of conflict, we must approach reconciliation and reintegration 
of former combatants in a holistic way, acknowledging the multifaceted complexity of the 
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social phenomenon that surrounds peacebuilding process. Whilst trying to achieve durable 
peace in a post-conflict environment, it is imperative that the identity of former combatants is 
recognised in order to ascertain the most suitable response. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
The Political Economy and Post-Conflict Recovery in Sierra Leone 
 
Introduction 
Recent post-conflict studies have focused on the economic dimension of conflict, suggesting 
that all conflicts require monetary capital.1 Many studies on African conflicts - in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, Mozambique, Uganda, Liberia, Ivory Coast, 
Central African Republic, and Sierra Leone - and more recently in South Sudan and 
elsewhere suggest that combatants are poorly disciplined and poorly paid; and that 
unsurprisingly, much of the fighting is funded through loot and commercial opportunisms.2 
Before making an enquiry into the political economy of the conflict and the post-conflict 
recovery in Sierra Leone, and how it impacts on post-war reintegration and reconciliation, the 
main events to the conflict and the principal parties involved in it will be briefly discussed  
and analysed first. 
 
1.1 Background: The Outbreak of the Conflict 
The Republic of Sierra Leone is a constitutional Republic on the West Coast of Africa with a 
total land mass of almost 28,000 square kilometres, and has a total population of seven 
million people.3 It is rich in natural resources such as diamond, rutile, bauxite, gold, iron ore 
and limonite. Founded by a group of British philanthropists in 1789 as a haven for freed 
African slaves, (hence the name of the capital, ‘Freetown’), Sierra Leone boasts of being one 
of the oldest modern polities in Africa. At the time of independence in 1961 under the Sierra 
Leone’s Peoples Party (SLPP) Government led by Sir Milton Margai, Sierra Leone had 
inherited as its legacy a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy that was the envy of the 
Sub-region. This was especially the case after the general elections of 1967 constitutionally 
handed the reins of government over to the opposition All Peoples’ Congress (APC), led by 
Siaka Probyn Stevens. 
 
                                                          
1 Berdal, M, and Malone, D. (2001) Greed and Grievance, Economic Agendas in Civil-Wars. Boulder: Lynne 
Renner. 
2 Le Billon, P. (2000) The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies need to Know. Humanitarian 
Practice Network, paper 33. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
3Recent official census in Sierra Leone indicates that the country’s population grew from 4,976,871 in 2004 to 
7,075,641 in 2015, with an average annual growth rate of 3.2 percent. 
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However, like all-too-many African leaders of his generation, Stevens was more interested in 
consolidating his personal power than in state-building effort. Stevens set about turning 
Sierra Leone’s parliamentary democracy into a centralised presidential republic and, by 1978, 
he completed the country’s transformation into a one-party state when a farcical referendum 
made his machine the only legal political organisation. Perhaps even worse than what Stevens 
did to the political system of Sierra Leone was what he did - or, as the case may be, failed to 
do - with the country’s economy. Upon assuming office, Michael Chege notes that Stevens 
inherited a sound, economy based on diamond and iron mining as well as agriculture, mainly 
coffee and cocoa production that expanded between 1965 and 1973 at the respectable, annual 
rate of 4 percent against an annual population growth rate of 1.9 percent.4 However, the 1973 
global oil crisis and financial meltdown coincided with a decline in diamond and iron ore 
prices, creating a deficit in the country’s international balance of payments. The conventional 
response to such an economic downturn would have been to cut public spending and devalue 
the national currency in the short term and, over time, attempt to diversify exports. But, as 
Chege points out, the Stevens regime did the opposite, opting to finance the deficit by 
borrowing from the central bank - effectively, printing more money - as well as from 
international governmental and commercial institutions and extending state control of the 
economy.5 Not surprisingly, the country experienced high inflation, averaging 50 percent per 
annum in the 1980s where it had been 2.1 percent between 1965 and 1973.6  
 
Dwindling revenues, compounded by institutionalised corruption and profligate spending on 
nonessential ‘prestige state projects,’ accelerated the sharp economic decline. In the words of 
Paul Richards, Sierra Leone under the Stevens regime went from being a nation of 
democratic governance and economic prosperity to being the exemplar of Africa’s post-
colonial ‘neo-patrimonial’ malaise, whereby national resources were distributed as ‘marks of 
personal favour to party supporters and followers who respond with loyalty to the leader 
instead of the institution that the leader represents’.7 This was particularly evident in the 
country’s diamond industry. As John Hirsch points out, before the APC took over governance 
in the country, the diamond trade constituted one-third of national output and contributed 
                                                          
4 Chege, M. (2002) ‘‘Sierra Leone: The State that Came Back from the Dead.” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, 
No. 3, pp. 147-160. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Richards, P. (2002) Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James 
Currey, p.34. 
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over 70 percent of the country’s foreign exchange reserves.8 By the mid -1980s, less than 
US$100,000 worth of the diamonds passed through legal, taxable channels. Large amount of 
the country’s diamond was misappropriated by Stevens and his associates, who also 
embezzled profits and other assets from various state enterprises, including the oil and rice 
monopolies.9 
 
Having looted an estimated US$500 million and leaving a balance of barely US$196,000 in 
foreign reserves in the Bank of Sierra Leone upon his retirement from office in 1985,10 
Stevens appointed Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh as his successor.11 Unfortunately for 
Sierra Leone, Momoh’s presidency proved to be more corrupt than his predecessor.  
 
However, the future of the country was thrown into disarray on the 23rd March 1991, when an 
armed group of non-state combatants, the RUF, under the leadership of Foday Saybana 
Sankoh,12 crossed into eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia seeking to topple the one-party 
government of President Joseph Saidu Momoh of the APC.13  Directed by few politicians and 
others who had grievances against those in power, Sierra Leone was driven into eleven years 
of devastating and brutal conflict between 1991 and 2002. Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader 
was a former political dissident,14 who in the 1970s and 80s had spent time in exile in Libya, 
where he came under the influence of the late Libyan leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi. While in 
Libya, Sankoh also met Charles Taylor, who he would later join in Liberia to launch a cross-
border armed invasion into Sierra Leone.15 Taylor and Sankoh founded the RUF, which on 
the 23rd March 1991 began carrying out attacks on towns along the country’s south-eastern 
                                                          
8 Hirsch. J., L. (2001) Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
9 Hayward, F. (1989) ‘State Consolidation, Fragmentation, and Decay,’ In Donal Cruise O’Brien, John Dunn, 
and Richard Rathbone (eds.), Contemporary African States, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
10 Pham, J., P. (2005) Child Soldiers, Adult Interests: The Global Dimensions of the Sierra Leonean Tragedy. 
New York: Nova Science Publishers. 
11 In October that year, instead of presidential election, a referendum to confirm the presidential candidate 
Joseph Momoh was held. The country was a one-party state under the APC, and only one candidate from the 
ruling party was allowed to context. Momoh's candidacy was approved by 99.85% of the votes. 
12 Keen, D. (2005) Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James Currey. 
13 The conflict in Sierra Leone was supported by Charles Taylor of Liberia, because the Momoh regime in Sierra 
Leone had supported ECOMOG’s operation against his forces. Taylor was therefore determined to destabilise 
Sierra Leone and also to gain access to its diamond deposits. 
14 Foday Sankoh was a former corporal in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), and a 
television cameraman who was briefly imprisoned for his firebrand politicking in Sierra Leone. Sankoh later 
joined a group of exiles in Libya, where Muamar Gadhafi was eagerly spreading his crackpot revolutionary 
ideas among West African dissidents. 
15 Charles Taylor later would become president of the Republic of Liberia following eight-years of civil-war. 
Taylor is currently serving 50 years imprisonment in the UK for his involvement in the civil-war in Sierra 
Leone. 
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border with Liberia. Within a short period of time, the RUF had taken control of a sizeable 
region of the south and eastern parts of the country, and was on track to overthrow the APC 
government that had been in power for nearly three decades.16 
 
In April 1992, a small military group, led by Captain Valentine Strasser, unconnected to the 
RUF movement, which later became the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), 
deposed the country’s president, Joseph Saidu Momoh, who has been in power since 1985. 
The RUF continued its campaign against the new military regime, committing atrocities 
against civilians across the country, and thousands fled to neighbouring countries, including 
the Republic of Guinea. By 1994, the RUF had systematically eliminated many rural workers 
in the country’s diamond mining areas of Tongo and Kono in the east. By then, the strength 
of the national army was dwindling because of its clumsy handling by the APC government 
and the RUF successfully continued to exploit many of the diamond mines to fund its 
campaign.17 
 
By mid-1995, the RUF had commandeered nearly all the country’s economic resources, 
including the rutile mines in the south of the country. With several thousands in its ranks, the 
RUF moved within few miles of Freetown, the country’s capital city. Until this stage, what 
remained remarkable was that the civilian population, as well as the international community 
did not fully understand the motives of the RUF,18 as was the case with the identity of Foday 
Sankoh, the movement’s leader. The movement’s manifesto produced in early 1995, 
‘Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone,’19 gave the civilian population, and 
indeed the international community their first insight into the movement’s aims, objectives 
and goals.20 The manifesto decried the country’s ‘state sponsored poverty and human 
degradation’ created by ‘decades of autocratic rule and militarism’, and claimed that the 
RUF’s goal of creating ‘equal opportunity and access to power to create wealth’ through 
armed struggle was important, and therefore remained the only option for the people of Sierra 
Leone.21 
                                                          
16 Venter A., J. (1996) Sierra Leone’s Mercenary War, Battle for the Diamond Fields, International Defence 
Review, Vol. 11, No. 96, pp. 65 - 70. 
17 Adebajo, A. and Rashid, I. (2004) West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region. 
18 Ganda, A. (1998) ‘The Degradation of Sierra Leone’ Focus on Sierra Leone, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 1 - 5. 
19 Revolutionary United Front, Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone. Document Available on 
line at: fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/footpaths.htm. Document Accessed on line on 23/10/2015. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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With the RUF literally knocking on the doors of Freetown by mid-1995, the NPRC military 
regime hired the private military company, Executive Outcome (EO),22 to help in its fight 
against the advancing RUF forces. A South African mercenary firm, EO had once assisted the 
Angolan Government in its fight against the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) rebels. EO troops first arrived in Sierra Leone in May 1995, and within 
days, they had repelled the threat posed by the RUF forces especially from around Freetown. 
In a short period of time, they had regained control of the diamond mines in Kono and 
Tongo. EO continued its assault on the RUF, and by 1996, the RUF was weakening and 
called for a cease-fire.  
 
The NPRC government was under pressure from the international community, regional 
organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU), the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), civil society organisations as well 
as the civilian population to conduct elections and to hand over power to democratically 
elected civilian government. The election in February 1996 brought Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of 
the SLPP to power.23 Early that year, the contract with EO ended; Kabbah distrusted the 
national army; security vacuum was created; the RUF advances continued and Kabbah’s stay 
in power was short-lived. In May 1997, there was an army mutiny by The Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Major Jonny Paul Koroma, and Kabbah was forced 
into exile in neighbouring Guinea. With little prospect of any regional and international 
recognition, the AFRC allied itself with its old enemy, the RUF whom it had fought since 
March 1991.  
 
The AFRC regime was unreliable, ruthless and inherently unstable. With pressure from 
regional and international organisations such as the AU and the United Nations to restore 
back to power the democratically elected government of Tejan Kabbah, the Nigerian-led 
ECOMOG forces launched an attack to drive the AFRC junta out of Freetown in February 
1998. Although the ECOMOG contingent succeeded in its mission, it however struggled in 
mopping up the AFRC/RUF remnants from the bushes around the capital, Freetown. One of 
the reasons for the struggle was because most ECOMOG commanders were more engaged in 
                                                          
22 The Executive Outcome was a private military contractor which offered ‘Security management’ and operated 
during the 1990s across Africa. Its military advisers and personnel were largely drawn from the South African 
Civil Cooperation Bureau. 
23 The SLPP, which Tejan Kabbah represented has not been in governance for nearly three decades. 
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diamond mining,24 a confirmation of Berdal and Malone’s argument that ‘all conflicts are 
underpinned by economic motives’.25 However, the final removal of the AFRC/RUF forces 
from around Freetown by ECOMOG forces paved the way for the return of the Tejan Kabbah 
regime. On 17th October 1998, the restored civilian government of Tejan Kabbah executed 
twenty-three former national army officers for what it called ‘treasonable complicity in the 
AFRC coup’, despite strong regional and international pleas for clemency. President 
Kabbah’s term of office ended in November 2007, following the landslide victory of the 
opposition APC party, which brought Ernest Bai Koroma to power.  
 
A UN backed Special Court for Sierra Leone set up in 2002 indicted five leading members of 
the RUF movement - Foday Sankoh, Issa Sesay, Sam Bockarie, Morris Kallon, and 
Augustine Gbow - for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. Sankoh and Bockarie died before their trials; Sesay, Kallon 
and Gbow were tried together, and in February 2009, they were found guilty and are 
currently serving their prison terms in Rwanda. 
 
1.2 The Political Economy and Reintegration in Sierra Leone  
Eleven years of violence in Sierra Leone significantly affected economic, political, social, 
cultural and psychological aspects of the Sierra Leonean society. This section presents an 
overview of post-conflict development strategies in Sierra Leone and compares it with the 
pre-war economy from a political economic perspective.  
 
Following the end of the conflict in 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone has pursued rapid 
economic development as the answer to reintegration and post-conflict development strategy, 
although the conflict was mainly due to issues of social inequality, bad governance, and 
corruption. During the eleven years of civil-war, Sierra Leone was one of the least developed 
countries in the world, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of around 1.9 billion US dollar. 
Since the end of the conflict in 2002, the economy is gradually recovering with a GDP 
growth rate of between 4 and 7 percent per year between 2004 and 2009, which increased to 
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20.1 percent in 2013, one of the highest in the world.26 Economic growth has mostly been 
driven by an increase in iron ore production resulting from the ramping up of mining 
operations at the Marampa and the Tonkolili Mines and the improved performance of the 
agriculture, private sector, construction, and service sectors. Before the outbreak of Ebola in 
2014, nominal GDP was estimated to be $4.9 billion.27 
 
However, the outbreak of Ebola in 2014 and global lower commodity prices have had 
adverse fiscal effects on the country’s economy leading to falling revenues, increased Ebola-
related spending and widening deficits. The deficits in 2015 was estimated at 4.8 percent. The 
recent World Bank’s report suggests that Sierra Leone’s GDP in 2015 was estimated to have 
contracted by -21.5 percent.28 This was mainly due to the shutdown of iron ore operations 
and a nascent recovery in non-iron ore GDP led by agriculture and buoyed by a partial 
resumption in services especially construction, including the resumption of donor financed 
capital projects. The recovery process has been slow in 2017/18 with a projected 0.1 percent 
growth per year. 
 
1.2.1 Post-Conflict Recovery and Development Plan 
During the civil war, human lives, infrastructures and public institutions were badly 
destroyed and more importantly the psychological trauma among former combatants and the 
civilian population has been immeasurable, especially in the rural areas of Sierra Leone. At 
the same time, road transport network was annihilated. The destruction of assets, social 
fabric, family structures, financial markets and the migration of people negatively impacted 
the daily lives and the livelihoods of the population, especially in the rural areas. However, 
following the end of the conflict, the Government of Sierra Leone highlights resettlement of 
displaced persons within five years, and gradually closing down all displaced camps around 
the country.  
 
It is important to point out that the post-war situation helped Sierra Leone to achieve 
moderate economic growth despite the global recession that began in 2008 and the recent 
                                                          
26 World Bank (2016) 2014-2015 West Africa Ebola Crisis: Impact Update. Document Available on line at: 
www.worldbank.org/.../macroeconomics/.../2014-2015-west-africa-ebola-crisis-impac. Document Accessed on 
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27 Ibid. 
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Ebola outbreak in 2014. However, after ending the conflict in 2002, economic growth rose 
significantly reflecting a peace dividend.  
 
Although government authorities dominate the post-war recovery efforts, United Nations 
Development programme (UNDP), DfID, World Bank, African Development Bank, World 
Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) and bilateral donors were engaged directly and through 
nongovernmental and civil society organisations in the country, none-state actors extended 
their support to the government’s post-war recovery plans. 
 
At a glance the Government of Sierra Leone made significant strides in post-war recovery, 
rehabilitation, resettlement and reintegration. However, upon close examination there are 
flagrant political economic issues that undermine post-war recovery and development in the 
country. The absence of war, huge investment on infrastructure, immense spending on 
establishing the country’s image with foreign lobbing groups after 2002 has not succeeded in 
delivering stable economic growth. At the same time, performance of household income and 
income disparities are also weak in post-war Sierra Leonean society. These indicate that 
Sierra Leone has not fully reaped the post-war dividend.  
 
1.2.2 Obstacles Facing Post-Conflict Achievements in Sierra Leone 
As pointed out earlier, post-conflict achievements in Sierra Leone have been thwarted by 
various factors; among them, the impact of colonialism on development, the domestic politics 
in the immediate post-colonial era and what has generally been referred to by many as 
‘diamond politics’.  
 
The Implications of Colonialism for Post-war Sierra Leone 
This section traces the flawed polity Sierra Leone inherited from the British colonial rule, the 
steady institutional decline of the postcolonial state, and the subsequent impact it has had on 
post-conflict political and economic development. The colonial history of Sierra Leone set a 
distinctive pattern to which the country’s socio-economic and political culture continue to 
cohere, where in the creation of a spatial and political divide along regional and tribal lines29 
- first between Western Area, occupied by the Creoles and the settler community, and the rest 
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of the country i.e., the protectorate occupied by the three modern provinces (south, east and 
northern provinces). This divide later shifted to be divided between Mendes of southeast and 
Temnes of the north and northwest, which has continued to affect the socio-political divides 
even in post-conflict Sierra Leonean society today. 
 
Sierra Leone is today made up of seventeen tribes, but Mende and Temne together make up 
around 60 percent of the present day population.30 Although these two tribes have influence 
over small tribes, the Limba - the third largest tribe in the country have traditionally 
coordinated with the Temnes.31 Since independence, the Limbas have also been influential in 
national politics, as three of the former leaders: Siaka Stevens (1968 - 1985), Joseph Saidu 
Momoh (1985 - 1992) and Jonny Paul Koroma (May 1997 - February 1998),32 were all from 
the Limba tribe. However, as Kandeh reminds us, the Creoles of Freetown, although in their 
minority, were the dominant tribe, and were more politically active than many other ethnic 
groups in the country.33 But why were the Creoles so dominant and influential in terms of the 
immediate post-colonial politics? Various reasons have been advanced by scholars. Firstly, 
the Creoles were regarded as the ‘elites’ as they were the most educated set of people in 
Sierra Leone, and because of their closeness to the colonial administration, and for this 
reason, they were appointed to high-ranking positions therein. As Fyfe discusses, the 
appointment of Creoles to high-ranking positions was also because of their knowledge of the 
English language, their allegiance to Christianity, their successful trading activities as well as 
their ownership of land in and around the Freetown peninsula before and during the colonial 
era.34 However, the ambition of the Creoles and the ‘new’ settler community of any self-rule 
during the nineteenth Century were hindered due, in part to the competitive nature of 
Europeans and Syrian traders, who almost entirely took over trade from them, and thus ruined 
them economically.35 
 
                                                          
30 Jackson, P. (2006) ‘Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards? The Politics of Local Government Reform in Sierra 
Leone,’ African Affairs, Vol. 106, No. 422, pp. 95 - 111. 
31 Bangura, Y. (2000) ‘Policy Failure and Governance in Sierra Leone,’ Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.  
38, No. 4, pp. 551 - 577.  
32Major Johnny Paul Koroma was the leader of AFRC, the military junta that ruled Sierra Leone from May 1997 
to February 1998 after the Sierra Leone army overthrew the democratically elected government of Ahmed Tejan 
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33 Kandeh, J., D. (1992) ‘Politicisation of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone,’ African Studies Association, Vol. 
35, No. 1, pp. 81 -99. 
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Although the British established Freetown in early 1787 to serve as a settlement for freed 
slaves, who later became known as the Creoles, it was a century later before the wider 
hinterland could become a British protectorate.36 Since then, there was an emergence of 
tension between the Creoles of Freetown, who saw themselves as direct British subjects, and 
the indigenous peoples of the hinterland, whom the Creoles saw as ‘ordinary natives’ or local 
people.37 Prior to the arrival of the settler community, there were already indigenous people 
living along the Freetown peninsula, but these indigenous people were ignored and excluded 
by the settler community. This differentiation and segregation of ethnic and tribal groups 
during this period formed a platform for ‘divide and rule',38 and for the future ethno-
politicisation of the state of Sierra Leone, as different tribes lived in close proximity. One of 
the factors that created tension between the settler community and the rest of the indigenous 
people was that the settler community enjoyed the influence of direct rule from the colonial 
administration, while the combine natives of the hinterland were subjected to indirect rule 
and what the TRC describes as 'mediated hegemony and judicial practices.39 
 
By the 1920s, there was increased tension between the Creoles and the natives. Although this 
was a kind of politicisation of ethnicity by the colonial administration, the chiefs and tribal 
leaders in the interior were also privileged in one way or the other. As the tension between 
the Creoles and the natives grew, it developed into what Kandeh describes as 'class 
domination to ethno-political dynamics'.40 By 1924, the colonial administration in Freetown 
had appointed three paramount chiefs to the colonial administration in Freetown, which gave 
the natives of the hinterland some form of acknowledgement for the first time in history, but 
the Creole domination remained significant. By 1945, the colonial administration opened 
various industries in the interior, which increased development as well as sense of entitlement 
                                                          
36 Porter, A., T. (1963) Creoledom: A Study of the Development of Freetown Society. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
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to the natives in the hinterland. By then, formal education has also increased in the interior. 
However, according to Porter,41 the natives of the hinterland, at this stage emerged to 
challenge the superiority of the Creoles for the first time in history, and by 1951, the newly 
drafted constitution of Sierra Leone gave the natives new opportunity to challenge the power 
structures dominated by the Creoles in the past. 
 
As independence approached in 1961, the relationship between the settler community and the 
protectorate, and within the protectorate itself between the Mendes of southeast and Temnes 
in the north, became subject to various political manipulations by politicians. The cleavages 
at this stage now operated at two different levels; the first level been the decline of Creole 
domination towards postcolonial era. The ‘educated’ creoles who initially occupied the socio-
economic and political positions were still important. In addition to the reasons highlighted 
earlier, key nationalists who pioneered and played important roles for independence in Sierra 
Leone also came from the ranks of the Creoles. Therefore, they retained important positions 
in the immediate post-independent cabinet. But since they were small in number, they were 
immediately underscored and marginalised by the sharp decline of their influence in the civil 
service and other professional services including the judiciary. When for instance general 
elections were held on a one-man one-vote basis throughout the country, the Creoles lost 
representation in the legislative assembly. Another fundamental political divide was ethnicity 
and regionalism. While the Mendes from the southeast has always supported the SLPP, the 
Temnes and Limbas from the north are drown to the APC.42 This tribal and regional divide 
and the resultant political setup has continued to affect post-conflict political progress in 
modern Sierra Leone. 
 
Domestic Politics in the Immediate Post-Colonial Era 
 As pointed out earlier, Sierra Leone achieved independence under the leadership of Sir 
Milton Margai of the SLPP, but the country only enjoyed relative ‘political peace’ from 1961 
to 1964. After the sudden death of Sir Milton Margai in 1964, came the beginning of political 
disagreements and rivalry. It started with the political infighting within the ruling SLPP 
which had formed a coalition government with People’s National Party (PNP) to negotiate 
the political future in the immediate post independent era. This has been highlighted by many 
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42 See Kandeh, J., D. (1992) ‘Politicisation of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone,’ African Studies Association, pp. 
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post-colonial scholars such as Alie43 as the beginning of the political cleavages in the 
country, which has continued to dictate the political destiny of Sierra Leone for the decades 
that followed.44 
 
The sudden death of Sir Milton Margai created a power vacuum which needed to be filled 
immediately, and the decision to give the half-brother of Sir Milton Margai, Albert Margai 
the opportunity to succeed his late brother was not accepted by many within the ruling SLPP. 
Thus, the appointment of ‘another Margai’, according to Alie laid the foundation for political 
fragmentation between the north and the southeast.45 John Karefa-Smart,46 a northerner who 
was the next in rank was to be the one to succeed Sir Milton to complete the remaining term, 
but he was deprived of the opportunity. Hence, the northern tribes led by the Temnes rallied 
around Siaka Stevens, a northerner himself, a trade unionist and a charismatic politician, who 
ended up becoming the country’s leader. As discussed earlier, Stevens established a one-party 
dictatorship that ruled the country for seventeen years, killing many of his political opponents 
and imprisoning many more.47 
 
Alie48 has made the point that the institution of a highly centralised, corrupt, inefficient 
administrative system and the seventeen years of one-party dictatorship of Siaka Stevens in 
the 1970s and 1980s, effectively crumbled the fabric of the state, contracted its economic 
space and significantly reduced the government’s ability to generate enough revenue and 
adequate services for its citizens.49 This forced most of the people, especially the youth to 
become disillusioned, and hence most of them migrated to mining towns of Kono and Tongo, 
and became ready recruits for any armed insurgency if they did not succeed in making quick 
money. Those who could not make it to the mining areas resorted to petty trading; some 
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became petty thieves while others became armed robbers - most of whom were to become 
area and regional commanders of the RUF movement during the war era.50 
 
Diamond Politics 
Sierra Leone’s mineral wealth, especially diamonds, has served to distort the country’s 
economy and politics, and also helped to fuel the conflict that lasted for over a decade, and 
hence the widely-acclaimed term ‘Blood or conflict Diamonds’. In other words, Sierra Leone 
has suffered from a virulent form of the ‘resource curse’.51 Diamonds would appear to be a 
robust foundation upon which Sierra Leone could rebuild its post-conflict economy and 
derive state revenues for development as the price for diamonds on the world market appears 
to be relatively stable, unlike most other mineral resources. However, the ease with which 
Sierra Leone’s alluvial diamond is mined, and exported has continually undermined the 
state’s ability to direct diamond revenues through government channels. This has undermined 
the state’s revenue base and foreign reserve, thereby impairing the state’s ability to build 
government’s capacity and deliver public goods and services.52 The scale of the illicit mining 
and smuggling also helped to foster an informal ‘shadow’ economy, which ultimately 
overcame the formal economy. 
 
William Reno gives a vivid scholarly account of the level of corruption in the diamond sector 
in the country. In his book entitled ‘Corruption and the State Politics in Sierra Leone’, Reno’s 
assessment focuses particularly upon the ties between foreign firms and the political elites in 
Sierra Leone, where politicians use private networks that exploit relationships with 
international businesses to enrich themselves, and to extend their powers of patronage,53  and 
in the process, however they undermine the state institutions. Reno goes on to suggests that 
as the post-colonial state is eroded, there is a return to what he describes as the ‘‘enclave 
economies and private armies’’ that characterised the pre-colonial and colonial arrangements 
between colonial administrators and some western businessmen and African political elites.54  
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The exploitation of diamond resources has been an important facet of Sierra Leone’s political 
economy before and after independent, which helped fuel the decade long conflict. In other 
words, struggles over access, control and utilisation of diamond proceeds by various political 
elites have been evident for decades.55 While the general influences of diamond exploitation 
by the elites was positive to some extent, a manifestation of resource blessing, was later 
transformed into a resource curse.56 As I will discuss later in this present chapter, diamond 
wealth in Sierra Leone has always benefited politicians and foreigners the most. Diamond 
resources have therefore had very little tangible benefits for the local people and the nation as 
a whole despite increased export over time.57  
 
According to Sierra Leone’s government records for 2007/2008, a Lebanese diamond 
exporter, Hussein Makie exported the greatest amount of diamonds from Sierra Leone, with 
more than 269.499 carats, worth around US $55 million, and Koidu Holdings exporting 
around 147.376 carats with an estimated value of around US$28 million.58 What is 
remarkable is that Hussein Makie, the main diamond exporter, and Beny Steinmetz, who own 
the largest share of Koidu Holdings, are regarded by many as crooked foreign investors 
engaged in the diamond business in Sierra Leone.59 Whatever the final tax they paid to the 
government from the diamond trade, which has proved impossible to quantify by researchers 
and government alike, at least more than 75 percent of the proceeds did not go to the local 
communities, nor to the central government.60 
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56 In the context of this thesis, resource blessing means the prudent utilisation of diamond resources for socio-
economic development at both local and national levels, while resource curse, on the other hand means negative 
paradoxical relationship between resources derived from diamond and socio-economic performance. 
57Campaign for Just Mining Press Release (2008) Document Available on line at: 
http://www.nmjd.org/press%20releases/CJM%20PRESS%20RELEASE%20MAY%202008.pdf. Document 
Accessed on line on 17/10/2015. 
58 Graynberg, R., and Mbayi, L. (2015) The Global Diamond Industry. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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The table below shows the Sierra Leone’s diamond export revenue flow between 1999 and 
2008. 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Value US $000s 1.24
4.8 
10.06
6.9 
26.022
.5 
41.732
.1 
78.969
.8 
126.652.
6 
141.838,
6 
125.304.
8 
141.56
5.7 
98.772
.2 
Tax Revenue % 
US$ 000 
37.3 302.0 780.7 1.252.
0 
2.279.
1 
126.652.
6 
4.255.0 3.759.1 4.247.
0 
2.963.
2 
Volume/Carats 9.32
0 
77.37
2 
222.52
1 
351,85
9 
506.72
3 
668.636 603.566 603,566 603.62
3 
371.26
1 
US$/Carats 134 130 117 119 150 183 212 208 235 266 
 
Table 1 
Source: Cubitt, P., C. (2012) Local and Global Dynamics of Peace-building: Post-conflict 
Reconstruction in Sierra Leone. New York: Routledge. 
 
This section has advanced some of the factors that have impacted the post-conflict 
achievements in Sierra Leone; among them, the domestic politics in the immediate post-
colonial era, and the ‘‘diamond politics’’ of Sierra Leone. The next section discusses the 
concept of good governance and the politics of macro-economic reform, and how they 
impacted the post-conflict political economy of Sierra Leone following the end of the 
conflict. 
 
1.3.1 Good Governance as a Concept 
The concept of good governance emphasises the continued implementation of sound political 
economic policies to attain macro-economic stability within a given system.61 ‘Good 
governance’ (especially democratic governance) was a key component to the reintegration of 
former combatants in Sierra Leone when the conflict officially ended in 2002. It was also 
important for peace-building effort, because the civil-conflict was as a result of socio-
economic and political breakdown, repression and dysfunctional governance system and the 
marginalisation of the youth population, (most of whom were to become rebels) for nearly 
three decades. Moreover, ‘democratic governance’ was necessary to absorb aid in order to 
                                                          
61 GOVSL (2001) Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Freetown: Government of the Republic of Sierra 
Leone. Document Available on line at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08250.pdf. Document 
Accessed on line on 10/10/2015. 
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promote and satisfy reintegration and development outcomes,62 and the effort of rebuilding 
social capital.  
 
Despite some improvement in terms of good governance, corruption remains a concern in 
Sierra Leone. Corruption is both the cause and the consequence of political turbulence, 
human rights abuses and under development. Corruption remains a challenge to post-war 
development and reconciliation effort. It is estimated that African countries lose as much as 
$148 billion annually to corruption, amounting to approximately a quarter of their individual 
GDPs.63 In Sierra Leone, like in many other African countries, corruption has been 
entrenched in post-war society, often through systems of patronage and nepotism. 
 
The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WWGI) below are designed to indicate 
good governance and how it should operate. It includes among other things, political stability 
and the absence of violence; rule of law; voice and accountability; control of corruption; 
regulatory quality; and government effectiveness (not necessarily in order of importance). 
The figure also compares governance indicators for 1998, 2003 and 2008 in Sierra Leone. 
 
                                                          
62 Mani, R. and Krause, J. (2009) Democratic Governance. In: Chetail, V. (Ed.) Post-Conflict Peace-Building: a 
lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
63 Hilal, A., W. (2014) Constraints and Impediments of Good Governance in Africa: Future Prospect. Afro Asian 
Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 2229 - 5313. 
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 Figure 1, WWGI: 2008, 2003 and 1998. 
 
 
The figure above indicates that within a period of ten years, Sierra Leone showed 
considerable improvement against two governance indicators. On the one hand, political 
stability in the country improved dramatically, partly because the violent conflict that has 
been going on since 1991 officially ended in 2002, followed by four free, fair, credible and 
peaceful local and national elections in 2002, 2004, 2007 and 2012. In addition, there has also 
not been any military coup in the country since 1997. The figure also shows that there was a 
significant improvement in 'voice and accountability’ due, in part to the return of multi-party 
democracy after nearly three decades of one party dictatorship and intermittent military rule. 
Sierra Leone illustrates that, where the government and its people are ready to undertake 
reform programmes, significant improvements in governance can and do occur in a short 
period of time.  
 
Figure two below also shows that between 1998 and 2009, various countries in different 
regions around the world, including Sierra Leone showed some improvements in governance, 
some of them starting from very low levels. In addition, there was also some form of transfer 
of political power from the central government to local governments in the form of 
decentralisation. Perhaps most importantly, a peaceful transfer of power from the ruling 
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SLPP to the main opposition APC following the 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary 
elections, the first in the history of Sierra Leone suggest major improvement in governance 
indicator in the country. In addition, there was some improvement in rule of law in 
comparison to the immediate post-conflict period. There was also a firm establishment and 
growing civil society institutions, as well as improved freedom of both broadcast and print 
media in Sierra Leone. One of the main areas of concerns however was corruption, in which 
there was a significant deterioration over the period under consideration.  
 
Due to continued violence across the developing world, the IMF and the World Bank have 
defined what constitutes ‘good governance’, and further created a system of measures to 
monitor it.  
 
The figure below shows selected countries with changes in the voice and accountability 
between 1998 and 2009 including Sierra Leone. 
 
Selected countries showing changes in Voice and Accountability, 1998-2009 
 
 
 
Figure 2 showing improvements in governance in Sierra Leone, 1998 - 2009 
Source: Kaufmann, D. (2010) Governance Matters: Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Highlight Governance Successes, Reversals, and Failures. 
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But why was the WWGI developed or created by the International Financial Institutions in 
the first place? To start with, the International Financial Institutions made it clear that there 
was the need for ‘good governance’ in managing the state’s economy and for post-conflict 
economic recovery and stability, which directly have significant impact on the reintegration 
of former combatants following their demobilisation. Thus, the IMF and the World Bank 
made these conditionalities part of their policy when providing financial support, advice and 
other technical assistance for countries emerging from conflict. Although IFIs limited these 
conditions to economic aspect of governance, they argued that these conditions could lead to 
significant macro-economic impact in terms of performance indicators.64 In fact, transparency 
and accountability became prerequisites for monitoring macro-economic reforms in post-
conflict societies. Hence, the reintegration of former combatants back into society, general 
peace-building effort, anti-corruption, poverty alleviation and ‘good governance’ were 
equated to ‘rediscovering' democracy and rebuilding social capital65 that had disappeared in 
the country for over three decades and particularly during the conflict. 
 
The figure below summarises programme resources to various sectors of society by 
percentage in Sierra Leone between 2002 and 2007. It further shows the political nature of 
aid to Sierra Leone by DFID, in which 41 percent ($69 million) of the total DFID budget 
spent in Sierra Leone was directed to governance reforms. 
 
Summary of programme resources to various sectors by percentage from 2002 - 2007 
 
                                                          
64 According to IMF report, the ‘IMF’s approach to promoting good governance and combating a guide’ (2005), 
there has been significant improvement in managing state resources in Sierra Leone following the end of the 
war. The report also indicates that there is an improvement in transparency and accountability, as well as stable 
economic regulation in the country, and that Sierra Leone was conducive to efficient private sector initiative. 
Further details on this are available on line at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/gov/guide/eng/index.htm. 
65 Abdellatif, A., M. (2003) Good Governance and its Relationship to Democracy and Economic Development. 
UNDP. Document Available on line at: 
ftp://pogar.org/LocalUser/pogar/publications/governance/aa/goodgov.pdf. Document Accessed on line on: 
12/04/16. 
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Figure 3: Sources of programme funding by sectors and by percentage in Sierra Leone 
between 2002 and 2007 
 
 Source: Poate, et al (2008) Evaluation of DfID country programme: Sierra Leone, OECD 
 
 
1.3.2 The Politics of Macro-Economic Reform 
‘For Sierra Leone to achieve long-term debt sustainability, it is of the utmost 
importance that the country achieves high and sustained growth through the 
maintenance of macro-economic stability, continued pursuit of structural reforms, 
... prudent debt management policies and avoiding a new build-up in debt’.66 
 
As in other post-conflict environments around the world, one of the issues that needed to be 
addressed following the end of the conflict in Sierra Leone in 2002 was the reform of the 
national economy to improve the management of the national economy through good 
governance and good leadership,67 with the goal of creating employment facilities and 
extracting profits from national wealth for equitable distribution to the local populace. 
 
For this reason, a loan of around US$51 million was drafted for Sierra Leone through IMF’s 
post-conflict reconstruction programme, which was aimed at the rehabilitation and 
resettlement of former combatants, the rehabilitation of state infrastructure, the effective 
                                                          
66 IMF/IDA (2002) Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative Decision Point Document. 
Washington: International Monetary Fund and International Development Association. 
67 Berewa, S., E. (2011) A New Perspective on Governance, Leadership, Conflict and Nation Building in Sierra 
Leone. Bloomington: AuthorHouse. 
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economic management and institutional capacity building.68 In addition, the World Bank also 
loaned Sierra Leone around US$250 million between 2000 and 2004 to deal exclusively with 
the rising post-conflict health issues, such as teenage pregnancy and HIV/AIDs.69 Moreover, 
the Bank’s loan was to target the rehabilitation of education sector, social action and 
institutional reform as well as to improve privatisation in the country. However, the 
conditionalities that came along with these loans were the reduction of government’s role in 
the economy, to encourage the participation of the private sector in the economy and to 
increase the role of the private sector in the management of public enterprises.70 These 
conditionalities were seen as the most prudent ways of delivering macro-economic reform for 
poverty reduction, economic stability and growth.71  
 
Following a series of promises made by the National Revenue Services (NRS) together with 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) to the donor community, which of course 
were successful to some extent in terms of bringing about some positive changes in Sierra 
Leone’s eligibility for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) status,72 there was some 
progress in attracting funds from the donor community for the reconstruction and 
reintegration processes. The IMF and the World Bank first launched the HIPC initiative in 
1996, following an exclusive campaign and lobbying from various international institutions 
and INGOs. The initiative provides debt relief and low-interest loans to write off or to reduce 
external debt repayments to sustainable levels. This implies that HIPCs can repay debt in a 
timely fashion in the future.73 To be eligible for the initiative, countries are expected to face 
an unsustainable debt burden that cannot be managed with traditional means of loan 
repayment. Eligibility is thus conditional on the national government of countries meeting a 
                                                          
68 Riddell, B. (2005) Sierra Leone: Urban-Elite Bias, Atrocity and Debt. Review of African Political Economy, 
pp. 120 - 122. 
69 Cheru, F. (2007) The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative: Old Wine in a New Bottle? In: 
McGrew, A. and Poku, N., K. (Eds.) Globalisation, development and human security. Cambridge and Malden: 
Polity Press. 
70 IDA and World Bank (2005) Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Sierra Leone for the period FY 
2006 - 2009. World Bank. 
71 DFID (2004) Poverty Reduction Framework Arrangement between the GovUK and GovSL. London: 
Department for International Development. 
72 IMF/IDA (2002) Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative decision point document. 
Washington: International Monetary Fund and International Development Association. 
73 Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiatives: IMF Factsheet. Document 
Available on line at: Factsheet: Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. 
Document Accessed on line on 28/01/2016. 
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range of economic management, socio-economic reform programmes as well as performance 
targets.74  
 
At the termination of the conflict, there was great expectation of economic growth, following 
the reopening of the diamond fields in Kono, Tongo and other areas around the country; the 
reopening of rutile mines in Moyamba and Bonthe districts; the expansion of fishing 
industry; the recovery of agricultural activities in rural areas and the improvement of the 
service industry through construction programmes.75 All of these together improved both 
private and public investments in the country. In addition, the government promised to 
commit itself to open, transparent economic and governance processes, good fiscal policy 
management, increased incentives for investment in the private sector and the creation of a 
social security system.76 
 
Other assurances that were made by the Government of Sierra Leone to the donor community 
included the introduction of new trade policy, which was expected to reduce protectionism by 
the state and to facilitate greater privatisation to take place. These promises made by the 
government secured from the IMF and World Bank an estimated fund of around US$ 21 
million between 1999 and 2001 as an emergency fund, with the approval of further US$169 
million between 2002 and 2004. A further US$ 46.3 million over a three-year period (2006 to 
2008) was also released to the government,77 all of which were to be implemented under the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) initiative. The PRGF initiative released 
further funds totalling around US$18.8 million in 2009/10. The three most important 
measures of macro-economic programme for stability include: 1.9 months import cover in 
reserves; reduce inflation to below five percent per year, and to achieve sustained economic 
growth of between 6 - 7 percent per year. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
74 In November 2006, Sierra Leone reached HIPC completion point, and thus qualified for debt relief under the 
Tejan Kabbah-led SLPP government. 
75 GOVSL (2001) Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Freetown: Government of the Republic of Sierra 
Leone, pp.19 - 20. 
76  Ibid, pp.19 - 20. 
77 IMF/IDA (2008) Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative Decision Point Document. 
Washington: International Monetary Fund and International Development Association. 
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1.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has examined the economic dimensions of the Sierra Leone’s post-conflict 
recovery in relation to the reintegration of former combatants. It has argued that the 
fundamental factors of the conflict and its poor socio-economic recovery are historical, 
including post-colonial and what many call diamond politics. Attention is drowned to the role 
played by personalised rule of the APC leadership, as well as structural factors such as 
deteriorating terms of diamond trade and the irrationality of post-colonial development 
strategy. Attention is also drowned to the structural adjustment programmes, which were 
implemented by the World Bank and the IMF that resulted in creating a group of socially 
excluded young men and women, who could not find employment opportunities either within 
the state or private sector. 
 
In the light of Sierra Leone’s unfortunate past, the prospect of the country’s present and its 
future political economy, driven by mineral resources raises understandable apprehensions 
over the capacity of government and the elites to obtain the best deals for the country, and to 
utilize revenues in an accountable and transparent way. But it also generates significant 
optimism that there is a real opportunity to propel Sierra Leone forward in terms of 
development and poverty reduction. Clearly, there is a need at this stage for a detailed 
institutional and political analysis of the extractives sector to support Sierra Leone’s 
government and its citizens. There is also the need to show the country’s international 
development partners that revenues are successfully managed and channelled into 
development and poverty reduction agendas. But how successful will this be depends on the 
ability of the country’s current leadership. 
 
The next chapter analyses the role of the Sierra Leone Special Court and the TRC, which 
were set up following the end of the conflict. It discusses the concept of retributive and 
restorative justice system in relation to post-conflict reintegration in the context of Sierra 
Leone. It then considers the importance of adopting each of these approaches in the justice 
environment in a post-war environment like Sierra Leone. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Restorative Justice and Identity Transformation: A Critical Evaluation 
 
Introduction 
The civil-conflict in Sierra Leone began in March 1991, when members of the RUF crossed 
the boundary into Kailahun and Pujehun Districts in South-eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia. 
The conflict in Sierra Leone was the direct result of varied interactions between structural 
problems1 in society, such as inequality, bad governance, repression and exploitation, which 
led to grievances2 among citizens and, accordingly, led to the emergence of the rebel forces. 
Although diamonds seemingly played an important role in financing the civil-conflict once it 
started, diamonds more likely contributed to corrupting state institutions in the pre-war 
period,3 thereby increasing grievance, rather than directly triggering the conflict itself. The 
problems of marginalised youth following the collapse of patrimonial society were also 
serious issues: without proper education and increased unemployment among the youth 
population in the country, many young people were left vulnerable to be easily recruited into 
the various armed movements.4  
 
The eleven-years of civil-conflict in Sierra Leone formally ended in 2002, following the 
involvement of the international community, and the British military in particular to suppress 
the advances of the rebel forces. However, the conflict has not completely ended yet, because 
some features of brutality and viciousness in the conflict are still fresh in the minds of most 
citizens. The forced recruitment of child soldiers by the rebel forces5 and the atrocious they 
inflected upon the civilian population are the most frequently featured aspects of the conflict. 
                                                          
1 See for instance Galtung, J. (1996) Peace by Peaceful means: Peace and Conflict Development and 
Civilization. London: Sage Publications. 
2 Collier, P.  and Hoeffier, A. (2000) Greed and Grievance in Civil War. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 2355.Centre for the Study of African Economies. University of Oxford. Document Available on line 
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=630727. Document Accessed on line on 01/01/16. 
3 Gberie, L. (2005) A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
4 Peters, K. (2011) War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
5 Children and young adults faced some of the gravest abuses in Sierra Leone’s civil-war. The RUF in particular 
targeted children for recruitment as child soldiers, forced labour, and sexual exploitation. See for instance 
Denov, M. (2010) Child Soldiers: Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front. Montreal: McGill University 
Press. 
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Indeed, many young Sierra Leoneans were conscripted into the conflict by the rebels as well 
as the government forces.6 
 
Despite the gravity of crimes committed during the eleven-years of sustained violence, there 
has hardly been a critical analysis of transitional justice mechanisms, which were set up to 
investigate and address crimes that were committed by various factions as well as individuals. 
This chapter analyses the internationally sponsored Special Court7 and the TRC that were set 
up following the end of the conflict. The chapter discusses the concept of retributive and 
restorative justice system in relation to post-conflict reintegration in Sierra Leone. It 
considers the importance of adopting each of these approaches in the justice environment 
following the end of the conflict. Given the high levels of crime committed during the 
conflict by all factions, including the RUF, and particularly of crime against humanity, it is 
likely that restorative justice will be seen by some as been ‘soft on criminals’ and criminal 
organisations. In an effort to illustrate the benefits of alternative approaches to wrong doing, 
the chapter sets out the arguments for and against retributive and restorative justice system. 
 
2.1 Restorative justice and the TRC 
Following the end of the conflict in Sierra Leone, two transitional justice mechanisms were 
set up to investigate and address crimes that were committed by various factions, as well as 
individuals: The internationally sponsored Special Court and TRC. The Special Court was 
charged with the responsibility to adjudicate the cases of those accused of bearing greatest 
responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity. It was the core institutional means 
of addressing impunity. The TRC, on the other hand was mandated to create ‘an impartial, 
historical record of the conflict’, ‘address impunity; respond to the needs of victims; promote 
healing and reconciliation; and prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.’8 
                                                          
6 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 2004, Witness to Truth: Report to Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 3B. Document Available on line at: http://www.sierra-
leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume3B.pdf . Document Accessed on line on: 12/05/15. 
7 The Sierra Leone’s Special Court was set up in 2002 at the request of Sierra Leone’s Government to the UN to 
address serious crimes against civilians and UN peacekeepers committed during the civil-war. Negotiations 
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the UN on the mandate and structure of the court, produced the 
world's first "hybrid" international criminal tribunal, mandated to try those "bearing the greatest responsibility" 
for crimes committed in Sierra Leone after 30 November 1996, the date of the failed Abidjan Peace Accord. It 
was the first modern international tribunal to sit in the country where the crimes took place, and the first to have 
an effective outreach programme on the ground. 
8 See for instance Evenson, E. (2004) Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination between Commission and 
Court. Columbian Law Review Association, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 730 -767. 
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Unlike its South African predecessor,9 the Sierra Leone TRC had little authority to grant 
amnesty. In addition, it was smaller, with fewer staff and commissioners.  
 
Within the present DDR environment, the traditional Western justice system of accountability 
for crimes committed promotes an adversarial, prosecutorial, retributive model of formal 
legal justice.10 Retributive model is a system of justice which holds that the best response to a 
crime is a ‘proportionate’ punishment, inflected for its own sake rather than to serve an 
extrinsic social purpose, such as rehabilitation or deterrence of the offender. Those who 
believe in retributive model hold that when an offender breaks the law, justice requires that 
the offender suffers in return. Since the 1990s, the international community has pursued 
prosecutions of war crimes through ad hoc international criminal tribunals, such as the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).11  
 
The literature contains various ideas about what restorative justice system actually is. It has 
been argued, for example that restorative justice is a kind of talking therapy,12 and that it is a 
way of thinking and behaving in society.13 Although there is no universally agreed definition 
of restorative justice, at least two ideas about its nature have been common since the end of 
the Cold War. One of the key ideas about restorative justice is that it is both a theory and a 
process. The following analyses are some of the places where restorative justice occur as a 
theory and as a process.  
 
It is a theory of justice that emphasizes repairing the harm caused by criminal behaviour. 
Restoration means reinstating a right or making reparation or bringing back a practice, or a 
situation, which is best accomplished through cooperative processes that include all 
stakeholders’.14 Restorative justice is proactive rather than reactive.15 It deconstruct the idea 
                                                          
9 Priscilla, H. (2002) Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions, pp. 40 - 45. 
10 Findlay, M. and Henham, R. (2005) Transforming International Criminal Justice: Retributive and Restorative 
Justice in the Trial Process. Uffculme: Willan Publishing. 
11 See for example Schiff, B., N. (2008) Building the International Criminal Court.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
12 Zedner, L. (2006) ‘Punishment and the Plurality of Privacy Interests’, in: Claes, E., Duff, A. and Gutwirth, S. 
(eds.). Privacy and the Criminal Law. Antwerpen: Intersentia, p. 171. 
13 Allena, T. (2004) ‘Restorative Conferences: Developing Students Responsibility by Repairing the Harm to 
Victims and Restoring the University Community’, in: Karp, D., R. and Allena, T. (eds.). Restorative Justice on 
the College Campus: Promoting Student Growth and Responsibility and Reawakening the Spirit of Campus 
Community. Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, p.57. 
14 Burkhead, M., D. (2009) A Life for a Life: The American Debate Over the Death Penalty. North Carolina: 
McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, p. 116. 
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of retribution by recognising the need for community healing; in such a way, as to evaluate 
the hurts in terms of the values of the socio-economic justice perspectives that community 
must adopt in order to obtain the best possibility of preventing future crime’.16 It is a theory 
that believes that instead of society punishing criminals by putting them in prison for 
example, they [the criminals] should be given the chance to correct the wrong they have 
done. Once those who caused havoc have done this, they can be brought back into society. 
The victim plays important part in the process and may receive some type of restitution from 
the offender’.17 It emphasises repairing the harm caused, which is best accomplished through 
inclusive and cooperative processes’.18 
 
Understood as a process, on the other hand, restorative justice involves bringing together all 
the stakeholders (offenders, victims and community members) in pursuit of a justice that 
heals the hurt of wrongdoing, instead of responding to the hurt of the crime by using 
punishment to hurt the offender’.19 It is regarded as a ‘process to involve, to the extent 
possible, those who have a stake in a specific offense and to collectively identify and address 
harms, needs, and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right as possible’.20 The most 
general meaning of restorative justice is that it is ‘a process where stakeholders affected by an 
injustice have an opportunity to communicate about the consequences of the injustice and 
what is to be done to right the wrong’.21 It involves a process whereby all the parties with a 
stake in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the 
aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future’.22 This brings in the argument of 
the Sierra Leone TRC. As I will discuss later in the thesis, it usually takes the form of victim-
offender mediation either through direct contact between the victim and the offender or 
indirect communication involving third parties. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
15 Stamatakis, N., and Beken, T., V. (2010) ‘Myths and Reality in the History of Restorative Justice’, in: Cools, 
M. et al. (eds.). Safety, Societal Problems and Citizen’s Perceptions. Antwerpen: Maklu, p. 289. 
16 Ibid, p. 289. 
17 Pressler, S., Saner, J., S. and Wasserfall, I. (2009) Criminal Justice Structure and Mandates. FET College 
Series, L3. Cape Town: Pearson Education South Africa. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 
No. 34 of 1995. S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 (3) SA 
391; [1996] 2 CHRLD 164; 1995 (2) SACR 1 (6 June 1995). 
18 Van Ness, D., W. (2005) ‘An Overview of Restorative Justice Around the World’. Address Delivered at the 
Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Bangkok, p.3. 
19 Dorpat, T., L. (2007) Crimes of Punishment: America’s Culture of Violence. New York: Algora Publishing, 
pp. 236 - 7. 
20 Zehr, H. (2002) The Little Book of Restorative Justice. Intercourse: Good Books. 
21 Braithwaite, J. and Strang, H. (2002) ‘Restorative Justice and Family Violence’, in: Strang, H. and 
Braithwaite, J. (eds). Restorative Justice and Family Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.4. 
22 Marshall, T., F. (1999) Restorative Justice: An Overview. London: Home Office Research Development and 
Statistics Directorate, p. 5. 
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Currently, scholars who argue in favour of restorative justice promote the customary 
mechanisms, the TRC,23 which focuses on rebuilding and restoring relationships at 
community level24 following the end of a civil-conflict. More recently, the international 
institutions, such as the human right groups, the ICC and the United Nations have recognised 
that Western legal trials and a truth commission, perhaps incorporating traditional, 
indigenous rituals, may be seen as complementary strategy to support both retributive and 
restorative justice in societies emerging from violent civil-conflicts like Sierra Leone. 
However, as Lutz argues, this mixed solution may not be adequate because it fails to break 
out of the dominant Western worldview of justice, and thus question the ‘standardisation of 
transitional justice goals and methods’ driven by external interventions and actors.25  
 
Other scholars, like Braithwaite who support restorative justice model, suggest that there is 
the need to build on the traditional local model of communitarian justice practised by local 
peoples, especially in the African context such as in Rwanda.26 However, some DDR scholars 
such as Dinnen have argued that the distinction between retributive and restorative justice 
practice by local peoples and traditional justice mechanisms is oversimplified and serves to 
mask rather than illuminate the multiple, complex human needs, expectations and 
experiences in relation to post-conflict reintegration through justice delivery in the context of 
reconciliation.27 And as Dinnen further comments, not only do the traditions of different 
societies vary in the relative weight placed on restorative and retributive components of 
justice system, in many ways these distinctions may in fact be conceived in very different 
terms.28 Conventional informal justice mechanisms and local reconciliation rituals can thus 
be seen as examples of approaches that treat restorative and retributive justice as 
interdependent rather than mutually exclusive processes. And as Molenaar found out, the 
traditional gacaca29 community justice in Rwanda for example required offenders to 
                                                          
23 Different versions of TRC in different post-conflict societies following the end of conflict are discussed 
elsewhere in this thesis. 
24 Tutu, D. (1999) No Future without Forgiveness. London: Rider. 
25 Lutz, E. (2006) ‘Transitional Justice: Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead’ In Roht-Arriaza, N. and 
Mariezcurrena, J. (Eds.) Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 333. 
26 Braithwaite, J. (2003) ‘Restorative Justice and a Better Future’ In McLaughlin, E. et al (Eds) Restorative 
Justice: Critical Issues.  London: Sage Publications. 
27 Dinnen, S. (2003) A Kind of Mending: Restorative Justice in the Pacific Islands, Canberra: ANU/Pandanus 
Press. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Gacaca, loosely known as ‘justice amongst the grassroots’ was a community justice system inspired by 
Rwandan tradition following the end of the 1993/4 Genocide. It particularly focused on community rebuilding 
while placing justice in the hands of trusted Rwandan citizens. This traditional, communal justice was adapted 
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‘appreciate the seriousness of the damage their action had caused’ and the agreed outcome 
was interpreted as a form of punishment albeit not one so severe that it would interfere with 
the primary goal of reconciliation.30 As such, the Rwanda gacaca community justice system 
could be seen as an example of both retributive and restorative justice at the same time. As 
Quinn remarks, ‘while the more formalized Western model often allows for only one form of 
justice system - retributive or restorative - traditional institutions like the gacaca or the Sierra 
Leone’s TRC seek to combine different forms of these and other elements in keeping with the 
values of the community’.31  
 
Thus, scholars who support restorative justice system believe that traditional customary 
justice practices might be more appropriate as a justice model for crimes against humanity. 
On the other hand, imposing primarily retributive legal justice mechanisms may also be seen 
as inadequate, because, for example the Sierra Leone’s Special Court failed to take into 
account local community needs for reconciliation. There is the need therefore to look at 
creative and locally relevant ways to incorporate principles of both restorative and retributive 
justice in accountability mechanisms, as well as structures and relationships to support future 
respect for human rights and the rule of law following the end of a violent conflict, such as 
Sierra Leone’s conflict. Rather than following the pluralist approach of separate institutions, I 
argue that a more meaningful approach might be to take a lead from indigenous traditional 
customary practices in order to design a more workable transitional justice mechanism that 
combines Western retributive and traditional restorative elements of justice system. 
 
My argument in this section, and those of other scholars who investigate traditional justice in 
different cultural contexts in a post-conflict setting, is that a hybrid approach in societies 
emerging from violent conflict like Sierra Leone is possible and indeed relevant. This 
syncretic approach to justice following the end of violent conflicts is incorporated in the 
model of transformative justice, placing transitional justice in the context of conflict 
transformation, reconciliation and general peace-building effort. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in 2001 to fit the needs of Rwandan people in the wake of the Genocide. The courts were credited with building 
the foundation for peace, reconciliation and unity in Rwanda. The Gacaca courts officially finished their work in 
June 2012. See for instance Molenaar, A. (2005) Gacaca: Grassroots Justice After Genocide: The Key to 
Reconciliation in Rwanda? African Studies Centre Research Report No. 77, Leiden: African Studies Centre, pp. 
14 - 15. 
30 Ibid, pp. 14 - 15. 
31 Quinn, J., R. (2005) ‘The Role of Informal Mechanisms in Transitional Justice’, paper presented at Canadian 
Political Science Association Annual Meeting, June 2005. Document Available on line at: <http://cpas-
acsp.ca/papers-2005/Quinn.pdf> Document Accessed on line on 12/12/2015. 
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In the next section, I discuss some of the factors responsible for sustainable reintegration in 
the aftermath of violent conflict. I argue that all reintegration programmes are different by 
nature and should therefore be implemented differently according to the needs of the local 
people as well as those of former combatants.  
 
2.1.1 Reparative Justice, Reconciliation and Reintegration 
Achieving justice is by far one of the most contentious issues within the reintegration context. 
This is because justice is both a conceptual problem (of who is morally entitled to be helped), 
and a practical one (for example, the payment of reparations ordered by TRC for low level 
offenders). These issues are strongly felt by beneficiaries of reintegration programmes and 
implementing organisations alike, as it is one of the main obstacles to the successful 
cohabitation of former prisoners and the civilian population who suffered in the hands of the 
rebels.  
 
A number of problems have emerged in Sierra Leone with regards to justice. The TRC has 
been concluded since 2010, and there are fears that some cases were not properly addressed 
through more formal justice processes, that the totality of the crimes committed during the 
conflict have not yet been fully judged, and that some cases will remain unsolved. In 
addition, the implementation of the decisions given by TRC has been problematic in itself. 
For instance, cases such as property destruction and theft have to be paid by the perpetrators. 
In many cases, the perpetrators are either unable to pay or refuse to pay. In effect, poverty is 
an obstacle to the payment of reparations, and as a consequence, an obstacle to justice and 
reconciliation. 
 
There is a direct connection between justice, reconciliation and reintegration.32 Nevertheless, 
this connection is linked to different narratives, depending on who you speak to. For some, 
justice, and the payment of reparations, is a prerequisite to reintegration. Without the 
acknowledgement of guilt by the perpetrators, the payment of reparations and the forgiveness 
of victims, there cannot be social cohesion in the new Sierra Leonean society. While 
reconciliation can be understood as a process, the reparative justice element of reconciliation 
                                                          
32 When asked about the benefits of the reintegration programmes, some former combatants, and indeed 
community members often explained how they had helped in bringing about reintegration and reconciliation, 
especially at local level. It was very clear to them how the dialogue elements in particular had helped create 
physical and psychological safe spaces for them to discuss reconciliation and justice questions. 
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(the payment of TRC reparations) is a trigger for this process. Without this payment, the 
process is flawed. Therefore, the TRC process and the implementation of the decisions taken 
by the Court are a first step towards reconciliation, without which reintegration is impossible. 
 
Other respondents also reported that people affected by the conflict can only start the process 
of reconciliation once their basic needs are met. They should feel secure, and have access to 
ways of fulfilling their demands in terms of livelihood, shelter or health before they can 
participate in dialogue about the conflict, recognise wrongs and attempt to put them right. A 
certain level of financial stability would ease the process of justice and the payment of 
reparations. If perpetrators had the financial means to pay back their dues, and felt physically 
secure in their communities, they would be more able and willing to fulfil the obligations set 
by TRC. Therefore, justice and reconciliation are seen more as a process than a fixed point in 
time or as a step which needs to be completed before reintegration can begin. Justice, 
reconciliation and reintegration are linked, and programmes should seek to implement them 
together, rather than sequentially. 
 
Both of these theories of change are valid, and it is difficult to validate one and not the other. 
However, what remains is a practical, problematic situation with regards to justice and 
reintegration. 
 
For many reintegration programmes, the issue of reparations remains problematic, 
particularly for former combatants. Different approaches have been tried to solve the 
problem, such as mediation between prisoners and survivors to lower the amount of 
compensation to a reasonable level. 
 
In general, more research needs to be carried out into the issue of reparative justice and its 
links to the wider situation in Sierra Leone. There remain different concepts/ terms /practices 
which need to be investigated and clarified. It was not very clear at community level during 
this research what was understood by ‘pardon’. Testimonies seemed to link it strongly with 
the payment of reparations, rather than the moral pardon for the crime committed. Indeed, 
victims’ accounts of what they meant by ‘pardon’ were often related to the payment of 
reparations, suggesting you could grant your ‘pardon’ for a lower amount than the one 
decided by the TRC. It would, therefore, appear to be important for people to link moral 
forgiveness to some degree of material compensation. 
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2.2 What Determines Successful Reintegration? 
The question of whether post-conflict reintegration is successful does not require a 
generalised or unique answer, because all post-conflict reintegration programmes differ by 
nature, depending on local needs, and the needs of the former combatants.33 
 
While a number of post-conflict scholars have made positive analysis of DDR projects 
around the world,34 others have scrutinised DDR programmes through the evaluation of 
specific projects.35 A study undertaken by Humphreys and Weinstein in 2007 for instance 
revealed that there is still no single explanation or answer to suggest which particular 
reintegration strategy or programme is the most convincing or best suited.36 Most DDR 
programmes, and indeed much of the DDR literature concentrates more on programme 
design and programme implementation, providing information that is technocratic, and 
simply quantifying number of weapons collected, and the number of combatants who took 
part in a particular conflict.37 One of the reasons for this quantification lies with the problems 
associated with the evaluation of such projects. Hence, Humphreys and Weinstein conclude 
that far from being able to determine that DDR programmes are sustainable, there are not 
enough cases or confounding variables to identify what contributes to sustainable DDR 
programmes in the aftermath of violent conflicts, like the case of Sierra Leone.38 
 
Despite the difficulties involved in measuring the success or failure of DDR projects, there is 
at least one factor that has been highlighted for sustainable post-conflict reintegration. This is 
the ability and the willingness of former combatants to be able to find or get into payable 
employment following their demobilisation.39 Apart from gaining payable employment, 
Humphries and Weinstein discovered during their study in Sierra Leone that there were three 
other criteria that helped with the reintegration of former combatants back into civilian 
                                                          
33 Humphreys, M., and Weinstein, J. (2007) Demobilisation and Reintegration. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 531 - 567. 
34 Doyle, M., and Sambanis, N. (2000) International Peace-Building: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 779 - 80. 
35 Theidon, K. (2009) Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of 
Former Combatants in Colombia. Human Rights Quarterly, pp. 2 - 3. 
36 Humphreys, M., and Weinstein, J. (2007) Demobilization and Reintegration. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 531 - 567. 
37 Theidon, K. (2009) Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration of 
Former Combatants in Colombia. Human Rights Quarterly, p3. 
38 Ibid, p. 553. 
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society at the termination of conflict. Among them the readiness, willingness and the ability 
of the receiving community to accept them also remain important.   
 
Traditionally, ‘successful’ reintegration has been defined by programme practitioners’ ability 
to effectively disarm and demobilise former combatants from conflict and subsequently 
reintegrate them into civilian society. This basic definition enables practitioners to justify 
their ‘success’ of programmes to the national government, the civilian population, the 
regional institutions, the donor community and other funding organisations. However, relying 
on numeric or minimal definition of ‘success’ such as counting the number of former 
combatants processed through DDR projects as well as weapons collected during these 
exercises deflects practitioners from strengthening national policies of reconciliation and 
socio-economic development. Utilizing limited definitions of success in defining post-
conflict reintegration has given what Karazsia describes as ‘cannon fodder’40 to opponents in 
attacking the ineffectiveness of such policies.  
 
DDR programmes are comprehensive and involve complex operations, usually undertaken in 
some of the most difficult socio-economic and political environments. Determining the 
success or failure of a programme is also complex. The ability of governments, the donor 
community and practitioners to effectively and efficiently achieve the desired goals and 
objectives of reintegration requires a long commitment on the part of the local community, 
the government as well as the former combatants themselves. 
 
Conflict outcomes or context is an essential determinant for a sustainable DDR process, as 
indeed is the reintegration of former combatants. Civil conflicts that conclude with a victory 
over an opponent often undergo DDR process for a short period of time, mainly for two 
particular reasons. Firstly, the victor engages in DDR process to show to the donor 
community and the rest of the international community as well as the local population that it 
is not only willing but also capable to include the remaining or defeated military factions 
under a unified command structure. Secondly, the victor uses DDR process to dismantle 
internal political competition that threatens the ruling elites’ authority and removes existing 
threats to their domestic supremacy. Following the implementation of the Lome Peace 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
39 Garibay, D. (2006) A Peace Built on Forgetting Demobilised Combatants in Post-War El Salvador. 
International Social Science Journal, p. 467. 
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Accord in Sierra Leone,41 in a conflict in which there was no decisive military victory on 
either side of the conflict, a 1+1=3 formula42 was adopted in transforming the country’s 
national army. Neither of the existing force structures, personnel or cultures dominated the 
new national army, at least in theory. For any DDR project to be successful or to contribute to 
a positive national outcome of reconciliation and economic development, it is important that 
practitioners must move beyond the basic accounting of guns and bullets (the disarmament 
phase) and enhance the reintegration training and short and medium term transitionary 
support for participants.43 
 
It follows that if we want to operationalise reintegration programmes ''successfully'', we may 
perhaps need to examine three particular domains beyond the programme specifics of 
counting arms and ammunitions. It must be remembered that DDR programmes (of which the 
reintegration of former combatants are part of) has been mistakenly or wrongly blamed for 
the failures of peace agreements and security sector reforms in many occasions, at least in the 
past. Therefore, before undertaking reintegration programmes and seeking to achieve 
sustainable peace, DDR practitioners and the donor community should examine various 
domains to confirm programme's viability of achieving “success”.  
 
First, practitioners and the donor community must all be aware that trust between formerly 
warring factions and the civilian population must be maintained at all cost. The social trust 
deficit of a post-conflict environment is one indicator of social commitment to reintegration 
processes and alternative national umbrella programmes aimed at resolving socio-economic 
and political violence. Given the fact that arms and ammunitions are easily trafficked into 
many poor societies around the developing world, the supply of weapons to armed actors 
remains difficult to eradicate even long after a peace agreement has been reached. It is 
therefore imperative for practitioners to fully engage with the demand side of the equation 
and foster socio-economic cooperation for the provision of livelihood for former combatants, 
and indeed other groups of people in the receiving community to take hold. If the trust deficit 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
40 See for instance the work of Karazsia, Z. (2015) Evaluating the ‘Success’ of DDR Programmes: The Case of 
Congo - Brazzaville. Journal of Interdisciplinary Conflict Science, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 1 - 34. 
41 See for example the Lome Peace Accord, Document Available on line at: www.parliament.gov.sl/.../0/.../1-
The%20Lome%20Peace%20Agreement%201999. pd. Document Accessed on line on: 27/12/16. 
42 The 1+1=3 formula means that at the end of the conflict, two separate armed groups - the non-state armed 
actors or the rebel factions on the one hand and the national army on the other were integrated together to form a 
fusion of a new third national army – the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). 
43 Zena, P., N. (2013) ‘The Lessons and Limits of DDR in Africa,’ Africa Security Brief: A Publication of the 
Africa Centre for Strategic Studies. No. 24, pp. 1 - 8. 
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remains high, it is likely that social support for the reintegration project will be difficult or 
impossible to achieve.  
 
Second, and perhaps most importantly, strong leadership, personality and power dynamics 
determine the extent to which reintegration programmes are conceived from the peace 
agreement; they determine how post-conflict reintegration programmes are designed and 
implemented; and who undergoes or takes part in what programmes. Donors, programme 
facilitators and practitioners should therefore be aware of local or community power 
dynamics and elites’ intentions before the commencement of any reintegration programmes. 
Ignoring the intentions and motivations of community members/leaders and local politicians 
who agree to former combatants being brought into their communities may result in a 
difficult situation as we saw in Angola with the asymmetrical reintegration of MPLA and 
UNITA forces. This directly contributed to shifts in the militaristic capabilities of the 
opposing forces, which militated against the peace agreement as well as the reintegration 
project in Angola.44 
 
In their analysis of sustainable reintegration of former combatants, Humphreys and Weinstein 
argue that outsiders (referring to the donor community in particular) and the international 
community have always defined sustainable reintegration. By outsiders, Humphreys and 
Weinstein also mean Western researchers, the IMF, the World Bank and other international 
financial institutions. There is little evidence in the literature to show the involvement of 
former combatants in drafting, directing or implementing their own reintegration projects 
following their demobilisation. Instead, the inputs provided by former combatants appear to 
be on how these projects, usually designed and implemented by ‘outsiders’ affect them as 
former combatants.45 As I will discuss in the section below, it thus appears, in general, that 
economic reintegration, which deals particularly with the provision of employment and the 
provision of livelihood is the most preferred form of post-conflict reintegration because most 
                                                          
44 See for example Andersen, V. (2011) Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in 
Angola: Why did Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration only succeed in the third and last Peace 
Processes? Institute of Comparative Politics. Available on line at: 
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45 Stovel, L. (2008) ‘There’s no Bad Bush to Throw Away a Bad Child’: Tradition - Inspired Reintegration in 
Post-War Sierra Leone. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2. pp. 305 - 324. See also Humphreys, 
M., and Weinstein, J. (2007) Demobilisation and Reintegration. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 4, 
pp. 531 - 567. 
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of today’s conflicts, and indeed post-conflict reintegration programmes are underpinned by 
economic motives.46  
 
There has also been the emergence of large volume of DDR literature that focuses mainly on 
the needs and welfare of former female combatants when they emerge from violent conflict, 
such as the conflict in Sierra Leone.47 Stovel discusses, one of the key challenges that is 
associated with the reintegration of former female combatants namely their devalued role as 
girls or women.48 Lack of equal access to food and money following demobilisation are 
among the primary reasons that war-affected girls and women adopt high risk behaviour, 
including exchanging sex for money and food following their demobilisation. In Bosnia, East 
Timor, The DRC, Burundi, Ivory Coast, Haiti, Central Africa Republic, and Liberia, UN 
Peacekeepers have been accused of exchanging sex for food and money with former female 
combatants49 as well as with refugees. A study conducted by World Vision in Northern 
Uganda found that ‘girl night commuters’ are known to exchange sex for money in order to 
pay for their School or College fees. During my research visit to Sierra Leone in 2015, one of 
my female respondents pointed out that she has been engaged in prostitution following her 
demobilisation simply to earn money to feed herself and her two children. There are similar 
cases like this in many countries emerging from violent conflict. 
 
At least two former female combatants reported during my research visit to Sierra Leone in 
2015 that their time in combat was characterised by equality and unprecedented respect by 
their male colleagues. However, upon their demobilisation, the wider civilian population 
appeared to recognise the former male combatants only. The implications rendered by the 
(im)possibility of female combatants are manifold. In general, combatants in war zones can 
be recognised as perpetrators of violence, which results in the blurring of gendered identities 
especially where perpetrators and victims are concerned. In consequences, both male and 
female combatants in combat zones risk not receiving proper psychological and physical 
support by not being considered as victims. Female combatants in war zones risk not being 
                                                          
46 Berdal, M. (1996) Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars. London: International Institute for 
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acknowledged as active agents, and their capability in adapting to seemingly incompatible 
roles and situations - roles that defy the image of combatants as inherently violence -  whilst 
they are ‘not sufficiently paid’ and undervalued is left unattended50 and unrecognised even 
following their disarmament. 
 
In the context of Sierra Leone, the DDR process and its accompanying transitional justice 
process remained largely separated, and as a result, reflect a ‘quick-fix’ approach to the social 
transition. In an attempt to provide a stable atmosphere for sustainable peace and 
development and to avoid a relapse into conflict, the gendered experiences of former 
combatants were largely ignored, and at best, explored only descriptively. The end of the 
conflict in Sierra Leone, albeit making the end of physical violence, therefore resulted in a 
contemporary Sierra Leonean society that remains unequal drown along social, class and 
gendered lines. 
 
The DDR process in Sierra Leone demonstrates the importance of reintegration as a conflict 
resolution mechanism. Without disarmament, demobilisation and the reintegration of 
combatants, sustainable peace is difficult to achieve. There are a number of factors that can 
cause DDR to fail; these include unstable strategic environment and the lack of support from 
the international community. However, there are some important factors responsible for 
successful DDR programmes such as the will for peace is the basis for the beginning of a 
successful reintegration. Accordingly, the greater the will for peace, the more likely the 
reintegration will be completed and the more successful the programme becomes. 
 
Reintegration represents the most demanding phase of DDR process. In competition with 
unemployed civilians, returning refugees and IDPs, generating jobs for successful 
reintegration is only possible with the coordinated use of every available economic 
mechanism. This was simply the case in Sierra Leone as the country had weak infrastructure 
following the end of the conflict. Thus, the case of Sierra Leone supports the argument that 
the will for peace, a coordinated implementation with other conflict resolution mechanisms 
are necessary key factors for the implementation of successful DDR programme.  
 
                                                          
50 Kimberly, T. (2007) Gender in Transition: Common Sense, Women and War’. Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 
6, No. 4, p. 463. 
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In the section below, I present a detailed analysis of the literature on the achievements of 
DDR projects, in particular the reintegration phase in series of post-conflict societies in 
Africa, including Sierra Leone. In the first part of the section, I discuss some of the most 
important literature in which objective or an etic viewpoint is highlighted. 
 
2.3 Economic Reintegration 
The 2004 study undertaken by Humphreys and Weinstein in Sierra Leone regarding the 
reintegration of former combatants questioned the effectiveness of post-conflict reintegration 
and the general DDR programme, arguing that little is known about the factors that facilitate 
effective post-conflict reintegration at the micro level.51 Following the identification of this 
gap in the literature, Humphreys and Weinstein carried out a quantitative study involving 
more than one thousand former combatants from all armed factions across Sierra Leone. 
During their analysis, they constructed four different variables, based mainly on the 
evaluation of DDR programming and the accumulated study to measure what successful 
reintegration appeared to be. The four variables they took into account were: dismantling 
former combatant's network on termination of conflict; increasing the confidence of former 
combatants in democratic process; allowing former armed actors to take part in political 
process;52 and increasing their income or earning capability as well as creating the 
atmosphere for reconciliation between them and their families.  
 
In addition, Humphreys and Weinstein discovered that economic reintegration was the most 
successful component of reintegration package for former combatants when the conflict in 
Sierra Leone ended in 2002, as evidenced in their analysis. One of the key challenges that 
faced Sierra Leone’s reintegration project is poverty and the corresponding lack of 
employment facility for even the civilian population. Generally, it was the increase in rural 
poverty and poor governance and their corresponding negative effects that drew young 
disenfranchised men and women into the combat role.53 Based on Humphreys and 
Weinstein's findings in Sierra Leone, the implementation of reintegration project in a society 
that devastatingly suffered from poverty and the lack of economic opportunities for majority 
of the population is a difficult process to undertake. Such analysis can be applied to the 
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reconstruction and reintegration projects in Nicaragua,54 Liberia and Sierra Leone,55 and El 
Salvador56 among many others around the world. As opposed to the cases mentioned above, 
Metsola suggests that the success that Namibia achieved during its economic reintegration 
process was through a unique reintegration programme, in which former combatants were 
provided with ‘converted’ civilian employment facilities.57 This practice provided an 
additional achievement by measurably improving the former combatants’ confidence and 
loyalty in the central state.58 Hamber also notes that in the reintegration exercise in Northern 
Ireland, which, unlike other examples elsewhere in Africa and across the developing world, 
boasts a highly developed economy, yet unemployment (partly due to legal barriers to 
employment) among former combatants after the DDR project was still higher than the 
national average.59 Although Humphreys and Weinstein acknowledge the difficulties 
involved in the economic reintegration project, they argue that former combatants that take 
part in DDR process are more likely to be successfully reintegrated than those who do not.60 
Humphreys and Weinstein claim for improved individual's success are questionable, as 
gender, and age were not taken into account as predictors of the reintegration variable.61  
 
Another important factor employed by practitioners and researchers alike in determining 
successful reintegration is the acceptance of former combatants by the community following 
demobilisation. Although it appears to be particularly difficult to measure, the level of 
acceptance of former combatants into civilian society after they are demobilised have been 
investigated by post-conflict scholars such as Humphreys and Weinstein. Evidence from the 
DDR process in Sierra Leone for instance suggests that former combatants who were not 
involved in serious crimes, war crimes and crimes against humanity were better accepted 
back into society than those who were involved in serious crimes and violation of human 
rights. One of the key reasons advanced by scholars for this has been that the serious nature 
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of their crimes against the civilian populations may have influenced on the unwillingness of 
the civilians to accept them, or because they may have committed violent abuses against the 
civilian population or their family members, or as a result of the psychosocial impact of the 
conflict on individual combatants.62 This argument presented by Humphreys and Weinstein 
suggests that the problem emanates, to some extent from the individual combatants 
themselves. 
 
The literature discussion in this section has focused primarily on objective and measurable 
outcomes of DDR programmes in post-conflict societies, including Sierra Leone. It has also 
focused on the provision of economic opportunities for former combatants when conflict 
ends, suggesting that economic opportunities in the form of employment and others such as 
'Weapons for Cash' programme are key in achieving successful post-conflict reintegration, at 
least in the short term. It is nevertheless evident that increased poverty, poor governance and 
poor leadership plus poor coordination reduce the chance of sustainable reintegration.63 
 
In the section below, I review the literature on how identity is considered as a component in 
the psychosocial reintegration of former combatants. In addition, I discuss how outsiders or 
external actors construct the identity of combatants, usually in negative terms and how these 
identity construction impacts reintegration and peace-building efforts in the context of the 
wider DDR process. 
 
2.4 Identity, Representation and Sentient Reconciliation   
Almost all of today’s DDR programmes are designed, directed and implemented by external 
actors, led by the UN, within the terms of peace agreements and economic opportunity, with 
little inputs from the beneficiaries, who are supposed to be at the centre of any DDR process. 
Lett for instance gives a comprehensive summation of emic and etic understanding with 
regards to today’s DDR programming using the macro-insecurity framework.  
 
The macro-insecurity framework supports economic opportunities for the benefit of former 
combatants as individuals and as groups, as well as the community into which they 
reintegrate, to the extent that it prevents or deter them from re-engaging into armed conflict 
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or other criminal activities.64 Moreover, former combatants have been viewed even by DDR 
practitioners as irrelevant, dangerous, and in some cases being labelled as ‘obstacles to peace, 
progress and development’65 ‘belligerents’,66 or ‘spoilers’.67 Stovel for example states that 
former combatants are sometimes negatively labelled as terrorists and as enemies to progress 
and human development.68 In the case of Liberia, for instance, Boas and Hatloy claim that 
former combatants were regarded as ‘‘uprooted urban youth with a history of violence, 
uselessness and idleness’. The best description of former combatants according to Boas and 
Hatloy in the context of Liberia was underemployed and unemployed youth.69 In describing 
the Sierra Leones’s RUF, Abdullah made similar claims as Boas and Hatloy, despite contrary 
evidence gathered from the former combatants themselves. However, Metsola gives a vivid 
summary of the reasons why former combatants are being negatively labelled, including 
those of the RUF. Metsola assesses that the fear that former combatants have the skills and 
the organisational capability, strategic knowledge, and military skills which will enable them 
to engage in violence against the state or the elites is one of their reasons.70 
 
Wide sections of society frequently have negative views about former combatants after their 
demobilisation. As such, tensions may lead to communal violence between returning former 
combatants and the civilian population. This has been identiﬁed as one of the major obstacles 
to the peace process in Angola.71 One of the reasons for this is that the factional identities of 
former combatants are often influenced by perceptions of society. In many post-conflict 
societies, people continue to label former combatants according to the armed group they used 
to belong to. As Themner discusses, in some cases, such identification can have a positive 
connotation, due to the role former combatants played in defending local communities that 
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were under their control.72 However, more often than not, such labelling has negative 
overtones. This can for instance, be the case when former combatants have committed serious 
atrocities against the civilian population in a particular region during the conflict. One such 
frequently cited example is that of former child soldiers of The Lord’s Resistance Army’s 
(LRA) who were subjected to resentment and verbal abuses when they returned to their local 
communities after their demobilisation.73 Throughout the conflict the community had 
suffered serious violence and intimidation at the hands of the LRA. 
 
A number of post-conflict scholars, among them Paul Collier, also hold negative views about 
former combatants in relation to their reintegration back into civilian society following their 
demobilisation. Collier argues that the engagement of former combatants in armed conflict 
serves as a major obstacle to socio-economic and political development in poor countries, 
regardless the length of their engagement in conflict.74 Collier puts all former combatants in 
the same category regardless the nature of the conflict in which they are engaged, and 
assumes that all guerrilla movements have dubious motives, because, according to him they 
all use what he calls ‘noble war tactics’.75 Collier cites the case of Sierra Leone as an 
example, and argues that fighters were recruited from ‘teenage drug addicts, easily controlled 
and not excessively inhibited by moral principles’.76 He goes on to claim that supposed 
demands for social justice by former combatants are quickly appeased with simplistic 
materialistic achievements such as expensive wristwatches, and valuable cars...,77 thus 
placing them on the moral level of a petty street or a drug gang. While Collier's assessment 
appears to have some credibility for many conflict situations in Africa and elsewhere in South 
America, it does not hold for every combat situation or for every individual former 
combatant. Collier also draws for his assessment from Oyefusi's study of the Niger delta in 
Nigeria.78 However, Oyefusi's analysis is based on the decision-making among Delta region’s 
youth who joined non-state armed organisations to resist the state. Oyefusi argues that 
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perceived grievance was not a justification for taking part in an armed conflict. Oyefusi 
argues that being a youth and at the same time unemployed, uneducated, untrained and 
unqualified were perceived as more important explanations for taking part in an armed 
movement in poor countries with dysfunctional governance system. Collier infers that ‘it is 
difficult to reconcile these characteristics of recruitment with an image of a vanguard of 
fighters for social justice’.79  
 
Having come into close contact with some former RUF combatants during fieldwork, and 
living with some of them in places like Koribondo in southern Sierra Leone, I have formed a 
different assessment, knowledge and understanding of this constructed identity of former 
combatants by agencies or external actors. Avruch argues that getting involved with peoples’ 
personal lives, and analysing their narratives will unavoidably leads to emic (deep) level of 
understanding of their lives,80 whether they are former combatants, policy makers, 
interlocutors, academics or community members. Evidence from around the world, mainly 
from the perspective of agencies, has tended to portray former combatants as not only ‘bad 
guys’, but as threat to human progress and indeed to their own nation’s development and 
progress. However, as indicated above, my experience with former RUF combatants in Sierra 
Leone suggests that this perspective is inconsistence with the way I as a researcher see former 
combatants. In her analysis of the peace process in Sierra Leone, Stovel explains how the 
external actors (the mediators, and DDR administrators in general) proposed reconciliation 
process in the country as ‘sustainable’, but through her interviews with former combatants 
themselves revealed a contradictory perspective.81 This disparity between outsider’s views 
and narratives and the views of former combatants themselves is further explored in the rest 
of the thesis.  
 
As conflict comes to an end, the initial transformation of combatants from their combat role 
to civilian lifestyle is a difficult process, one that affects their identity. The newly constructed 
identity is manifested individually. It may also, especially at the early stages of their 
reintegration process, internally embody the heroic images of the warrior fighting for a just 
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cause, while externally embodying a threatening and fearful image.82 This identity formation 
in itself appears to be a straightforward process for former combatants who rebel against the 
state for a cause that they strongly believe in to be just.83 Nevertheless, in cases where armed 
groups abduct young boys and young girls and use them as child soldiers, like the RUF in 
Sierra Leone and the LRA in northern Uganda for instance, their participation in serious 
crimes and crimes against humanity and against international humanitarian law has in recent 
times led to identity breakdown and confusion among the former combatants. The RUF for 
instance, is said to have forced children to commit violent crimes against their own parents 
and other family members as a way of showing their loyalty to the armed movement.84 In his 
essay ‘Rebels in a Rotten State: Understanding Atrocity in Sierra Leone Civil War’, Mitton 
notes that those children who committed grave atrocities against their own parents faced 
rejection during DDR process and were forced to face their own families and members of 
their communities, hence facing their own contradictory identities as child killers - identities 
that were constructed during the conflict.85 In any case, it is clear from this perspective that 
identity is tied to our basic psychological need for our sense of belonging - but one that has 
not been taken seriously in traditional DDR process.86 
 
While a small number of post-conflict literature has viewed the identity of former combatants 
as victims, a large proportion of the traditional literature still views them as perpetrators of 
violence. Former members of the Uganda’s LRA are a good example here. One of the only 
few ways in which former combatants are seen as victims is when they are classed as child 
soldiers. But even in this context, former child combatants are sometimes seen as both 
perpetrators and victims of violence. Although the literature is focused on issues such as the 
lack of socio-economic and identity, victimhood is mostly absent. It remains to be seen 
whether former combatants will regard themselves as victims of circumstance or perpetrators. 
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In discussing how external actors construct the identity of former combatants, often in 
negative terms, I believe that the literature is limited in that the perspective of the former 
combatants is under-represented in the traditional DDR literature. The Eurocentric notion of 
cultural sensitivity is also limited in research by the power relationships, where the researcher 
is the expert, but at the same time the Western perspective is viewed as superior to the views 
of the former combatants themselves,87 despite being at the centre of the reintegration 
process. The fact that most of today’s DDR programmes are designed, directed and 
implemented by external agencies, so that there is the tendency for lack of cultural sensitivity 
and power imbalances, external actors have, until recently started to adopt local cultural, 
norms and values in relation to post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation following 
demobilisation. Stovel notes that the internationally supported DDR project in Sierra Leone 
adopted the notion of a traditional slogan: ‘There is no bad bush to throw away a bad child’, 
suggesting that there was a greater need to accommodate every individual in the new post-
conflict Sierra Leonean society, no matter the level of violence or crime they might have 
committed during their war years. 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has analysed the internationally sponsored Special Court and the TRC that were 
set up in Sierra Leone following the end of the conflict. The chapter has also discussed the 
concept of retributive and restorative justice system in relation to post-conflict reintegration 
in Sierra Leone. It considers the importance of adopting each of these approaches in the 
justice environment. The Special Court was mandated to prosecute those individuals who 
bear the greatest responsibility of serious crimes under international humanitarian and Sierra 
Leone laws, including the leaders who had threatened the peace process. The TRC’s mandate 
was to create an impartial historical record of abuses and violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law, to respond to the needs of the victims, to address impunity, to 
promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses 
suffered by the people of Sierra Leone. 
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Given the increased levels of crime committed during the conflict by all factions, it is likely 
that restorative justice will be seen by some as being ‘soft on criminals’ and criminal 
organisations. In an effort to illustrate the benefits of alternative approaches to offending, the 
chapter sets out the arguments for and against retributive and restorative justice system in 
Sierra Leone. 
 
The next chapter analyses and justifies the application of social capital as the best concept for 
this study as it has the features that enable a far more comprehensive understanding of 
conflict and post-conflict issues. It then concludes that the application of social capital 
concept in this present study enhances our understanding of conflict and post-conflict 
reintegration and reconciliation. 
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CHAPTER THREE: SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
Introduction 
Social capital, which is the ‘features of social organisation such as norms, cooperation, trust 
and networks that facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit’,1 is shown to be an important 
prerequisite for social cohesion and post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation. This 
chapter will show that social capital is a complex concept but significant in contributing to a 
sophisticated e understanding of many spheres of social life, which is particularly applicable 
to understanding the dynamics of conflict and post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation. 
 
Social capital approaches to post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation have, since the 
1990s increasingly gained momentum among policy makers, practitioners, academics and 
researchers. It is certain that for a post-conflict society to be successful in development terms, 
its social capital must be rebuilt or renewed, positively transformed or catalysed so that both 
former combatants and the community into which they are reintegrated can benefit from the 
multiple networks of association and projects.  
 
When we apply social capital concept to examine conflict and post-conflict society, it can be 
seen to contribute to the causes of conflict as well as conflict resolution mechanism and DDR 
process in general. It is evident that societies characterised by high levels of cooperation have 
significant higher investment rates, while low cooperation societies - typically characterised 
by poverty, inequality, poor governance and conflict may have low level of trust.2 In addition, 
the application of social capital in DDR programme stimulates cooperation and social 
cohesion through more trustful relationships between those who are to be reintegrated and 
their receiving community, which increases output.3 These positive linkages between social 
capital, social cohesion and cooperation are confirmed by studies conducted in countries 
emerging from violent conflict.4 
 
                                                          
1 Putnam, R.D. (1995) Bowling alone: America's declining social capital, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 1, 
p. 67. 
2 Zak, P., J. and Knack, S. (2001) Trust and growth, Economic Journal, Vol. 111, No. 470, pp. 295 - 321.  
3 Akcomak, I., S. and ter Weel, B. (2009) Social Capital, Innovation and Growth: Evidence from Europe, 
European Economic Review, Vol. 53, pp. 544 - 567. 
4 Grootaert, C. and van Bastelaer, T. (2002) The Role of Social Capital in Development: An Empirical 
Assessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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By adopting social capital concept, this study will find a deeper and a more meaningful 
explanation of what holds or brings society and its people together in order to foster social 
relationship after conflict has divided them. This chapter begins by explaining social capital 
as a concept.  It then goes on to explore the reasons why people join armed groups and argues 
that for any reintegration to be successful, former combatants must relinquish ties with armed 
groups to which they formerly belong, and make themselves ready for a new social structure 
within the civilian community into which they wish to be reintegrated.  It then argues that 
societies emerging from violent conflict need to transform ‘bonding social capital’ into 
‘bridging social capital’,5 an indication that post-conflict reintegration programmes and 
policies can only be sustainable, if they convert exclusive intra-group cohesion and unity into 
inclusive inter-group cohesion and unity.6 It goes on to explore how social capital is 
measured and evaluated before ending with an analysis of why it is a useful tool for analysing 
events in Sierra Leone.  
 
3.1 Social Capital as a Concept 
Social capital is a multidimensional phenomenon that has recently been highly regarded by 
several social scientists as important, pointing particularly to human actions and relationships 
as a resource of capital that is as important as human and monetary capital in terms of 
community cohesion. Paul Collier outlines three types of positive externalities that social 
capital may create. Firstly, he says that knowledge is transmitted through exchanging and 
pooling information in social interactions and through copying the observed behaviour of 
better informed persons.7 Secondly, information on the trustworthiness and reliability of 
agents is gathered.8 This contributes to building trust and reduces transaction costs. Thirdly, it 
enhances collective action. While the importance of social capital has recently been 
recognised, there are a number of approaches operationalising the concept that vary across 
disciplines, between theoretical and empirical studies, and with the unit of analysis used. In 
terms of the unit of analysis adopted, three key dimensions are identified9: Firstly, macro 
approaches following an institutions perspective to explore how processes shape norms; 
                                                          
5Colletta, N., J. and Cullen, M., L. (2000) ‘The Nexus between Violent Conflict, Social Capital and Social 
Cohesion: Case Studies from Cambodia and Rwanda’. Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 23. 
Washington: World Bank, Social Development Department. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Collier, P. (1999) On the Economic Consequences of Civil War, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 
168 - 183. 
8 Ibid, pp. 51 -52. 
9Ibid. 
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secondly, micro-level studies in which groups benefit from positive externalities; and thirdly, 
meso interpretations focusing on vertical structures of hierarchy and power within 
institutions.  
 
One of the greatest pioneers of social capital has been Lyda Judson Hanifan10 who, in her 
work ‘the community centre’ defines social capital ‘as those tangible assets that count for 
most in the daily lives of people: namely fellowship, sympathy, goodwill,  and social 
intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit....’11  She goes on 
to argue that If an individual comes into contact with their neighbour, there will be an 
accumulation of social capital, which may directly satisfy their social needs, and which may 
bear a social potentiality sufficient to improve the living conditions of people in the 
community.12 Her work inspired others to develop interest in social capital. 
 
Following Hanifan’s earlier effort, work on social capital subsided for at least a decade, and 
only re-emerged in the 1950s and 60s by a team of urban sociologists.13 Other great pioneers 
in the field include Jane Jacobs,14 Pierre Bourdieu,15 Jean-Claude Passeron16 and Glenn 
Loury.17 In particular the seminal research of James Coleman on education18 and those of 
Robert Putnam on civic participation and institutional performance19 have provided the 
inspiration for most of the current work in the field of social capital. Their works have also 
become some of the most cited names in the current literature on social capital. Robert 
Putnam for instance defines social capital as 'a set of horizontal associations between people 
that foster cooperation for the mutual benefit of the community’....20 However, Putnam’s 
definition of social capital appears to be narrow by Coleman's standard. Thus, he [Coleman] 
                                                          
10Hanifan, L., J. (1916) The Rural School Community Centre. Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Sciences, Vol. 67, pp. 130 - 38. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Seeley, J, R., Alexander R. S., and Loosley, E., W. (1956) Crestwood Heights: A Study of the Culture of 
Suburban Life, New York: Basic Books. 
14Jacobs, J. (1961) ‘The Life and Death of Great American Cities’. New York; Vintage Book. 
15 Bourdieu, P. (1986) ‘The Forms of Capital’, in J. Richardson, (ed). Handbook of Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of Education. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
16 Jean-Claude P. (1970) Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture. New York: Sage Publication. 
17 Loury, G. (1977) ‘A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Difference’ In Wallace, P., A and Lemound, A (Ed.) 
Women, minorities and Employment Discrimination. Lexington: Lexington Books. 
18 Coleman, J. (1988) ‘Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital’ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
94, pp. S95 - S120. 
19 Putnam, R., D. (1993) ‘The Prosperous Community - Social Capital and Public Life.’ The American Prospect, 
Vol. 4, No. 13, pp. 35 - 42. 
20 Putnam, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
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expanded Putnam's definition of social capital to include vertical relationships characterised 
by a hierarchical structure and unequal power distribution within a given community....21 
Coleman also says that social capital could even yield harmful effects for society depending 
on a particular circumstance. 
 
A broader concept of social capital which encompassed formalised institutional relationships 
and structures such as government, political regime, rule of law, and judicial system was put 
forward by Douglass North. In his essay 'institutions, institutional change and economic 
performance',22 North argues that it is institutional change at a particular magnitude that 
shapes the way societies evolve over time.23 With reference to cooperation and collaboration 
among people, North says that historically, 'the emergence of institutions create a hospitable 
environment for cooperative solutions to complex exchange that provides for economic 
growth and human development.24 A historical perspective on social capital was also 
undertaken by Olson in his 1982 edition - 'the rise and decline of nations'. Olson's thesis 
suggests that if a society experiences political stability for a long period, that society is likely 
to develop ‘strong special-interest groups’ that in turn decrease the efficiency of a society 
from an economic standpoint.25 Robert Bates26 also advances North’s perspective in his work 
'institutions as investments,' by arguing that the interaction between the search for capital and 
the reforms that post-conflict states undertake to restructure their economies in order to 
enhance their standing in international capital markets was important. Therefore, by Bates' 
standard, economic recovery for any post-conflict society like Sierra Leone, though 
challenging but remains significant. 
 
Others scholars like Bourdieu27 argues that social capital can be converted from one form into 
another, and further suggest that social capital was an important part of development strategy 
in any post-conflict society in achieving durable peace. In his literature 'forms of capital,' 
Bourdieu points to the differences between social, cultural and economic capital, and goes on 
                                                          
21 Coleman, J. (1988) ‘Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital’ American Journal of Sociology Vol. 94, 
pp. S95 - S120. 
22 North, D., C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
23Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Olson, M. (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
26Bates, R., H. (1996) ‘Institutions as Investments’. Harvard Institute for International Development, Discussion 
Paper 527. 
27 Bourdieu, P. (1986) 'The Forms of Capital', In J. Richardson, [Ed]. Handbook of Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of Education. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
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to argue that they are all different from one another according to how easily they are 
transmitted.28 
 
The mainstream concept and the role of social capital in post-conflict recovery and 
development were addressed by Ismail Serageldin29 in his study ‘sustainability as opportunity 
and the problem of social capital in terms of its contribution to sustainability and 
development’. Christiaan Grootaert30 also examines Serageldin’s argument in his work 
‘social capital: the missing link’ in which he distinguishes between micro and macro-level 
institutions. Both Grootaert and Serageldin later took an integrating view of these different 
approaches by combining several of these concepts and focusing on their complementarily.  
 
More recently, Francis Fukuyama31 built on Coleman’s concept of social capital and 
advanced the idea for the establishment of large, democratic, and capitalistic organisations to 
achieve economic success in post-conflict environments. In his study ‘in trust: the social 
values and the creation of prosperity’, Fukuyama says that the importance of trust, which he 
uses as a measure of social capital, is embedded in cultural factors such as ethics and moral 
values and the behaviour of people in society.32 He also says that trust arises when a 
community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create expectations of regular and 
honest behaviour among people in a given community. The motives necessary to sustain trust 
that foster it are further examined by other scholars like Diego Gambetta.33 In his literature 
‘in trust: making and breaking cooperative relations’, Gambetta explores a range of historical 
case studies of cooperation and its breakdown in society. 
 
Another school of thought that plays important role in the conceptualization of social capital 
is championed by Mark Granovetter,34 who argues that economic transactions are embedded 
in social relations. The concept of ‘embeddedness’, as he describes it focuses on how 
personal relationships and networks of connections generate trust and discourage what he 
                                                          
28 Ibid, pp. 241-258. 
29Serageldin, I. (1996) ‘Sustainability as Opportunity and the Problem of Social Capital,’ Brown Journal of 
World Affairs, Vol. 3, No.2, pp. 187 - 203. 
30Grootaert, C. (1997) ‘Social Capital: The Missing Link?’ In Expanding the Measure of Wealth: Indicators of 
Environmentally Sustainable Development. Monographs Series No. 7, The World Bank. 
31 Fukuyama, F. (1995) Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press. 
32 Ibid. 
33Gambetta, D. (1988) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
34Granovetter, M. (1985) Economic Action and Social Structure: the Problem of Embeddedness,' Vol. 91, No. 3, 
pp. 481 - 510.  
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calls ‘malfeasance’ in economic life.35 Granovetter’s argument further suggest that, ‘once you 
take people's social relationships into account, there is a different view of the economy, 
because much of what happens in the economy happens through peoples’ social relationships, 
where people carryout most of their economic activities through social relationships....36 
 
To complete the theoretical argument of the social capital concept, and to put it in the 
perspective of post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation, it is important to look at the 
definitions adopted by some important post-conflict reconstruction agents for their 
operational purposes. In its practical and theoretical analysis, the World Bank defines social 
capital as a combination of cognitive (micro), structural (meso) and institutional (macro) 
elements. The World Bank explores the ways social capital operates in specific DDR 
situations through a number of small-scale case studies. Therefore, ‘given the variety of 
organisational, cultural, political, and other contexts in the countries of intervention, the 
World Bank’s preferred model for addressing social capital has largely been based on the 
importance of the contextual variables as a determinant factor for collective action.’37 The 
National Centre for Development Studies (NCDS) at the Australian National University also 
says that social capital exists within levels or scales as one feels belonging to family, 
profession, community or a country concurrently.38 Adler and Kwon39 supported this 
argument by stating that the sources of social capital lie in the social structure within which 
the actor is located. Thus, social capital can be thought of as having an individual and an 
aggregate component.40 Hence, social capital belongs to the group and can be used by the 
group or individuals within the group.41 
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) uses social capital as 
a marker of well-being, measured in turn through four major indicators - social participation, 
                                                          
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid, pp. 493 - 494. 
37 Grootaert, C., and van Bastelaer, T. (2001) Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: A synthesis of 
Finding and Recommendations from Social Capital Initiatives, SCI Working Paper No. 4. 
38 Kilby, P. (2002) 'Social Capital and Civil Society.' National Centre for Development Studies at ANU, 
Canberra. 
39 Adler, P., S, Kwon S., W. (2002) Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept, Vol. 27, No.1, pp. 17 - 40. 
40 Newton, K. (1997) Social Capital and Democracy. American Behavioural Scientist, Vol. 40, No. 5, pp. 575 - 
586. 
41Sander, T., H. (2002) Social Capital and new Urbanism: Leading a Civic Horse to Water. National Civic 
Review, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 213 - 221. 
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civic participation, social support, and social networks.42 According to OECD, social capital 
refers to networks, together with shared values and norms and understandings that facilitate 
cooperation within groups.43 This definition also presupposes that social capital can manifest 
differently depending on the context and the underlying issues. 
 
This thesis adopts Robert Putnam’s definition as well as his conceptualisation of social 
capital, which he defines as the redemptive driver for social cohesion and civic engagement.44 
It involves the process of networking, making new contacts and reinforcing old ones, 
exchanging information, and generally using - or accumulating for potential use - social 
connections that will help maintain and advances the community or society in various ways. 
Robert Putnam’s explanations of social capital and its accompanying solutions have provided 
starting points for this research. 
 
3.2 Social Capital and Armed Conflict  
During armed conflict, people usually join a new social unit that rewards them with social 
status and a means to provide for themselves and their families. In some cases, social capital 
is generated in the form of demanding the right to socio-economic and political equality45 
from elite sections of society. Like in many other armed conflicts around the world, this was 
the case in Sierra Leone during the conflict, where for example the RUF used socially-based 
common values to rationalise the killings of large number of people.  
 
 If this is one reason why it is often difficult for combatants to stop fighting, another is that 
the ‘war family’46 defines their identity and thus serves as a source of income and security for 
them. Moreover, hostility and other forms of violence contribute to further social 
fragmentation by polarising groups, tribes, communities, and regions, and at the same time 
forcing individuals to join, support or oppose certain groups during conflict. In this way, 
citizens are caught in the middle, and are likely to move to formal groups based on stronger 
alliances, such as tribe, ethnic, race, religion or region. This fragmentation is important for 
                                                          
42 Franke, S. (2005) Measurement of Social Capital: Reference Document for Public Policy Research, 
Development and Evaluation. 
43 Cote, S. and Healy, T. (2001) The Well-Being of Nations: The Role of Human and Social Capital, p. 47. 
44 Putnam, R. (1995) “Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital” Journal of Democracy.  Vol. 6, No. 
1, pp.  65-78. 
45Colletta, N. and Cullen, M. (2000) Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital. Washington: 
The World Bank. 
46 Hazen, J. (2007) Social Integration of Ex-Combatants after Civil War, p.1. Document Available on line at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/egm/paper/Jennifer%20Hazen.pdf. Document Accessed on line on 27/10/2014. 
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survival, but has damaging effects on the local and national economy, as well as social 
capital.47 For example, when social capital is no longer in existence in a particular society, 
transaction costs rise due to the extra measures that should be taken to ensure proper delivery 
of goods and services. In addition, tolerance levels of social cohesion decrease and 
discrimination grows as groups and communities lose the ability to interact with those who 
are not members of their own community or group.48 
 
Societies that experience serious human rights abuses, such as mass killings and other serious 
atrocities are often left with damaged social capital and low levels of trust even after 
demobilisation.49 Hazen, for instance, notes that during DDR process, former combatants are 
stripped of their sense of importance, their support network, and most importantly their 
economic income as well as their social status.50 To make matters worse, communities may 
refuse or become reluctant to accept them back as members because of any act of violence 
they committed during conflict in the very communities that they wish to return to.  
 
In Sierra Leone, like in other post-conflict societies for example, resentment, anger and 
distrust were widespread during the initial stages of disarmament and demobilisation 
process.51 Communities were unwilling to accept the return of former combatants back into 
communities that had been terrorised by rebels for over a decade. This was also evident in 
Uganda, where the initial reintegration of former combatants led to serious alienation and 
hostilities in most of the communities where the reintegration authorities operated.52 
 
 For any reintegration process to be successful, former combatants themselves must 
relinquish ties with wartime social networks, and make themselves ready for a new social 
structure, which include unfamiliar norms, beliefs and values, and laws within the civilian 
community into which they wish to be reintegrated. Making this transition can be difficult 
                                                          
47Fukuyama, F. (1999) Social Capital and Civil Society. The Institute of Public Policy. Available on line at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/.../fukuyama.htm. Document Accessed on line on 
27/12/2015. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Colletta, N. and Cullen, M. (2000) Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital. Washington: 
The World Bank. 
50 Hazen, J. (2007) Social Integration of Ex-Combatants after Civil War, p.1. Document Available on line 
at:http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/egm/paper/Jennifer%20Hazen.pdf. Document Accessed on line on: 04/04/15. 
51Gberie, L. (2005) A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
52 Colletta, N., Kostner, M. and Wiederhofer, I. (1996) Case Studies in War to Peace Transition: The 
Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. Washington: World 
Bank. 
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and challenging, and psychologically it can be traumatic and confusing for most former 
combatants.53 Thus, for a post-conflict reintegration, positive conflict resolution processes 
and social capital renewal need to be carefully addressed.54 I am convinced that failure to 
conduct well-planned and a well-funded reintegration programme can lead to further 
deterioration in social capital, poor economic conditions for former combatants as well as the 
communities into which they are reintegrated. It can also lead to the resumption of violence 
on a greater scale.  
 
In contrast, reintegration programmes that use existing community organisations enable 
communities to take ownership of peacetime development projects, while at the same time 
facilitating the reintegration of former combatants. Informal networks among former 
combatants such as former fighters’ associations, discussion groups and business ventures are 
significant elements of sustainable post-conflict economic and social reintegration of former 
combatants. These networks are particularly important in post-conflict societies such as 
Sierra Leone where social capital is in short supply.55 
 
It is therefore essential for former combatants to be fully engaged in the formation and 
operation of civil society organisations, which is not only a generator of social capital but 
also a by-product of it.56 Socio-economic reintegration of former combatants should be 
embedded in a well-planned, and a well-coordinated process that addresses their needs within 
the development framework of their communities. As Colletta points out, without a society-
focused approach that fosters new, and nurtures pre-existing types of social capital, the 
reintegration of former combatants will be difficult or almost impossible to achieve. In other 
words, it will also be difficult to secure sustainable livelihoods in peacetime. 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 Ibid. 
54Ibid. 
55 Colletta, N. (1997) Demilitarization, Demobilization, and the Social and Economic Integration of Ex-
combatants: Lessons from the World Bank of Africa. USAID Conference Promoting Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Reintegration in Post-Conflict Societies, pp. 30 - 31. Document Available on line at: 
http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNACD087. pdf. Document Accessed on line on19/10/16. 
56 See for instance Tongeren, P., V. (2004) ‘Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict’, 
European Centre of Conflict Prevention. Document Available on line at:   
http://www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding/Action/DesaTaskForce/papers_egm20041115/Role_civil_s 
ociety_PVanTongeren.pdf. Document Accessed on line on 01/03/2015. 
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3.2.1 Social Capital and Post-Conflict Reintegration: Bridges to Bonds 
I have referred above to the importance of transforming ‘Bridging’ into ‘Bonding’ social 
capital - forging enduring links between like-minded individuals, and reinforcing 
homogeneity’.57 Bonding social capital is associated with strong norms and trust which can 
have both positive and negative manifestations and implications for social exclusion. 
Bridging social capital, on the other hand, also known as vertical social capital refers to the 
ties between individuals which cross social divides or between social groups.58 Bonding 
social capital exists between individuals with a relatively high degree of network closure,59 
and builds strong ties, but can also result in higher walls excluding those outside the bonds. 
Known also as horizontal social capital, it strengthens ties between individuals within the 
same social group. It is often associated with local communities where many people know 
many other people in the group or network closure. From a network perspective, bridging 
social capital is associated with reciprocity and ‘thin trust’.60 It provides access to network 
resources outside of an individual’s normal circles, and as such it can provide significant 
individual (and group) benefits. Linking social capital refers to ‘norms of respect and 
networks of trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal, 
or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society’.61  
 
Community-Based Development (CBD) initiatives are regarded as one of the key 
mechanisms for transforming bonding social capital into bridging social capital because of 
their inclusive and participatory nature. Sustainable CBD approaches depend on local 
communities to use their social capital to organize themselves as units and participate in 
development projects in a given community.62 In a post-conflict society like Sierra Leone, 
CBD approaches are expected to facilitate community participation and cooperation, meeting 
victims and thus promote inclusive collective action and problem-solving with regard to the 
reintegration of former combatants. Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) lend 
themselves to the utilisation of CBD projects and approaches. For this reason, they are 
                                                          
57 Payne, T., G., Moore, C., Griffis, S., E., and Autry, C., W. (2011) Multilevel Challenges and Opportunities in 
Social Capital Research. Journal of Management, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 491 - 520. 
58 Lin, N. (1999) Building a Network Theory of Social Capital. Connections, Vol. 22, pp. 22 - 51. 
59Burt, R., S. (2000) The Network Structure of Social Capital: Research in Organisational Behaviour. In: Sutton, 
R, and Staw, B. (2000). London: JAI Press. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Schuller, T., Baron, S., and Field, J. (2000) Social Capital: A Review and Critic. In S. Baron, J. Field, and T. 
Schuller (Eds.). Social Capital. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
62Mansuri, G. and Rao, V. (2004) ‘Community-Based and Driven Development: A Critical Review’, The World 
Bank Observer, Vol.19, No. 1, pp. 1 - 39. 
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sometimes referred to as ‘messiahs or agents of peace’.63 The roles of CBOs in post-conflict 
environments include supporting groups that had previously opposed one another during 
conflict to live together again as a unit and addressing shared practical concerns following 
demobilisation. In sum, CBDs in post-conflict societies aim to address immediate community 
rebuilding needs - which include ‘peace dividends’ or tangible ‘quick wins’. At the same 
time, they serve as catalyst in empowering conflict affected communities by acting as a 
means of restoring trust, norms and values such as uniting community members, enabling 
them to work together and restoring social cohesion.64 
 
3.3 The Argument of Bonding and Bridging Social Capital 
This section examines, through the use of theoretical and empirical evidence, the role of 
social capital throughout violent conflict, exposing both its positive and negative aspects 
during and after conflict.  
 
Social capital plays an important role in the emergence of conflict due to the ways in which it 
contributes to the cohesiveness of society. As Berkman and Kawach explain: 
 
Social capital is an important pillar of social cohesion. It refers to two broader 
interrelated features of society: (a) the absence of covert conflict whether in the 
form of income or wealth inequality, racial/ethnic tensions, disparities in political 
participation, or other forms of polarisation and (b) the presence of strong social 
bonds - measured by levels of trust and norms of reciprocity, the abundance of 
associations that bridge social divisions (civic society), and the presence of 
institutions of conflict management, for instance responsive democracy, and 
independent judiciary, and an independent media.65 
 
As noted from Berkman and Kawach’s explanation, it is evident that bonding and bridging 
social capital play an important role in creating, developing and maintaining social cohesion. 
The inward-looking ties that bind (bonding social capital) provide the fundamental building 
blocks of society while the outward looking ties that link (bridging social capital) provide 
cross-cutting relations across different social groups. It is in the discussion of social cohesion 
that we may be reminded of Putnam's argument of bonding social capital as 'sociological 
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superglue'66 and Fukuyama’s argument of bridging social capital as that which increases 
‘radius of trust’ in society.67 Nevertheless, the exact balance between bonding and bridging 
social capital is important when considering its impact on social cohesion. When there is 
strong bonding social capital in society, it can be detrimental to other groups or communities 
within that society in terms of promoting inequality and exclusion of other social groups.68 
 
Despite the fact that strong bonding social capital is necessity for community cohesion, it is 
not sufficient for the breakdown of social cohesion and the descent of society into conflict 
because bridging social capital too plays its own part. The absence of cross-cutting ties 
between groups and communities (bridging social capital) poses greater threat to social 
cohesion than strong bonding social capital because the lack of such ties can serve to magnify 
the strength of bonding social capital through inadequate interactions between groups, as well 
as reducing the opportunity for societal conflict resolution mechanisms to evolve. ‘For the 
collective good of society, a transition has to take place from exclusive loyalty to primary 
groups to networks of secondary associations whose most important characteristic is that they 
bring together individuals who in some ways are different from the self. Social relations 
underlie all societal institutions, and in turn reinforce the organisation and functioning of a 
country's formal and informal institutions.’69 Narayan emphasises the importance of inter-
community networks as symbolising 'agents of peace',70 due to the role they play in building 
bridges, and managing tensions that arise, between social groups. When these 
interconnections are absent there is the possibility of increased violence to take place in 
society. 
 
The above analysis of how bonding and bridging social capital may impact on community 
cohesion as it gives an explanation of the dynamics in the bonding-bridging balance within a 
local context, i.e., one that has not been manipulated. However when a society is 
characterised by strong and weak bridging social capital, the potential for pervasive of social 
capital in order to weaken social cohesion and polarise society for individual and group gain 
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can be significant.71 Putnam discusses this observation in a different way thus suggesting 
that, ‘social capital is often most easily created in opposition to something or someone else.72 
And as Woolcock and Narayan point out, the argument that social capital can be manipulated 
and contribute to both conflict and peacebuilding exercise place emphasis on the need for a 
closer examination of the concept.73 When synergy is apparent between the state and 
community social capital can be developed in a positive manner leading to the benefit of the 
general community.74 However when synergy diminishes in society, the tendency for the 
perversion of social capital becomes greater. If an authoritarian regime exists in a given 
society this can result in the reduction of bonding social capital, which thus results in conflict 
if bridging social capital is not present in order to offset it.75 
 
When synergy is also absent the tendency for such a breakdown in social cohesion may 
increase further. As the provider of public goods and services and enforcer of law,76 the state 
has the ability to discriminate against certain social groups in support of others and if the state 
chooses to do so the absence of synergy between state and community will lead to unrest. As 
discussed so far when the level of bridging social capital is low in society this can lead to 
dormant conflict even if the state is functioning well. This dormant conflict then progresses 
into active conflict especially if the state becomes dysfunctional.77  
 
From the argument thus so far, it is evident that vertical and horizontal social capital and 
synergy between state and community have potential to contribute to and prevent the 
emergence of civil-conflict. Where the emergence of civil-conflict does occur, it is possible 
that the society is characterised by high levels of bonding social capital, low or non-existent 
of bridging social capital, and a lack of synergy between state and community.  
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A micro level study of the discussions of how social capital may contribute to the emergence 
of conflict can be conducted using Fukuyama's concept of 'trust'.78 As will be discussed later 
in this present thesis, a society that has the tendency for conflict is characterised by high 
levels of bonding social capital, low levels or non-existent of bridging social capital, and a 
weak vertical social capital. As such trust becomes important and has a higher tendency to 
influence as to whether society will descend into conflict or not. When bonding social capital 
is high and bridging social capital is low trust may be relatively high between members 
within the different social groups whereas the level of trust between these social groups may 
be relatively low. This increases the tendency for conflict, as social cohesion is low and 
division is high. However, when coupled with low level of trust between state and society, a 
consequence of the lack of synergy, the potential for conflict is increased.  
 
As Colletta and Cullen remark: 
 
Vertical relations plagued by inequality and an unequal distribution of power and 
opportunity (often accompanied by exclusion and indignity) can instigate conflict. 
The absence of horizontal relations (of cross-cutting ties between unlike groups in 
a multicultural society) can erupt into hostilities if one group is seen as 
monopolising resources and power to the disadvantage of the others. And if, 
within these groups, high levels of bonding social capital link only like members, 
difference in access to resources and power may further aggravate relations and 
heighten tensions between those in control and those excluded. Thus, conflict is 
triggered by the presence of strong exclusionary bonds and disempowerment 
combined with a lack of horizontal and vertical linking social capital.79 
 
In this context therefore, trust has an important role to play in the emergence of conflict. 
However, trust is also an important notion when it comes to the effects of conflict on social 
capital. As Colletta and Cullen further say, ‘trust is a grossly depleted commodity during 
conflict.’80 Trust becomes such a depleted commodity for various reasons. In a society where 
conflict takes place; there is the tendency for identity to form along increasingly narrow lines 
based on units of identity such as clan, tribe, ethnicity or religion, in order for those within 
these groups to maintain some degree of security.81 One of the reasons for this division of 
identity is due to the ‘root causes of conflict such as long-standing distrust and 
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marginalisation of some sections of society, poor governance and inequality which are 
reinforced by the immediate experience of violence, division, and atrocities. This experience, 
in turn, further exacerbates the hatred and fear that are fuelling the conflict.’82 
 
The absence of cohabitation, whether during or after conflict enables the perversion of 
bonding social capital thus leading to the increased breakdown in social cohesion. ‘Where 
there is deep, long-term fear and direct experiences of violence that sustain an image of the 
enemy, individuals become vulnerable and easily manipulated. As a result of fear, sub-group 
identities are often created, reinforced and used by ‘leaders’ to solidify their position and the 
internal cohesion of the groups behind them. Increased polarisation and divisions become 
functional for increasing cohesion, reducing ambiguity, and decreasing internal criticisms of 
leaders.’83 The impact this has for the bonding-bridging dynamic is that bonding social 
capital within these sub-groups become strengthened and polluted due to fear and distrust 
whilst bridging social capital that is important for social cohesion, is reduced thus furthering 
the strengthening of negative bonding social capital. The effect for the conflict is to create 
greater polarisation and deeper social cleavages, which conspire to reinforce sub-group 
identity and potentially turn hostilities into a protracted violence. 
 
Both bonding and bridging social capital play important roles in causing and continuation of 
violence. At the same time, they play an important role in societal cohesion following the end 
of conflict. As Colletta and Cullen point out, ‘social capital can be constructive and support 
social cohesion and the mitigation of conflict.’84 This particularly becomes important because 
social capital is ‘a resource whose supply grows rather than decreases which (as opposed to 
physical capital for instance) becomes worn-out if not used.’85 To this end it is important to 
examine how social capital is measured, and how it can help in transforming conflict as well 
as how it helps in post-conflict reconciliation and reintegration. 
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3.4 Measuring Social Capital and how it is Operationalised 
As discussed in section 3.1, social capital is relatively a new concept in terms of its 
applicability to post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation. Other forms of capital such as 
human and physical capital have, throughout their existence, developed ways through which 
they are measured and applied, though such development has taken place over time and have 
been rigorously tested in their application. At present this is not well established in the case 
of social capital.86 As a result, it is in its early stages in terms of a clear or agreed definition of 
what it is and how it can and should be measured or applied to post-war investigations.87  
 
Over the years a number of empirical studies in the field of social capital have contributed to 
the development of different proxy indicators of social capital and with them the debate as to 
which proxies are most effective and acceptable has emerged. Although it is important that 
the proxy indicators utilised within empirical research are accurate and do furnish us with 
accurate information pertaining to the level of social capital evident within a group, 
community, society or nation, it is not helpful to establish a closed list of indicators that can 
be applied to empirical research into social capital because it is difficult to establish a stable 
and enduring list of indicators for social capital.   
 
Indicators used in this thesis have therefore been allowed to evolve as the conceptual 
definition and, more important, the operational definition of social capital emerges. This is 
seen as a useful approach for the following reasons: 
 
First, the indicators chosen for any research study will be dependent on the type of social 
capital that is being examined, the nature of the research phenomenon as well as the 
geographical location where the study is being conducted. As noted also in section 3.1, 
studies dealing with social capital, in its present understanding, started in the United States 
and as a result the proxies used in these studies were applicable to the society in which they 
were applied. However, the proxies used in the United States studies may not be applicable in 
other areas of the world even if the study is looking at the same type of phenomena. This is 
true for developing societies where the use of ‘Eurocentric’ proxies of social capital may 
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result in different, and often inaccurate, research findings. As Krishna notes, ‘applying social 
capital concept outside a Western environment, its empirical referents will vary as different 
cultures manifest social capital differently’.88 It is important therefore that an accurate and 
effective social capital proxy that relates to the community, society or culture being 
investigated is adopted. 
 
Second, and as shown earlier in this section, there are various types of social capital and all of 
these different types will influence the measurement tool we seek to adopt. Studies that 
examine horizontal and vertical social capital for instance will differ in their indicators 
according to their focus. Horizontal social capital may use different indicators that are 
dependent on whether bonding or bridging social capital is being examined. In order to 
observe bonding social capital, one may look at indicators such as levels of community trust; 
types of reliance on community support; old-age dependency ratios; levels of crime in a given 
community, and kinship networks. On the other hand, proxies for bridging social capital may 
include the number and types of associations; membership of associations; community ethno-
linguistic fragmentation; and social mobility rates. Vertical social capital, define as the link 
between state and civil society, may be exemplified through trust in government, trade union 
membership, number of people facing political or economic discrimination, measure of 
political stability, voter turnout, and strength of democratic institutions. 
 
Third, it is important to acknowledge that social capital indicators are proxy because they 
provide us with a superficial alternative of the phenomena we are investigating. As Jackman 
and Miller point out, ‘trust is not isomorphic with group membership’.89 Jackman and Miller 
are not negating the use of trust in understanding social capital; instead they are reminding us 
that group membership does not always translate into trust or vice versa. In terms of how this 
impacts on our understanding and measurement of social capital it does not denote that the 
use of proxy indicators is ineffective but that it is important to know that proxy indicators 
provide an important substitute for what is a social phenomenon that is difficult to quantify. 
As a result, it is important that throughout our empirical research into social capital we 
employ triangulation techniques wherever Possible. As Putnam points out, ‘No single source 
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of data is flawless, but the more numerous and diverse the sources, the less likely that they 
could all be influenced by the same flaw’.90 
 
In the context of post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation, the application and 
measurement of social capital is clearly one such example of where careful consideration 
should be taken. Although the concept of social capital has been applied to the context of 
conflict much research has dealt with this subject in a superficial way only referring to the 
fact that conflict has an impact on social capital and vice versa with no real attempt to 
examine the dynamics between social capital and post-conflict reintegration and 
reconciliation. One of the most comprehensive studies into social capital in the context of 
conflict and post-conflict context is the study undertaken by Colletta and Cullen: Lessons 
from Cambodia, Guatemala, Somalia, and Rwanda.91 Their investigation involves the 
dynamics between conflict and social capital in four different conflict-affected countries as 
noted above. In each of these countries a different range of social capital proxies were 
adopted. These indicators are dependent on the definition of social capital used. 
 
In the Cambodia study the type of social capital examined was vertical and horizontal 
together with structural and cognitive social capital. The following proxies were used to 
identify the level of existing social capital: community associations, community events, local 
leadership, links with external agencies, and informal networks. Community events included 
those events that improved communication and promoted civic-mindedness and selfless 
behaviour, among others. Informal networks examined informal exchanges of information 
and resource exchanges as well as what shapes these exchanges. When looking at 
associations the researchers looked at the structures, roles, and rules within associations and 
the ways in which they nurture mutual help, self-help, cooperation, and solidarity. 
Investigations into local leadership centred on investigating the types of leadership and the 
role leaders played in political, social, religious and welfare activities and how they shaped 
networks within, and between communities. Finally, the external links investigated where 
external community links between the community and government, NGOs and the private 
sector.92 
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The analysis of social capital in Guatemala and Somalia were carried out by CERFE, an 
Italian research NGO that has had prolonged field experience in both countries. In their 
findings, the aspect of social capital focused on was civil society's protective provision of 
basic survival needs and the creation of conditions for sustainable economic development. 
The study was essentially divided into social initiative and social responsibility. During the 
study, they viewed social initiative as civil society's engagement in efforts towards economic 
growth and development. On the other hand, social responsibility was characterised by civil 
society's ability to provide what they saw as ‘social protection or welfare during crises such 
as lack of access to higher education, unemployment, and during conflict.’93 
 
Social capital concept has been little applied to manage social cohesion and inequality in 
post-conflict environments.94 Social capital approach in Sierra Leone’s reintegration and 
reconciliation reinforces a dynamic in which structural barriers of class is reduced to 
individual characteristics rather than impediments that whole groups and communities 
experience.95 As study has shown in socially deprived and segregated communities such as 
West Belfast in Northern Ireland,96 social capital can be a useful concept to understand the 
different values of network relationships for a society emerging from violent conflict like 
Sierra Leone in a socio-political context.97 
 
Further debate exists over whether social capital is an individual or a community concept,98 
or a function of both.99 The position of this thesis is in the focus on the actions of individual 
former combatants in relation to the community into which they are reintegrated that the 
framework of social capital finds its greatest usefulness.  
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3.5 Social Capital Concept and its Application to Sierra Leone  
The aftermath of the conflict in Sierra Leone provides a unique opportunity to more closely 
examine how social capital is operationalised in a post-conflict environment - in which it 
could be its most useful. This examination is especially relevant when trauma is mixed with 
inequality, poverty and social exclusion. The present research is grounded in the assumption 
that social capital exists in people’s lives, and that the important questions are what kinds of 
social capital exists and how do people use it? As I will discuss later in chapters 5 and 6, and 
again in the conclusion, bonding and bridging social capital were useful in helping former 
combatants to prepare for, endure and mutually aid one another during and after the conflict 
in terms of their reintegration and reconciliation.  
 
The different conceptual types of social capital overlapped at times, but it was found that 
bonding social capital was especially relevant in everyday activities and for community 
cohesion following the end of the conflict. The usefulness of Putnam’s bonding social capital 
was especially true for the economic status of the former combatants. We saw the strength of 
bonding social capital in facilitating the pooling of resources, as well as working together to 
survive the conflict, both emotionally and physically. 
 
Bridging social capital, too, understood as social networks between socially heterogeneous 
groups that widen social capital by increasing ‘radius of trust’ in Fukuyama’s terminology,100 
was important in helping former combatants survive the immediate aftermath of the conflict. 
Connections across social, cultural and economic lines provided access to essential resources 
for them. This type of bridging social capital was common and indispensable in a post-
conflict environment in Sierra Leone. In addition to support offered to former combatants 
after their demobilisation, they were introduced to new ideas, and ways of life. This crossing 
of economic and social lines was especially important for them as they prepared to live as 
civilians again.  
 
What is important however, is not just the existence of social capital, but how it operated in 
the lives of former combatants and their host communities. It is evident that bonding and 
bridging social capital are not compartmentalised, but are seen as experiences that rely on, 
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build upon and interact with each other. The interaction of bonding and bridging social 
capital resources played and continues to play an important role in the reintegration and 
reconciliation of the Sierra Leonean society.  
 
It is clear from this and other similar studies such as Hawkins and Abrams,101 and Colletta 102 
that while bonding social capital provides one layer of security and connection, it alone may 
not sustain wellbeing in difficult times. Bonding helped former combatants to survive or plan 
for survival, but lack of community resources and support left many of them struggling to 
maintain their lives. Therefore, combining bridging and bonding social capital offers the best 
social chance. 
 
As previously identified, and given the complexity of social capital conceptualisation, all 
studies must apply social capital concept in relation to the particular discipline, study level, 
and context. Many conceptualisations over simplify the concept to the point where much of 
the meaning and significance is lost. The other end of the spectrum is also problematic 
because operationalising the concept becomes almost impossible simply because of this 
complexity. However, this thesis uses Putnam’s conceptualisation of social capital to 
examine the reintegration and reconciliation of former combatants in Sierra Leone following 
the termination of the civil-conflict. Defined in section 3.1 as ‘the redemptive driver for 
social cohesion and civic engagement that involves the process of networking, making new 
contacts and reinforcing old ones, and generally using or accumulating for potential use - 
social connections that will help maintain and advances society in many ways, especially 
those societies emerging from violent-conflict.103  
 
Building on Putnam’s concept of redemptive driver for social cohesion and civic 
engagement, as noted above, the concept helps in analysing how cohabitation helps to serve 
as an alternative in the absent of trust. Moreover, the concept provides insights into the nature 
of cooperation and human relations within the Sierra Leonean post-conflict society. It points 
out which set of social categories of people - IDP, former combatants, refugees, and 
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community members are particularly affected by the post-conflict initiatives. The study 
reveals that social capital in Sierra Leone is shattered, with former combatants and their host 
communities pursuing social strategies of social reintegration, reconciliation and inclusion. 
While this benefits relatively most former combatants to settle in communities on the bases of 
what Stovel describes as ‘‘there is no bad bust to throw away a bad child’’,104 the 
achievement of mutual support, networks, and cooperation have positive ramification on 
achieving sustainable through cohabitation.  
 
The application of Putnam’s concept of social capital in this study has two key implications. 
First, high levels of support for the former combatants, in terms of their identity, and a sense 
of belonging to the Sierra Leonean community render a way forward for achieving effective 
social reintegration and reconciliation. In an environment where social advancements of 
former combatants are observed with suspicion, marginalisation, and name-calling, and 
where immoral accusations are easily made, it is less likely that cooperation and cohabitation 
between the former combatants and community members are easily achieved. Thus, positive 
cohabitation and trust building are expected to be limited.  
 
Second, given the serious impact left behind by the civil-conflict, and the fact that alignments 
with various armed groups did not follow clear ethnic/tribal or regional patterns, although 
class patterns were sometimes observed, there is virtually no immediate danger of Sierra 
Leone relapsing into civil-conflict again. However, the exclusion of a significant proportion 
of former combatants from political participation is likely to facilitate social discontent, with 
the state blamed for its failure to provide equal political platform for all citizens.  
 
In order to properly examine and analyse community relations, in terms of the presence of 
former armed actors, exchange of goods and services, linkages, extended family, 
intermarriages, conflict-resolution mechanisms, building trust, and cooperation or collective 
responsibility toward achieving sustainable peace and development, Putnam’s concept was 
seen as the most appropriate conceptualisation. 
 
Adopting Putnamian concept in this study also facilitated the examination of social 
responsibility, or the level at which former combatants were involved in community projects 
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and development, as well as their interaction with community members. These were 
examined along with society's social initiative, or potential to have a positive effect on peace-
building. The approach also helps in analysing the capacity of civil society, which 
encompasses both bonding and bridging social capital, within and between the civilians and 
the former combatants.  In its quest to lump all social capital together under the rubric of civil 
society, the concept accepts the importance of bonding social capital manifested in 
relationship, association, and informal networks and groups. 
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
Although social capital is relatively a new concept as compared to other concepts, it 
contributes an important way of examining conflict and post-conflict reintegration and 
reconciliation after conflict ends. In terms of post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation it 
has the capability to enable a far more comprehensive understanding of conflict and how 
former combatants are successfully reintegrated following their demobilisation.   
 
Following it detailed examination and applying it within a conflict analysis, social capital 
enhances our understanding of how conflict can occur and its impact on social cohesion. The 
result of this is in two ways: firstly, by increasing our understanding of the factors that causes 
conflict we are more able to develop conflict prevention mechanisms and strategies that can 
diminish the likelihood of low level conflict advancing to full-scale, and also utilise available 
networks and associations that promote social cohesion. Secondly, by enhancing our 
understanding of the effect of conflict on social cohesion we are better able to design and 
implement post-conflict development strategies that result in more meaningful impacts for 
those affected by conflict. 
 
Despite the fact that social capital was developed and first used in Western societies, it has 
recently been applied in societies emerging from conflict and in developing societies in 
general. As a result, social capital concept currently explains societal issues in developing 
societies better than in the Western context due to the communitarian nature of many of these 
developing societies. The importance of a robust, consideration of the various methods that 
can be utilised for the measurement of social capital cannot be underestimated, because it is 
through such a consideration that we develop our ability to improve our knowledge of social 
capital. The application of social capital concept in this study enhances our understanding of 
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conflict and post-conflict reintegration. The notion of trust represents a central theme to both 
social reintegration and social capital, along with cooperation and coordination, and it is 
through observing these themes that we can develop our understanding of them in isolation 
and the way in which they may combine to contribute to reconciliation and social cohesion.   
 
This study therefore concludes, in agreement with Schuller and his colleagues,105 that social 
capital concept is unique in its ability to bridge the theoretical gap between individual former 
combatants and community that spans from the micro to the macro in an interactive and 
independent manner more effectively than many previous socio-economic and political 
theories. 
 
The next chapter looks at the choice of methods and methodology adopted for this study. It 
discusses the ethical issues faced as well as the role of the researcher. The chapter then 
conclude that the results obtained through the combination of different research techniques 
was the presentation of a balanced, empirical study, and a well contextualised account of the 
effects of social relationships on the reintegration of former combatants, which added to the 
existing knowledge in the field. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Researching Former Combatants in Sierra Leone: Methods and 
Methodology 
                                                                                                       
 
Introduction 
This chapter explains and justifies the choice of methods and methodology adopted for this 
study. The chapter begins by defining and providing an explanation of ethnography and why 
it was the most appropriate method for this research. It discusses the ethical issues and other 
difficulties that this research process has faced. Data collection and analysis is discussed 
including how data were collected, recorded and analysed. My own role as a researcher is 
also discussed. 
 
4.1Qualitative Methodology 
Qualitative methodology allows for the exploration of people's feelings and thoughts.1 The 
purpose of this research is to examine an alternative perspective to view the process of former 
combatant’s reintegration and reconciliation that do not rely on traditional measures of 
reintegration, which in the past have been economic and political indicators. The thesis, will 
instead also assess the impact of conflict on social capital and explore ways in which the 
effective social reintegration of former combatants may facilitate the restoration of social 
capital destroyed during the course of the civil-conflict in Sierra Leone. In order to do this, 
the thesis will need to focus on the perspective of former combatants who directly 
participated in the conflict, which might help our understanding of how the conflict was 
experienced by those who participated in it.  
 
In order to fully understand the complexity of post-conflict reintegration in Sierra Leone from 
a social perspective, the study proposes social capital concept, which deals with society and 
human actions. It composes of, among other things norms, networks, reciprocity, and trust. 
Norms are the standards of behaviour set from within the community itself, where 
community levies sanctions on those who do not behave according to the prescribed rules. 
Networks are systems of social linkages with other members of the community one can rely 
                                                          
1 Creswell, J., W. (2007) Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design - Choosing Among five Approaches. London: 
Sage. 
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on such as family, neighbours and members of the same social or religious organisations. 
Reciprocity is where every member of the community has duties to every other member, 
usually known as the ‘golden rule’. Trust is a sense that members of the same community 
conduct their relations in good faith and that no individual act solely out of self-interest.  
 
The capacity to mobilise social capital centred on assessing how well members of the 
community are involved in improving actors’ social and material well-being. Therefore, the 
application of social capital concept is of great significance to this study. 
 
Social capital theory has traditionally been associated with attempts to explain cross- and 
sub-national variation in economic development, community cooperation, unity and the 
quality of democracy in societies after the termination of conflict.2 The core proposition is 
that former combatants’ participation in civic life builds a foundation of cooperation and 
mutuality between them and their receiving communities. Successful cooperation between 
former combatants and their receiving community has been found to underpin a network of 
functioning civil society in which members of society cooperate and work together in a 
peaceful environment.3 Hence the application of qualitative research methods in combination 
with social capital concept provide further insight and rich data about the complex issue of 
social phenomenon like the reintegration of former combatants,4 and will answer the research 
question posed earlier. 
 
4.1.1 Ethnography 
I have chosen ethnography because of its link to the study of social phenomenon. I wanted to 
explore the efficacy of alternative perspectives in the reintegration of former combatants as 
durable peace-building mechanisms in post-conflict Sierra Leone. By so doing, the thesis 
argues that where the reintegration of former fighters occurs without reconciliation built on 
trust, peaceful coexistence is an alternative. Interpretivism looks for patterns of meaning, 
describes meanings, and tries to understand the views of former combatants and others who 
were directly or indirectly involved in the reintegration and reconciliation exercise in post-
war Sierra Leone.  
 
                                                          
2 Fukuyama, F. (1996) Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press. 
3 Jackman, R., W., and Miller, R., A. (1996) A Renaissance of Political Culture? American Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp.  632 - 659. 
4 Ibid. 
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Ethnography involves the study of a particular social group in naturally occurring settings.5 
One of the key aims of ethnographic research,6 is to gain an understanding of the social 
phenomenon in a given community. Hobbs and May define ethnography as a way of ‘telling 
it like it is’7, describing the human action and looking at the social world being studied as 
seen from the inside.8 Nevertheless, Davies points out that the researcher's understanding of 
the social phenomenon forms the basis of the findings, which come from the information 
provided by respondents.9 Denzin acknowledges the point raised by Davies, and argues that, 
‘There can never be a final representation of what was meant or said - only different textual 
representations of different experiences’.10 The researcher has their own interpretation of an 
event and the participants may have a different view on a particular issue. The researcher 
attempts to uncover the participants' interpretation and draw their own conclusion about the 
event using the many versions that exist to try to make sense of the experience. 
 
Researchers document their findings to become part of the phenomenon being investigated to 
gain understanding and insight. As noted in section 0.1, as a Sierra Leonean myself, who 
lived in the country before and during much of the conflict, and now as a researcher, I was 
already part of the phenomenon. However, in order to examine and understand the 
reintegration and reconciliation of former combatants in Sierra Leone following the 
termination of eleven years of violent conflict, I needed to undertake this research process. In 
ethnography the researcher needs to have direct and sustained contact with those being 
researched within their natural setting. This involves listening to their narratives; what they 
say and asking them questions.11 
 
As Hammersley and Atkinson advocate, ethnographic investigation should take place by the 
researcher in an undisturbed environment.12 Ethnography should also be undertaken over a 
period of time in order to reduce the impact of the researcher's presence on the situation being 
                                                          
5 Hobbs, D and May, T. (1993) Interpreting the Field - Accounts of Ethnography. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
6 Spradley, J., P. (1979) The Ethnographic Interview. New York: Rinehart and Winston. 
7 Hobbs, D, and May, T. (1993) Interpreting the Field - Accounts of Ethnography. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Davies, C., A. (1999) Reflexive Ethnography - A Guide to Researching Selves and Others. London: Routledge. 
10 Denzin, N. (1997) Interpretive Ethnography - Ethnographic Practices for the 21st Century. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage, pp. 5 - 6. 
11 Ricoeur, P. (1980) 'The Narrative Function', in W., J., T. Mitchell (Ed.), On Narrative. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
12 Hammersley, M, and Atkinson, P. (1991) Ethnographic Principles in Practice. London: Routledge. 
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investigated.13 The researcher's presence may alter behaviour for a short period, but this will 
only continue for a while as 'real' behaviour re-emerges. Therefore, a period of adjustment is 
required in order for behaviour to return to normal as individuals can only maintain an act for 
a short period. 
 
Ethnography utilises three main research methods; observation, interviews or focus groups 
and the study of written documents or artefacts.14 The observation is normally carried out 
over a period of time with the researcher becoming part of the research process. Interviews or 
focus groups can either follow the observation or be carried out during the period of 
observation to explore issues further. Policy and other important documents relating to a 
particular issue under investigation are studied to find out about how information is recorded 
and transmitted.  
 
Ethnographic design was adopted because I wanted to observe and interact with the 
participants, the former combatants in their real-life environment. Paul Richards claims that 
if you want to understand African farmers, it was best to observe, listen, and interact with 
them on their farm fields while they are farming.15 Following Richards’ perception, I listened 
and interacted with participants, then examined critically their narratives and views.  
 
4.2 Ethical Considerations 
Any study that involves human subjects must seek, receive, and maintain good ethical 
approval from a recognised institutional ethics committee.16 The question of whether 
sufficient information about a particular research process is provided to participants, whether 
the researcher abides by ethical consideration when undertaking a particular research, ethical 
approval from the necessary institution remains paramount. As such, this research was 
ethically approved by the University of Surrey Ethics Committee in November 2014.  
 
My fieldwork involved interviewing a range of participants. During the interview process, 
high level of confidentiality and anonymity were maintained. Confidentiality and anonymity 
advocate that the identity of research participants should be kept secret or confidential to a 
                                                          
13Ibid. 
14 Hammersley, M, and Atkinson, P. (1991) Ethnographic Principles in Practice. London: Routledge. 
15 Richards, P. (1986) Coping with Hunger. Hazard and Experiment in a West African Rice Farming System. 
London: UCL Press. 
16Morse, J., M. and Field, P., A. (1996) Nursing Research: the application of Qualitative approach, p.46. 
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third party. Berg17 makes a distinction between confidentiality and anonymity. He defines 
confidentiality as an active attempt to remove from the research records of any elements that 
may indicate or reveal the subject’s identity, and anonymity as where the subject remains 
nameless and unidentified18 throughout a particular research process.    
 
Respondents’ social, physical, and psychological well-being were not affected as a result of 
their participation in this research be it physical harm, humiliation, exclusion, shame or death. 
As a researcher, I was able to deal with threats to my safety and well-being in the field, as I 
considered carefully how to avoid harm to participants or third parties, how to protect their 
rights, sensitivities, interests, and privacy as well as my own safety. Social Research 
Association’s (SRA) ethical guidelines19 say that social researchers should try by all means to 
minimise disturbance to the subjects and the subject’s relationship with their environment.20 
As such, SRA’s ethical guidelines were strictly adhered to throughout this study. 
 
Since I was working with some respondents who were vulnerable and marginalised because 
of their direct role in the conflict, data collection was guided by the following ethical 
considerations: (1) confidentiality (2) voluntary participation (3) respondent’s well-being and 
(d) identity disclosure. Before each meetings or interviews, I sought the participant’s consent 
and also gave information about the nature and the reasons for my research (see Appendix 2 
and 3). This include explaining confidentiality of their identities except if they consented to 
disclosure and asking them to read the participant information sheet (PIS), which explained 
the nature and purpose of the study. Although there were some instances where participants 
were not interested in reading the PIS, I decided to discuss the rationale for my research in a 
discursive manner with every participant.  
 
I still had to utilize what Kovats-Bernat21 describes as ‘localised ethics principles’ - which 
states that for every data collection to be successful, the advice and the recommendations of 
the local population, especially in closed localised communities, must be sought and taking 
seriously in relation to the type of conversations that were significant. For example, while 
conducting an interview with one of my respondents, this respondent was not comfortable in 
                                                          
17 Berg, B., L. (2001) Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
18Ibid. 
19 Social Research Association (SRA) (2003) Introduction to Ethical Guidelines. London: SRA. 
20Ibid. 
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discussing the role of the poro secret society in promoting post-conflict social reintegration 
and reconciliation. Being a cultural insider, I was aware that the poro secret society plays an 
important role in promoting social relations in local communities among Mendes and Temnes 
ethnic groups in particular. Being aware of the cultural sensitivity of the issue, I avoided 
raising questions relating to secret societies in all of the remaining interviews and instead 
relied on literature that have been written by other academics regarding the role secret 
societies play in peace-building and post-conflict community cohesion.  
 
4.3 Access to the Field 
Conducting fieldwork in societies ravaged by war and poverty always presents a set of 
complex challenges. It is even more daunting when the focus of the empirical research is on 
both the victims and perpetrators. Jasini for instance states that it is not easy to gain access to 
a post-war society for the purpose of data collection because of the challenges those societies 
may pose.22 Due to my link in Sierra Leone, I had easy access to most communities and to 
organise interviews. Before leaving for Sierra Leone in April 2015, I had already established 
contact with my would-be gatekeeper, Dr John Lamina Conteh, a Sierra Leonean academic, 
and a researcher in similar field. Dr Conteh has vast knowledge and experience in this area 
because of his long-term involvement for the cause. He was helpful in providing me with 
contacts of would-be participants for my research, which had a snowball effect (see Appendix 
4). It was therefore easy for me to gain access to the participants. Jasini cites this as an 
advantage of doing research in a place that you are familiar with.23 I considered myself 
fortunate to have chosen to conduct research in Sierra Leone. 
 
However, because of the way in which I gained access to the field I was aware of coercion 
and made every effort to ensure that participants made an informed decision about taking part 
in the study and did not feel obliged to do so. In their article, Appelbaum and his colleagues 
discuss the impact of coercion on their own respondents. They were aware of the pressure 
that is placed on respondents during interviews. However, they point out that from their 
experience some respondents are not easily pressured into divulging information that they 
wanted to keep private. I agree with this notion, and I believe that the respondents that I was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
21 Kovats-Bernat, C., J. (2002) ‘Negotiating Dangerous Fields: Pragmatic Strategies for Fieldwork Amid 
Violence and Terror,’ American Anthropologist, Vol.104, No.1, pp. 208 - 22. 
22 Jasini, R. (2015) From the Field: The Challenges of Conducting Research with Victims of Mass Atrocities. 
Document Available on line at: http://bordercriminologies.law.ox.ac.uk/from-the-field-the-challenges-of-
conducting-research-with-victims-of-mass-atrocities/. Document Accessed on line on:17/05/16. 
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dealing with had the opportunity not to participate in my research and they also had many 
opportunities to discuss subjects that they did not want me to hear about or be aware of 
outside of my hearing. 
 
Johnson discusses honesty and openness in research and gives examples of past research that 
was covert in which respondents were not correctly informed about their role in a study.24 
This is no longer permissible due to rigorous ethical requirements by the SRA, and ethics 
committees are very keen that researchers consider their position and do not misuse any 
power invested in them that they might have over the participants to coerce them into taking 
part. 
 
4.3.1 Informed Consent 
Before the start of any interviews, I informed the participant about the study and asked for 
their consent. Therefore, I spoke to all participants by providing each one of them with my 
contact details (in Appendix 3) and a PIS (also in Appendix 3 in p. 229). After participants 
had time to read about the study they were asked to voluntarily complete and sign the consent 
form. It allows them to opt out of the study at any time. Participant consent forms were 
collected by me before the start of every interview. 
 
Like the SRA, the University of Surrey Ethic Committee mandates that all participants had 
consented to taking part in the research. This was achieved by asking all participants before 
the start of the interviews for permission, this was practiced by other similar studies such as 
Humphreys and Weinstein.25 It is difficult for everyone taking part in a given study to give 
their consent, and as Johnson points out, ‘ethnographers in complex social situations are 
rarely able to gain consent from everyone they meet’.26 However, I managed to convince all 
of my respondents to give their consent. The University of Surrey Ethic Committee was 
satisfied with the level of consent for this study as I was abiding by my professional code of 
conduct with regards to participant information. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
23 Ibid. 
24 Johnson, M. (2004) Real World Ethics and Nursing Research. Nursing Times Research, p. 253. 
25 Humphreys, M., and Weinstein, J. (2007) Demobilisation and Reintegration. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 531-567. 
26 Johnson, M. (2004) Real World Ethics and Nursing Research. Nursing Times Research, p. 253. 
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4.3.2 Ensuring no Harm 
Before gaining access to the field, I decided how I would deal with problems of harm should 
it occur. It was decided in discussion with my supervisory team that I would intervene if 
necessary and that I would report any instances to Medecins Sans Frontieres, Connaught 
Hospital or the Sierra Leone Police. This was difficult for me as I did not feel that this was 
my role as a researcher to 'police' the respondents. But as Dixon-Woods reminds us ‘ethical 
issues about when and how to intervene are not only common but very important in social 
research’,27 and other scholars such as Hobbs and May acknowledge the dilemma of not 
intervening when harm occurs during a research process.28   
 
Johnson discusses few reasons why intervention is a difficult concept for researchers in 
societies emerging from violent conflict. One of those reasons is the 'wildebeest 
perspective',29 which points to the nature of documentaries where the person filming does not 
intervene when the predator stalks and eats the vulnerable new born. It is believed that 
intervention would disturb or intervene with nature,30 or in this case, the social setting in 
ethnography, where the researcher observes but does not intervene or change behaviour. 
However, Johnson argues that in some cases, researchers should intervene, for example to 
relieve mistrust. He goes further to argue that it is useful to consider where interventions or 
their avoidance can be planned for or predicted in research, but this does not reflect the 
turmoil of the real and messy world of social research. Considering intervention, I realised 
was not as simple as saying I would intervene if I thought participants were in emotional 
danger. This was fine in terms of semi-structured interviews, but there could be other 
occasions where there could be an emotional harm or risk of bodily harm, or maybe where I 
felt that the care of the participant was not ideal. I needed to decide where to draw the line. 
As a researcher I needed to abide by my professional code of conduct and this provided some 
guidance. SRA calls this an 'intervention dilemma' and advocates for the development of a 
personal 'bottom line' of care below which the researcher feels they must intervene.31 In the 
context of this research, no one was at risk of physical or emotional harm.  
 
                                                          
27 Dixon-Woods, M. (2003) What can Ethnography do for Quality and Safety in Health Care? Quality and 
Safety in Health Care, Vol. 12, No.15, p. 326. 
28 Hobbs, D, and May, T. (1993) Interpreting the Field - Accounts of Ethnography. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
29 Johnson, M. (2004) Real World Ethics and Nursing Research. Nursing Times Research. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Social Research Association (SRA) (2003) Introduction to Ethical Guidelines. London: SRA. 
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Thankfully however, I did not have to intervene at any time during the research process. As a 
researcher it was my place to tell participants about their poor time management. In one 
instance, I wanted to tell one participant to reflect on and learn from his lateness and poor 
timekeeping, but this was not my role as a researcher. 
 
As discussed earlier, a mechanism was put in place for participants to withdraw from the 
study at any time as spelt out in Appendix 2. It was agreed that if participants wish to 
withdraw they could inform me. If a participant decided to withdraw from the study all data 
relating to him or her would also be removed from the study. All of the 36 participants who 
consented and took part in this study, none of them withdrew from the research process. 
Agreement and consent to participate was therefore strong with 100 percent of participants 
consenting.  
 
4.3.3 Situational Ethics 
All interviews were recorded and other conversations in a notebook which I took with me 
into every interview place. To guarantee that trustworthiness was ensured during data 
collection, I left my notebook and recorder on the table when I went away for breakfast. I 
wanted participants to believe that I had nothing to hide from them and I told them that they 
could read my notes at any time. I also wanted the respondents to feel that I was being open 
and honest with them about what I was recording. Costley and Gibbs say that being honest 
with and open to participants build trust, which is important in any social research process.32 
Costley and Gibbs further argue that building what they call 'moral trust' and instilling trust in 
participants helps to promote the researcher's integrity.33 I also did not want the participants 
to think that I was there to check up on them or to spy on them. Hence, I hoped to reduce the 
feeling that I was a 'spy' from any government or international agencies. At the end of the 
process, the record helped to verify the accuracy, chronology and the interpretation of the 
data collection process.  
 
Prior to formally starting data collection, I took part in some low-key fieldwork exercise in 
eastern Sierra Leone in 2013 just immediately before starting my PhD programme. This 
exercise empowered me to evaluate issues such as trust, bias, community interest in my 
                                                          
32 Gibbs, P. and Costley, C. (2006) An Ethics of Community and Care for Practitioner researchers, International 
Journal of Research and Method in Education. Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 239 - 249. 
33 Ibid. 
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research topic, willingness of people to participate, appropriateness of interview format and 
style (including nature of questions), and my ability to conduct the study in English. All of 
these factors made me feel that this study had community and societal confirmation, and that 
there was the potential for respondents to cooperate with me during fieldwork. 
 
My extended stay in Sierra Leone from April to September 2015 added to the authenticity 
and trustworthiness of this research process. Working together with participants and 
establishing rapport with them,34 enabled me to enter into the respondent’s world and to gain 
valuable understanding at first hand. Engaging in conversation with them, learning about 
their present way of life, about what they went through during the civil-conflict, about their 
culture, the problems they now face, and their beliefs enabled me to reflect on what 
respondents take for granted or do not state as well as what they say and do.  
 
Fairness was also achieved by working with respondents together to ensure that those who 
were chosen reflected the overall voice of former RUF combatants (see Appendix 1). At the 
same time, the nature of the interview questions and process ensured a safe and fair space so 
that honest and diverse perspectives were respected.  
 
4.4 Sample Frame 
This section discusses the sampling strategy. Data collection was carried out in Sierra Leone, 
targeting a total of 36 participants (see table on page 111). One of the reasons why Sierra 
Leone was chosen for this study is because the country experienced violence at all levels; and 
the functioning of formal civic association in the country is still largely impeded. At the same 
time, post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation initiatives between former combatants and 
the civilian population were undertaken in challenging socio-economic and political 
environments in which: 
 
 Security and legal institutions remained precariously fragile and challenging 
 Social institutions remain weak despite the important role they played in ending the 
civil-war and 
 Large proportion of the former combatants remain poor either because they are 
unemployed or underemployed. 
 
 
                                                          
34 Charmaz, K. (2006) Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Quantitative Analysis. Los 
Angeles: Sage Publications, pp. 19 - 20. 
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4.5 Methods in the Field 
In order to collect data successfully three main research methods were chosen; (a) 
snowballing to enable this researcher to have access to the hard-to-reach respondents, such as 
the former members of the RUF (b) semi-structured interviews with former combatants, 
community members/leaders, interlocutors, academics, NGO staff and politicians/policy 
makers to explore further the issues highlighted in the thesis, and (c) examination of 
academic and policy documents that relate to the reintegration of former combatants and the 
DDR process in a post-war context. All interviews took place in secure places over a period 
of six months. The central aim of this research is to explore the efficacy of alternative 
perspectives in the re-integration of former combatants as durable peace-building 
mechanisms in a society emerging from violent conflict, and the main argument is that the 
reintegration of former combatants could not successfully occur without reconciliation built 
on trust. 
 
4.5.1 Snowballing 
For any quality research outcome, researchers need to work with a manageable number of 
participants and have good quality source of information.35 My chosen sampling strategy was 
purposive sampling,36 because it was appropriate to reach the hard-to-reach respondents, 
especially the former RUF combatants, most of whom could not have been reached by other 
means.  
 
Some contacts were established through their websites, and they were happy to participate in 
the research. For instance, I successfully established contact with David Francis from 
Bradford University, a scholar and a specialist in African peace and conflict studies with a 
particular interest in Sierra Leone peace and post-conflict reconciliation and reintegration. In 
addition, I was able to contact Sorious Samura, a renowned Sierra Leonean journalist whose 
well received documentary: Cry Freetown brought the conflict in Sierra Leone to the 
attention of the international community in the 1990s. Likewise, I was able to establish 
contacts from the NGO sector, and these personnel were willing to contribute to the research. 
However, I encountered difficulty in establishing contact with some potential participants in 
Sierra Leonean institutions through web addresses, and instead relied on the use of telephone 
and Skype messaging to recruit some of them. I did not have much difficulty in obtaining 
                                                          
35Atkinson, R., and Flink, J. (2001) Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: Snowball Research 
Strategies, p.1. 
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interviews from individual participants and also from organisations that I was introduced to 
by my contacts.  
 
Hence, a snowballing method was adopted. Snowballing method is where a participant is 
selected who then referred other participants to me. Patton shows that snowballing approach 
is useful, and indeed important in identifying participants or cases of interest from 
participants who know what cases information are rich.37 Therefore, I wanted to get in 
contact with hard-to-reach participants such as former members of the RUF armed group. 
Using other research approaches like quantitative approach, it would have been difficult or 
almost impossible to reach some of the hard-to-reach respondents like Saddam, a former RUF 
combatant who contributed immensely to this study. Using the snowballing technique 
enabled me to access a range of respondents, and to gather critical information from a range 
of sources in order to be able to make a sound judgment about the reintegration and 
reconciliation process in Sierra Leone.  
 
In addition, I recruited Dr John Lamina Conteh, a Sierra Leonean academic, and a researcher 
in similar field as me, who is very knowledgeable and experienced in this area because of his 
long-term involvement for the cause. He was helpful in referring would-be participants, 
which had a snowball effect.38 I also established relations with NGO staff, academics, policy 
makers, civil society institutions and community leaders/members who were prepared to 
participate in this research.  
 
A key policy adviser to the Government of Sierra Leone only agreed to be interviewed during 
my research visit because his brother, one of my contacts had persuaded him to take part in 
my research. Another former policy adviser, whom I interviewed in Newcastle, UK in May 
2014, also told me that he only agreed to be interviewed because of the good relationship 
between himself and one of my contacts. In addition, former Vice President, Solomon 
Berewa told me that he agreed only to take part in my research because his close family 
member introduced me to him. As I will discuss below, participants were drawn from 
different categories with the hope of choosing from all groups of people in society.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
36 Ibid. 
37Patton, M., Q. (1990) Qualitative Evaluation Methods, p. 182. See also Glaser, B., G. and Strauss, A., L. 
(1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
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4.5.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
A semi-structured interviewing format was adopted to explore issues further. As illustrated in 
the table below, I was able to interview a range of respondents, including former combatants. 
This is because I recognise that qualitative research involving semi-structured interviews is 
dynamic, and for this reason, I had a contingency plan to expand the number of interviews 
and discussions if saturation of information was not initially attained. As Kvale points out, 
‘semi-structured interviews bring forth new and unexpected aspects of a research process’.39 
Therefore, this number was a starting point, as other research techniques would have been 
adopted if required. Interpretation of sample was conducted to the point of saturation, in other 
words, when no new information was elicited by interviewing, data collection was halted.40 
This was achieved at 36 participants. 
 
The table below shows details on gender breakdown of participants who took part on the 
study 
 
 
Category Former 
Combatants 
Community 
Leaders 
Policymakers NGO/civil Society 
Organisations 
Academics/Journalists Total 
Male  11 04 05 03 05 28 
Female 05 03 00 00 00 08 
Total 16 07 05 03 05 36 
Table 2 Source: Author’s own data 
 
Semi-structured interviews were expected to explore the issues highlighted in the thesis as 
recommended by Coffey.41 The list of interviewees can be found in Appendix 1. I was able to 
seek clarification about issues from the participant's perspective. Different participants were 
chosen with the intention of choosing from all groups of people who were directly or 
indirectly connected with the reintegration exercise, including community leaders.  
 
Choosing semi-structured interview enabled respondents to answer questions in as much 
details as they can. In addition, I wanted to create an informal atmosphere, to encourage 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
38Ibid, p.1.  
39 Kvale, S. (1996) Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 
p.102. 
40 Ibid, pp. 102 - 103. 
41 Coffey, A. (1999) The Ethnographic Self. London: Sage Publication. 
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respondents to be open and honest while answering questions. In terms of flexibility, I 
wanted to have the possibility to adjust the question, where possible and to change direction 
as the interviews progress. I wanted to ask open-ended questions to probe wherever necessary 
to obtain data deemed useful for the investigation. In other words, I wanted to achieve a 
holistic understanding of the respondent’s point of view.  
 
Prompts were included in the interview in order to facilitate the flow of the discussion and 
contribution from the participants. Although the interviews took semi-structured format, each 
interview consistently began with questions such as:  
 
 What was your experience of reintegration after your demobilisation?  
 What types of problem do you face from your family, neighbours or community? 
 How do you assess your current situation? 
 Are you employed? If yes, what type of job do you do now?  
 What type of job would you like to do? 
 Do you receive any financial, emotional or psychological support? If yes from 
whom 
 How have you contributed to the development of your new community/society? 
 Describe a scenario where you may justify the importance of your reintegration 
back into civilian society 
 How do you deal with inequality and discrimination towards you? 
 
 
As shown above, I utilised a variety of open ended and exploratory questions and a range of 
appropriate listening responses throughout the interviews.42 This ranged from silent listening 
-to facilitate the voice of respondents and allow them to be in charge of the interview, 
questioning - to elicit clarification, keep on topic, ask for further information where 
necessary, paraphrasing - to affirm my interest in the participant’s message, and to clarify my 
understanding of what was said, and supporting - to offer solidarity with the participant. In 
other words, although the structure of the interview was open-ended, it followed a semi-
structured format with predetermined motivating questions. These questions were based on 
the themes that emerged from the literature review. Subsequent sub-topics to be followed up 
after each motivating question were also previously established but flexibly implemented 
according to the flow of the interview. In addition, neither motivating questions nor sub-
topics were introduced in a specific order or were necessarily introduced in the conversation 
                                                          
42 Adler, R., et. al (2009) Interplay: The Process of Interpersonal Communication. Don Mills: Oxford 
University Press. 
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precisely; instead, transitions between topics were approached in a flexible manner to create 
what Patton calls ‘a natural conversation context’.43 
 
The interviews were recorded onto a digital recording device and transcribed into separate 
word documents. The data produced were contextualised and I began to look at issues and 
events from the insider's or emic perspective.44 Validation of findings were done by 
examining all of the data from a study to test the findings. Results were confirmed by using 
data from different sources and this helped to give authority to the findings. However, it is 
important to acknowledge that the final report is not 'the truth'; rather it is my presentation as 
a researcher that is most important. As a researcher I am aware of my influence on the 
research and on the data. Agar says that the researcher needs to consider who they are as part 
of the research process.45 Coffey agrees with Agar and argues that the fieldwork is personal 
to the researcher, and that the data collected depends upon the researcher's interpretation and 
memory, which may challenge the researcher's sense of identity.46  
 
4.5.3 Documents Examination 
Apart from interviews, the study also included document analysis of government policy 
papers, such as policies towards the creation of job opportunities for youth, a large proportion 
of who are former combatants.47 Policy document pertaining to post-conflict development in 
Sierra Leone, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, prepared by member countries in 
consultation with development partners and stakeholders, including IMF and the World Bank 
were also analysed. As discussed in chapter one, the papers relate to the Sierra Leone’s 
macroeconomic, structural, and social policies in support of growth and poverty reduction, as 
well as associated external financing needs and major sources of financing post-conflict 
development initiatives.  
 
In addition, individual and institutional testimonies, reports and conference papers were 
utilised. Strategy documents published by the Government of Sierra Leone and UN in 
relation to the reintegration of former combatants served as significant sources for exploring 
                                                          
43 Patton, M., Q. (2002) Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods. London: Sage Publications. 
44 Kottak, C. (2006) Mirror for Humanity. New York: McGraw-Hill, p. 47.  
45Agar, M., H. (1980) The Professional Stranger-An Informal Introduction to Ethnography. London: Academic 
Press. 
46 Coffey, A. (1999) The Ethnographic Self. London: Sage Publications. 
47 Recent UNDP report suggests that youth unemployment and underemployment rate in Sierra Leone stands at 
between 70 - 75 percent, one of the highest in the world. 
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the efficacy of alternative perspectives in the re-integration of former combatants as durable 
peace-building mechanisms in a society emerging from violent conflict.   
 
Secondary data from published journal articles, newspaper articles and books and official 
strategy documents, law texts and other written texts were also utilised to validate facts. 
Utilising these data were significant as part of the fieldwork, because much of the written 
documents concerning RUF’s participation and contribution to the peace process and their 
reintegration into the ‘new’ Sierra Leone were scarcely available outside Sierra Leone. 
 
4.6 Returning from the Field 
At the end of the data collection, when the interviews were completed I was sad to leave 
Sierra Leone. I felt that I became part of the research process as well as the participants, and 
had made some lasting friendships with some of the participants. At the end of data 
collection, Chesney noted that it was difficult to leave a group where she had physically and 
emotionally became a part of for a period of time.48 In addition to Chesney’s observation, 
Coffey supports the notion that researchers always have an emotional involvement with their 
first set of participants, calling them the 'first love', and therefore leaving them behind is 
always difficult for the researcher.49 According to Coffey this is rarely discussed in the 
research texts, (he calls it the ‘silent space’),50 where experiences are not spoken about. In 
line with these observations, I felt that I had left behind a team that I had become a part of 
and left a group of friends and colleagues. 
 
However, I was optimistic that my research would have a positive effect on the reintegration 
and reconciliation of former combatants in Sierra Leone and the general DDR process. I had 
asked many questions about the difficulties former combatants face during their reintegration 
process, as well as the reasons why they took up arms in the first place. Ellen discusses the 
transformation research brings, and argues that the researcher can challenge the reasons for 
behaviour through questioning, resulting in changes in practice. 
 
 
                                                          
48 Chesney, M. (2000) Interaction and Understanding "me" in the Research. Nurse Researcher, Vol 7, No. 3, pp. 
58 - 69. 
49 Coffey, A. (1999) The Ethnographic Self. London: Sage Publication, p. 7. 
50 Ibid, p. 8. 
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4.7 Data Analysis 
The act of capturing data may shape what is said and in turn influence how it is analysed.51 
Therefore, the empirical chapters present the raw data in the text so that the reader can review 
the interpretation of the data presented. 
 
This qualitative research is presented in a manner that demonstrates the rigour of the work. 
This is done by allowing the research participants' voices to be heard. There are therefore 
many quotations presented within the results chapters to illustrate the themes. 
 
Data analysis is the process of systematically searching, arranging and making sense of the 
data.52 The data gathered from interviews were analysed to look for common themes, patterns 
of behaviour, and actions. During data analysis the main research question and sub-questions 
were re-visited to look for answers. It is important to acknowledge that I may see things 
differently from those actually involved in the reintegration and reconciliation process I was 
investigating. It is also important to acknowledge that data analysis is not a distinct phase of 
the research process; rather data collection and analysis are simultaneous and continuous 
processes.53 The collection and analysis of data are closely linked and each shapes the other 
in an iterative way. 
 
Dey defines data analysis as ‘a process of resolving data into its constituent components to 
reveal its characteristic elements and structure’.54 Day further says that ‘one of the first stages 
of analysis is moving from a chronological order to another kind of order’.55 All of the data 
collected were organised and checked for spelling, clarity, and detail. The data were indexed 
into word documents for easy reference. Each file was printed out onto paper to allow for 
easy reading. I decided not to use a computer software programme, preferring to use paper 
copies of the data. I found it easier to place paper files alongside one another and compare 
information. Dey says that data should be well managed to allow for good analysis to take 
place.56 
                                                          
51 Miles, M., B., and Huberman, A., M. (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications. 
52 Creswell, J., W. (2007) Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
53 Bryman, A, and Burgess, R., G. (1994) Analysing Qualitative Data. London: Routledge. 
54 Dey, I. (1993) Qualitative Data Analysis. A User-Friendly Guide for Social Scientists. London: Routledge, 
pp. 30 - 31. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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I read all of the raw data several times. The data were reviewed line by line in detail until a 
concept emerged. Bryman says that when you sort through and read through the data it 
becomes more familiar to you and you become more familiar with it.57 When reading the 
data, I had to make decisions about what I felt was important and needed to be included in the 
thesis and what could be discounted. These decisions were based on my own interpretation of 
events from the field and my interpretation about the narratives of the respondents during the 
interviews. As I read through the data I began to make sense of it. 
 
In addition, databases for this research were selected from a range of disciplines including 
political science, political economy, anthropology, and sociology. The extensive literature 
reviews provided a sound platform for exploring the complexity of post-conflict reintegration 
in a post-war environment from a social perspective. As social capital concept is complex, 
conceptualised and understood in the literature, this research firstly, reviewed literature on the 
concept to gain a more thorough understanding of it. The literature review drew out questions 
that will be further explored in the empirical chapters.  
 
4.8 Reliability and Validity 
In qualitative research reliability and validity tend to not be used to measure the quality of the 
research process as these are quantitative concepts. For the purpose of this study the 
following terms are used; credibility, dependability, conformability and transferability. 
 
Credibility 
This can be achieved through prolonged engagement with the participants, allowing time to 
fully understand the group, build trust and rapport, and gain honest responses.58 Although 
there was a short timeframe available for fieldwork, however, credibility was established as 
each of the conclusions from each of the different techniques yielded the same or similar 
conclusion. In this way, a more detailed and balanced picture of the situation under 
investigation emerged. 
 
Dependability 
According to Holloway and Wheeler, dependability measures how stable data are over time. 
They claim that researchers should use an audit trail to record how the data was collected and 
                                                          
57 Bryman, A. (2004) Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
58 Brewer, J., D. (2000) Ethnography. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
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how conclusions were reached.59 My initial aim was to verify that my findings were 
consistent with the raw data and if other researchers were to look at this data, then they would 
arrive at similar findings, interpretations, and conclusions. This was important to make sure 
that nothing was missed in the research study, or that I was negligent or misguided in my 
final report. 
 
Conformability 
This acknowledges the influence of the researcher and does not hide it. However, the 
researcher should still aim to provide data that accurately represents the participant's 
responses. I was able to establish dependability by having an outside researcher to conduct an 
inquiry audit on my research study. This technique is also called an external audit. It is an 
inquiry audit that involves having a researcher outside of the data collection and data analysis 
examine the processes of data collection, data analysis, and the results of the research study. 
This was done to confirm the accuracy of my findings and to ensure the findings were 
supported by the data collected. All interpretations and conclusions were examined to 
determine whether they are supported by the data itself. Inquiry audits are beneficial because 
they allow an outside researcher to examine, explore, and challenge how data analysis and 
interpretation occurred. 
 
Transferability  
Generally, transferability refers to the degree to which the results of qualitative research can 
be generalised or transferred to other contexts or settings. It is the extent to which a study 
invites readers to make connections between elements of the study and their own experiences. 
This was achieved by providing a thorough description in order to contextualise the data, thus 
enabling readers to make inferences about contextual similarities. 
 
4.9 Member Checking  
This involves giving the data and its interpretation back to the respondents for them to check 
the meaning that one has ascribed to the data, and looked at the accuracy and credibility of 
the account. I used member checking through two of my assistants who were both 
experienced researchers in the field. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, I recruited Dr John 
Lamina Conteh, a Sierra Leonean academic, and a researcher in similar field as me. Dr 
Conteh is very knowledgeable and experienced in the area because of his long-term 
                                                          
59 Holloway, I. and Wheeler, S. (2002) Qualitative Research in Nursing. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
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involvement for the cause. In addition, I recruited Mr Abdul Rahaman Sannoh, a UNDP 
national coordinator, an expert in qualitative research method and an expert for Small Grants 
for Development Programmes with particular interest in post-conflict development initiatives 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Mr Sannoh has much experience in working with former combatants 
from a range of armed groups. They both looked at the data to see if they recognised the 
descriptions and interpretations as a form of member checking. This increased the 
authenticity and reliability of the findings and helped to reduce researcher bias. 
 
4.9.1 Limitations 
There are some limitations with my choice of methodology and methods. The main limitation 
is that this was a small study, undertaken in a country that had over 70 thousand demobilised 
former combatants.60 My selection of who to interview had an influence over the result.61 The 
choices made ultimately influenced the data gathered. It was not possible for me to interview 
all of the former combatants or all those who were connected with the reintegration process. 
As a result, I may have missed out on important informants. I was only able to work with the 
data that I had been able to gather. Some participants may have felt threatened and did not 
reveal important information; some may have withheld information or not provide a true 
picture of the situation.  
 
Another key limitation was the short timeframe available for fieldwork (a 6-month period, 
from April to September 2015). This prevented repeat visits to the field, and thus limited 
opportunities to build trust with respondents over time. In some ways this affected the 
reliability of the data collected. However, due to limited timeframe and funding limitations, 
this could not realistically be avoided. The politicisation and poor quality of descriptive data 
available on the ground also affected the result. However, due to lack of alternatives, such 
data were used with the goal of making the information collected as representative as 
possible. 
 
Distrust over the researcher’s identity and intentions may also have influenced the reliability 
of data collected. The researcher is an academic who is simultaneously perceived as being 
both ‘foreign’ (who has lived in the UK since the early 1990s) and ‘local’ (with Sierra 
Leonean origin). Therefore, the researcher’s status as an independent investigator was always 
                                                          
60 Solomon, C. and Jeremy, G., J. (2008) Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Sierra Leone, p.2. 
61 Hammersley, M. and Atkinson, P. (1991) Ethnographic Principles in Practice. London: Routledge. 
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questioned by some respondents. My ability to speak some of the key local languages such as 
Mende, Mandingo, and Creole, was expected to help build rapport with respondents. In 
addition, my introduction to participants through local facilitators was presumed to help 
create a basic level of trust. Yet, my association with these local facilitators came with its 
own problems, to the extent, it compromised my independence as a researcher, and restricted 
how, when, where and with whom I interacted. Recognising this source of potential bias, 
there was little that could be done to counteract it. 
 
There was also, in addition a problem in getting relevant and unbiased source of information. 
This was perhaps the most discouraging challenge, and difficult to address, because the views 
of my respondents were routinely tainted by their group’s identity as the RUF for example 
was heavily linked with serious human rights violations in the past. For example, no former 
RUF combatant would ever comment in a way that would indict his or her group’s members, 
or the present community in which they live for fear that the community would retaliate 
against them. Therefore, each respondent stuck to their group’s version of the story about the 
conflict and the DDR process. However, respondent’s views expressed were weighed against 
those given by practitioners, NGO staff and academics, which in some cases proved 
revelatory. 
 
4.10 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter proposed a qualitative methodology used in six months of field work. The value 
of this approach relates to the richness of the data obtained from the field via data collection 
through semi-structured interviews. Snowballing technique was adopted in identifying key 
participants, which together with semi-structured interviewing complemented each other. 
Investigating the reintegration of former combatants using social capital as a lens proved 
difficult and challenging. Some of the challenges were almost overwhelming, as well as the 
research methods adopted. In a bid to overcome some of the challenges, various strategies 
were applied to manage them, and in the process, a pool of relevant data was discovered. In 
writing up the final thesis, existing literature on the reintegration of former combatants were 
weighed against the narratives of the former combatants themselves. The results obtained 
through the combination of these research techniques was the presentation of a balanced, 
empirical study, and a well contextualised account of the effects of social relationships on the 
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reintegration of former combatants, which added to the already existing knowledge in the 
field. 
 
The next chapter presents the first important analysis of the data from fieldwork conducted as 
part of this study. The chapter looks to develop an understanding of social reintegration and 
provide a foundation from which to appreciate the impact social reintegration may have on 
the restoration of social capital and reconciliation. It looks at the experiences of reintegrating 
former combatants into society as well as their ability to effectively function in their ‘new’ 
civilian environment. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Reintegrating Former Combatants: Trials and Tribulations 
 
         Introduction 
‘My actual name is James - James Dauda, but during the war, and even up to the 
time that I gave up my weapon, I changed my name to Saddam Husain… Saddam 
is my fighting name, which is what is on my ex-combatant ID card. Everyone 
knows me as Saddam… One thing that the ‘big people’ (regional institutions, as 
well as the international community) have come to realise in recent years is that 
combatants were not born to become killers or be bad guys… People only 
become bad because their governments or their leaders are bad, their systems are 
rotten and corrupt, and because the society force them to join armed groups and 
to fight. But after the conflict ended in 2002, we have all learned from our 
mistakes. As for me, I am very good at the trade that I learnt after the DDR 
process, I have my certificate, I am a motor mechanic, but I still want to go to a 
good College whether in this country or abroad and get further certificates if 
possible, because competition for job is very high now that we are all civilians’.1  
 
 
Saddam is a 35-year old former RUF combatant from Joru, Gaura Chiefdom in Kenema 
district eastern Sierra Leone, who joined the RUF armed movement when he was just twelve 
years of age. He now lives in neighbouring Bo town, Bo District. (See map of Sierra Leone 
below).  
 
                                                          
1 Author’s interview with James Dauda (known throughout in this thesis as Saddam Husain), Bo, 29th May 
2015. 
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Figure 4, a map of Sierra Leone showing, Kailahun, Kenema, Pujehun and Bo districts, 
where the civil-conflict had its most devastating impact in terms of physical and human 
destruction. 
 
Saddam was forced to join the RUF when his village was attacked by members of the RUF in 
1993. He was one of my respondents, who, in many ways contributed most of the information 
collected during my research visit to Sierra Leone. In one of our conversations, he expressed 
how former combatants were, before the conflict, normal people, most of them (like himself) 
children or young adults, who during the conflict passed through transition phase, and by the 
end of the conflict, they wished to return to their normal civilian lifestyle again and live like 
the rest of the civilian population.  
 
The process of transformation from combat lifestyle to civilian lifestyle in Sierra Leone 
began with the UN backed-DDR process, which happened at the same time when the country 
was undergoing economic and political transformation. The transformation of Sierra Leonean 
society - from the wartime society to a peaceful one - required a complete change of people’s 
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behaviour, their relationships, perceptions and personalities, including those of former 
combatants.  
 
Like many societies emerging from conflict, the social aspects of reintegration in Sierra 
Leone centres on two main issues. On the one hand, it centres on the ability of former 
combatants to effectively function in their ‘new’ civilian environment. On the other hand, it 
centres on whether society is willing and ready to accept and accommodate them. At an 
individual level, psychological challenges in relation to self-images and overcoming 
traumatic experiences that occurred to them during the conflict and the challenges they face 
during their reintegration are very important. Thus, dealing effectively with former 
combatants in civilian context may entail serious challenges for them as well as for the 
civilian community into which they reintegrate.  
 
The comprehensive DDR programme, implemented and coordinated by the UN and the 
NCDDR, took place between 1999 and 2003. Over this period, about 72,500 combatants 
from all armed factions were disarmed and demobilised, including 4,751 women (6.5 
percent) and 6,787 children (9.4 percent), of whom 506 were girls; 42,330 weapons and 1.2 
million pieces of ammunition were collected and destroyed.2 
 
The table below shows gender category of former combatants from various armed factions 
disarmed and demobilised between 1999 and 2002.  
 
Faction No. of men % No of women % No of boys % No of girls % 
AFRC 7,914 89.3 530 6.0 375 4.2 41 0.5 
CDF 34,890 93.3 296 5.3 1,996 5.3 7 0.001 
RUF 16,735 68.8 3,925 16.1 3,229 13.3 436 1.8 
SLA NA NA NA NA 445 NA 22 NA 
Total NA NA NA NA 6,181 NA 506 NA 
Table 3: Gender category of former combatants from different armed factions in Sierra Leone 
                                                          
2 Solomon, C, and Ginifer, J. (2008) Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration in Sierra Leone.  
Contribution to the Project on: DDR and Human Security, Post conflict Security Building in the Interest of the 
Poor. Document Available on line at: 
www.operationspaix.net/.../4024~v~Disarmament_Demobilisation_and_Reintegration_in_Sierra_Leone.pdf. 
Document Accessed on line on: 15/08/2016. 
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Source: Solomon, C, and Ginifer, J. (2008) DDR and Human Security: Post-Conflict 
Security-Building in the Interests of the Poor, p. 8. 
 
The DDR programme in Sierra Leone started badly, as it suffered severe setbacks at various 
points, including initial non-compliance with the Lome Peace Agreements on the side of the 
RUF forces, and resumptions of armed conflict. It was not until the closing stages of the 
demobilisation programme in 2002 that these breaches were finally controlled. The 
expectation that DDR would underpin stability and security proved unfounded for much of 
the DDR phases as civilians in some parts of the country continued to be attacked and more 
children were recruited into various armed groups.  
 
This chapter analyses the dramatic increase in comprehensive programmes that sought to 
reintegrate former combatants in Sierra Leone, a country recovering from one of the most 
violent conflicts that Africa has witnessed in recent memory. It starts by arguing that being a 
member of an armed group during the conflict in Sierra Leone was an important way of 
accumulating power and fortifying one’s status in society.3 The chapter further argues that 
carrying and/or using weapons during the conflict gave combatants a sense of power and 
control over civilians. It examines the difficulties faced by the NCDDR commission to attract 
funds, as well as the difficulties to manage the very large number of former combatants, 
which resulted in the delivery of poorly structured short-term training opportunities for 
former combatants. 
 
5.1 Identity Transformation: Power and Status 
In the context of this thesis, power is defined as the ability to influence or outright control the 
behaviour of people through the use of the gun, which involves force or the threat of force. It 
is important to step back at this point and to discuss what it takes or means to be a former 
RUF combatant in Sierra Leone, following the end of the conflict. Being a member of an 
armed group during the conflict was an important way of accumulating power and increasing 
one’s status. A need for a better position in Sierra Leone to withstand oppression from the 
authorities was part of the wider reasons why most of the youth joined the RUF armed 
movement. Evidence from the field suggests other reasons why people joined the movement 
including access to food, wealth, power, and the creation of a ‘new type of family or 
                                                          
3 Weiss, T. (2005) Perpetrating Powers: Small Arms in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia. ISS Monograph, 
No. 116. Document Available on line at: https://reliefweb.int/.../sierra-leone/perpetrating-power-small-arms-
post-conflict-sierra. Document Accessed on line on: 07/10/16. 
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community’ - a supportive network that could look after them, and provide them with social 
status in society. 
 
During the conflict, it was the combination of socio-economic and political factors that 
suggested the rank that a particular subject hold or occupied in society. The higher the 
person’s position in society was, the more opportunity that individual was likely to enjoy. In 
other words, if we want to measure the status of an actor in society, we must consider certain 
variables, such as: the level of power that individuals exercise; the level of security they have 
access to; as well as the level of influence they enjoy.4 Some of these variables, which are 
further discussed below were used by armed actors as a determinant factor during the conflict 
to show their status or their position in society. These variables became also important after 
the conflict ended in 2002.  
 
I have emphasised in the preceding paragraph that one of the most important variables that 
determine strong status in time of conflict is the level of power individuals exercise, 
especially by the use of the gun. Therefore, the relationship between power and status was 
important in maintaining the hierarchy of certain individuals in wartime Sierra Leone”.5  
 
As Amadu Yajah, one of my respondent’s narratives below suggests: 
 
‘I joined the freedom fighters (the RUF) in August 1993. At first, I was so scared…then I got 
used to it,’ said Amadu, who began his fighting career with the RUF in Pujehun at the age of 
ten. ‘We were being treated badly by them (the rebels). Some of us were forced to join the 
revolution, we had no choice. Others joined willingly…. Our responsibility as younger 
members of the movement were to transport looted goods and arms and ammunition anytime 
they went to the battlefield. We were also responsible for cooking. I got used to the situation, 
I wanted to be in control one day like others, I wanted to be a Bosman (an important person 
in society) … For others like Fanta Steven, she started fighting with the RUF at the age of 
eleven after she was detained, raped and tortured by the government forces. ‘I thought of 
leaving [the fighting] many times,’ she said. ‘I dropped out of school, I lost my future, I lost 
everything... I looked for job, but there was no job. That was the most difficult period in my 
                                                          
4 Lindemann, K. (2007) ‘The Impact of Objective Characteristics on Subjective Social Position’. Tallinn, 
Estonia: Trames, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp.54 - 68. 
5 Massey, K., Freeman, S. and Zelditch, M. (1997) ‘Status, Power and Accounts’. Social Psychology Quarterly. 
Vol. 60, No. 3. pp. 238. 
129 
 
life.’ So, I decided to stay with them (the RUF) for protection, because there was no way to 
go back to my village. I was attached to captain Kongolo’s regiment so that he would protect 
me from further rape, torture and abuses. 
 
The cases of both Amadu and Fanta are in line with David King’s analysis of youth’s 
involvement in the conflict in Sierra Leone. King views the engagement of Sierra Leonean 
youth in the conflict as a move towards influence, status, power and security.6 King argues 
that most people joined the RUF armed movement, especially the youth as a way to gain 
influence, protection and power in society, because wartime Sierra Leonean society enabled 
youth to become strong figures in society through the use of the gun.7 Therefore, one of the 
most important ways to have access to power and influence during the war era, according to 
King was to participate directly in the conflict as the narratives of Amadu and Fanta suggest. 
They were both abused first and humiliated, especially Fanta. Therefore, for some joining the 
movement was a strategy to avoid abuse and humiliation. It must also be remembered that the 
more violent an individual became during the conflict, the more power he or she 
accumulated.8 However, following the end of the conflict, their disarmament and 
demobilisation led to a loss of influence and power that they as fighters had accumulated 
during the conflict, which inevitably led to increase in their vulnerability. 
 
During the conflict, huge amounts of power were vested in ‘authorities’, which created the 
possibility for those in power (especially those with weapons) to force people to do 
something they would not otherwise do in normal circumstance. For many who were 
associated with the RUF, like in many other armed organisations elsewhere, power 
symbolised control over the life of civilians or non-combatants. Thus, during the armed 
conflict in Sierra Leone, the legitimacy of power depended on the status of the fighters and, at 
the same time, status tended to legitimise power. 
 
                                                          
6 King, D. (1995) Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James Currey. 
7 See for instance Utas, M. (1997) ‘Assiduous Exile: Strategies of Work and Integration among Liberian 
Refugees in Danane, Ivory Coast’. Department of Cultural Anthropology. Uppsala: Uppsala University Press. 
8 Known throughout Sierra Leone as ‘Mosquito’ for his ability to attack while civilians as well as other armed 
groups were off their guard - Sam Bockarie was one of the most feared RUF commanders to emerge from the 
country's decade-long civil-conflict, which ended in 2002. Sam once said in an interview with the BBC: ‘‘I 
cannot tell how many people I have killed, because when I am firing during an attack, nobody can survive my 
bullets’. Sam’s ability to kill large number of people with no hesitation shows why he was one of the most 
feared and powerful men in the RUF hierarchy and in the country at large during the conflict. This enabled him 
to accumulate more power and influence during the armed struggle. 
130 
 
In many ways, intimidation and fear were used by combatants during the conflict as a means 
of exercising power over the powerless, i.e., the civilian population, as well as their 
opponents - mainly the national army and the CDF. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
such was the case during recruitment process into the armed movement. Thus, intimidation 
and fear were used as instruments for maintaining control by the combatants.  
 
The statement below gives a summation of how power was utilised by the RUF during the 
conflict. 
 
‘I was twelve years old when my village was attacked’, said Turkish in an interview 
with this author in Bo, southern Sierra Leone. 
 
Like many other recruits, Turkish, now 39 years old and living in Bo, was forcefully recruited 
into the RUF movement at the age of twelve. He later joined the West Side Boys9 after the 
RUF/AFRC forces were driven from Freetown in late 1999. He described how he and other 
boys of his age from his village had gone to the neighbouring village to find food for their 
families when they were, in his own words, ‘ambushed and kidnapped’ by members of the 
RUF. He described how, after forcefully recruiting them into the movement they used human 
parts to make checkpoints so as to install fear and intimidation into civilians and new recruits 
to prevent them from escaping. They tracked down anyone whom they deemed to be their 
enemy - doctors who treated wounded enemies, journalist - and tortured and killed them. 
They killed people who refused to give them money, or those who did not give enough 
money, or people who looked at them wrongly.  
 
Although Turkish was abducted by the RUF, he however did acknowledge that some of the 
people from his own village, including children voluntarily joined the armed movement.  
 
With the outbreak of the armed conflict in Sierra Leone in March 1991, it was common for 
people to join the rebellion, especially in the rural areas. Some families took their own 
                                                          
9 The West Side Boys were one of several armed military groups in the Sierra Leonean civil-war. It was a 
splinter group of the RUF which emerged as a key player particularly between 1999 and 2000. In most 
international media accounts, the West Side Boys appeared as nothing more than renegade, anarchistic bandits, 
devoid of any trace of long-term political goals. For detailed analysis on The West Side Boys and the part they 
played in the Sierra Leone’s conflict, see for instance Utas, M. (2008) The West Side Boys: Military Navigation 
in Sierra Leone. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.3, No. 46, pp. 487 - 511.  
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children to the RUF Headquarters,10 because they felt that their families needed to be 
represented in the revolution. Also, there were some chiefdoms in rural Sierra Leone where 
family feuds, especially chieftaincy ruling houses used this situation to settle old scores. A 
classical case in point is the chieftaincy dispute that existed between and among the Banyas, 
the Gobehs and the Bundehs for paramount chieftain positions in Kailahun.11 Other parents 
felt that if their children joined what they saw as ‘the struggle for freedom’, they would be 
able to improve their status as well as protect them.  
 
As one of my respondents explained: 
 
 ‘…So, because we had a big family, two of my brothers had already joined the 
struggle in early 1992 when the revolution started. I did not know why they had 
joined, because I was young… Although I did not join at that time, I expected to 
join and team up with them at some stage during the struggle... so that we can 
protect our own people in case other groups wanted to take advantage over them. 
At that time, many people were joining, even girls as young as eight…’12  
 
 
The recruitment of children and young people into armed groups has traditionally been 
looked at from two main perspectives: those children and young adults who are forced into 
armed groups and those who join voluntarily. Some DDR scholars, among them Burgress, 
view children’s recruitment into non-state armed groups as a result of poverty, lack of 
education, and due to family violence,13 as pointed out in the preceding paragraphs. Burgress 
describes these children and young adults as passive victims of actions conducted by adults or 
parents in particular, and thus raising the issue of how child recruitment into non-state armed 
groups should be understood. In Burgress’ view, there is little difference between ‘coerced/ 
forceful’ and ‘voluntary’ recruitment into armed movements, indicating some kind of 
dichotomy between the two forms of recruitment. In reality, recruitment of child soldiers 
largely take place in what Vautravers calls the ‘‘grey zone’’ between forced and voluntary 
recruitment, and the recruits, mainly children make their choices based on the information 
                                                          
10 Headquarters means the office where the administration of the movement was based, and where important 
decisions about the revolution were being taking from. 
11 Chieftaincy is a traditional form of leadership at the local level in Sierra Leone, where there are ruling houses 
that compete in chieftaincy elections to be paramount chiefs. Those contests are mostly hotly contested, to such 
an extent that it has created enmity in certain chiefdoms like Luawa and Njaluahun chiefdoms in eastern Sierra 
Leone. Thus, it was not surprising that members of these ruling houses were to join armed factions as to have 
power over the others. 
12 Author’s interview with Tigana Joseph, a former RUF member, Pendembu, 21st March 2015. 
13 Burgress, R. (2009) ‘Colombia’s Children at Risk of Recruitment into Armed Groups: Exploring a 
Community-Based, Psychosocial Pedagogy’, Journal of Education for International Development, Vol. 4, No. 
1, pp. 1- 11.  
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available to them at the time of recruitment.14 However, as Honwana points out, children 
affected by conflict do not all constitute a homogeneous group of helpless victims but some 
exercise choices that are shaped by their particular experiences and circumstances.15  
 
In any case, power is important for the status of an armed actor in time of conflict. But the 
difference lies in where actors get their power from, and how that power is exercised. In the 
case of the Sierra Leone’s RUF, the power that they had during the conflict lay in ‘coercive 
force’,16 which was inevitably based on the fear of having freedom, assuring the submission 
of others. This ‘coercive power’ that was at the disposal of the armed actors during the war 
left resistance and resentment as a legacy in Sierra Leonean society, which has up till now 
affected some former combatants in terms of their ability to reintegrate.  
 
5.2 Access to Security 
One of the key attributes that determine actors’ identity, in addition to power and social status 
is security.  As discussed in the preceding section, a need for security was one of the main 
reasons why many people joined various armed groups during the conflict. As Lujala recently 
reminds us, during armed conflicts, security is not just a matter of individual, family or 
communal safety, but also of access to wealth, food and other basic goods for survival, as 
well as to settle old disputes between and among groups and families.17 This can be applied 
directly to the long running land dispute between the Banyas and the Gobehs in Kailahun, as 
well as the Gbows and Jajuas in Segbwema, eastern Sierra Leone. 
 
Lujala’s analysis given above in terms of family and communal security, as well as access to 
wealth, food and other basic goods for survival, and for military settlement of old disputes 
between and among families during conflict can be attributed to Tamba Lamina’s own 
narratives below: 
 
‘Before I joined [the rebels], I was in my village. Early one morning, Government 
forces came to our village looking for members of the RUF. In the event, my 
elder brother, Jamiru was falsely accused by the Government forces of being a 
member of the RUF. As a result, he was shot repeatedly by the Government 
                                                          
14 Vautravers, A., J. (2009) Why Child Soldiers. Refugee Survey, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 96 - 107. 
15 Honwana, A. (2006) Child Soldiers in Africa. University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 4 - 5. 
16 French, J., R., P., and Raven, B. (1959) ‘The Bases of Social Power’. In Cartwright, D. (Ed.), Studies in 
Social Power. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
17 Lujala, P. (2010) The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebels Access to Natural Resources, 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 15 - 28. 
133 
 
forces. The commander then asked whose son my dead brother was, and people 
pointed at my father.  Now my father too is not alive... So, later on, I had to join 
the revolution [the RUF movement] to protect the rest of my family; I needed to 
provide security for them. I also joined so that I will be able to provide for my 
family in time of great difficulty in the country.’18 
 
 
Tamba fought for most of the time in Kailahun and Kono districts. His narrative above 
evokes the unstable security situation in the country during the conflict. In their study 
undertaken in 2009, Humphreys and Weinstein found that although 87.8 percent of RUF 
recruits were abducted, about 42 percent of all those who joined did so in other to survive and 
to provide security for themselves and their families.  
 
The table below gives a summary of how recruitment into the RUF and CDF armed groups 
were structured. The table also shows that almost 88 percent of the recruits for the RUF were 
drawn from abduction of children and other marginalised youth from the rural areas across 
the country. However, around 42 percent of the recruits joined for survival and for security 
reasons. Please note that the focus of this study is on the RUF. 
 
Reasons for joining RUF CDF 
I supported the group’s political goals 9.6% 70.4% 
I joined to defend my community 1.1% 15.8% 
People inside the group lived better than those outside 2.4% 2.3% 
I was abducted 87.8% 2.0% 
I was put under social pressure to join 0.3% 1.4% 
I joined in order to retaliate 0.3% 5.0% 
I was scared of what would happen if I didn’t choose to join 41.8% 51.2% 
I was offered money to join 0.0% 0.4% 
Total number interviewed 374 557 
 Table 4: Summary of RUF and CDF recruitments during the armed struggle in Sierra Leone. 
Source: Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J., M. (2009) Field Experiments and the Political 
Economy of Development. California: Stanford University. 
 
 
The narratives above raise two particular concerns: firstly, for actors to provide protection or 
security for themselves and their families, they needed to join an armed group. Secondly, 
                                                          
18 Author’s interview with Tamba Lamina, former RUF member, Kono, 4th April 2015. 
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following the decision to join a particular armed group, they needed to be motivated to stay 
with that particular armed group. 
 
For the purpose of this study, whether the decision to join the RUF was through abduction, to 
defend one’s community, to protect or provide security for one’s own family or community, 
to support a particular armed group’s political goal and ideology, or whether the decision to 
join was spontaneous or not, what is clear is that most people joined different factions 
because of lack of choice as most were forced to do so. Life must be considered as a valuable 
asset, which, during the conflict could only be protected by joining a particular armed group - 
in this context, to have access to weapon and to accrue the status of a fighter - as a precaution 
against getting killed or having your family killed.  
 
When it came to acquiring basic goods and services during the conflict in Sierra Leone, like 
in many other war-ravaged societies around the world, the effect of the conflict modified the 
normal social order. As a result of the instabilities and the nature of the brutality posed by 
various armed actors during the conflict, there was a total transformation in the socio-
economic and political status of the Sierra Leonean society into ‘a survival society’. Thus, 
civilians were deprived of basic goods and services. Therefore, for most of the population, 
especially in the rural areas, the only way to have access to food and security was to join an 
armed group. As one former combatant explains: 
 
‘I joined the freedom fighters voluntarily, by myself, because when they [the 
RUF armed group] came to our village in December 1994, it was Christmas time, 
they stayed there for long, we ran out of food and other goods, and we needed to 
survive, many people in the region joining them…. So, like other people, I joined 
them too to have access to food, money and other basic goods and to protect 
myself and my family’.19  
 
 
But the power of small arms and ammunition should not be underestimated during civil 
conflicts. Ultimately, the most important positions during conflict are held by those who have 
access to arms. They are therefore those who control wealth, food, power, status and security. 
 
It is important to emphasise that many respondents who took part in this study quite candidly 
revealed that carrying and/or using weapons during the conflict gave them a sense of power, 
                                                          
19 Author’s interview with Denis Conteh, a former RUF fighter, Freetown, 14th June 2015. 
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security and control over civilians, as well as other combatants which they very well enjoyed. 
In this sense, the structure of the RUF armed movement, like many other armed groups 
around the world, mirrored the traditional male-controlled hierarchies of a society that in the 
past relegated women, the young and the poor to lower social standing and elevated the rich 
and the powerful in society. However, as many former combatants discovered, while carrying 
weapons did not alter their relatively low status within the rebel group, it did provide them 
with an opportunity to achieve power outside of the group, particularly over the civilian 
population. Some respondents reported feeling an increased sense of pride, self-confidence, 
and belonging as a result. This excitement in handling weapons may have been comparable to 
experiencing a form of emancipation on the side of the rebels during the armed struggle. 
 
However, the transition from ‘victim’ to ‘perpetrator’ was not a linear one, nor was it true 
that all - or even most - young combatants experienced the full transition from victim to 
hardened perpetrator. Instead, it would appear that the youth within the armed movement 
continually vacillated between committing acts of violence and being victims of violence 
themselves. The complexity of this situation often brought about much confusion. 
 
The younger members of the RUF armed movement were subjected to brutal victimization by 
their captors. Yet to characterize these younger members solely as victims is to present a 
distorted image of their lived realities. Many of them also became active and violent armed 
actors, and in so doing perpetrated acts of violence and cruelty themselves, and thus 
experienced a common rush of power in acquiring and using weapons of violence.  
 
In this section, I have discussed what it means to be a member of an armed faction like the 
Sierra Leone’s RUF. I have, in addition argued that it is the combination of socio-economic 
and political factors that suggest the rank that a particular subject hold in society in time of 
conflict. The higher the person’s position is in society, the more opportunity that individual is 
likely to have access to in time of conflict. Younger members of the armed movement were 
subjected to brutal victimization by their captors, and therefore, to characterize them solely as 
perpetrators of violence is not feasible. 
 
 In the next section, I discuss how former RUF combatants struggle to construct their new 
civilian identity following their demobilisation. I also discuss the relationship between 
identity and status, and further argue that the exclusion of some former combatants from 
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society usually arises as a result of the violent past behaviour associated with them as 
individuals or as a group. 
 
5.3 Status, Identity and the Construction of Self 
During the reintegration of former combatants, status serves as a key factor in understanding 
the identity and community inclusion and/or exclusion. Status is defined in this thesis as the 
present condition or state of a person or that experienced by him or her. The concept of social 
identity and its exact definition on the other hand can vary within certain limits of context and 
history. Given its importance as a concept in this study, I will discuss it further as both things 
to be explained and something that has explanatory force. In social category, group identity is 
a set of persons marked by a label and distinguished by rules deciding membership and 
(alleged) characteristic features or attributes.20 In terms of individual identity, it refers to 
some distinguishing characteristic(s) that a person takes a special pride in or views as socially 
consequential but more-or-less unchangeable.21 
 
One of the key aspects of the relationship between status and identity is that one cannot 
function correctly without having an impact on the other. The status of an individual is 
basically a macro overview [held by society] of the individual’s personal choices and traits in 
a personalised and social environment.22 These choices are structured by the identity of the 
individual. Herein lies the relationship; the status is macro-structured while the identity is 
micro-structured.23 
 
Identity plays an important role in post-conflict reconciliation as well as in the reintegration 
of former combatants following their disarmament and demobilisation.24 However, identity is 
decidedly influenced by historical and contextual circumstances. In the context of Sierra 
Leone’s RUF, due to the present difficulties in the process of their transformation, the 
                                                          
20 Fearon, D., J. (1999) What is Identity as we now Use the Word? Document Available on line at: 
https://web.stanford.edu/group/.../What-is-Identity-as-we-now-use-the-word-.pdf. Document Accessed on line 
on: 10/12/16. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Jennings, K., M. (2008) ‘Seeing DDR from Below: Challenges and Dilemmas Raised by the Experiences of 
Ex-Combatants in Liberia’. Journal of New Security Programme Report. Vol. 9, No. 4. 
23Fearon, D., J. (1999) What is Identity as we now Use the Word? Document Available on line at: 
https://web.stanford.edu/group/.../What-is-Identity-as-we-now-use-the-word-.pdf. Document Accessed on line 
on: 10/12/16. 
24 Ibid. 
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situation is shaped by the past conflict. Hence, identity and status is a crucial aspect of being 
a former combatant.  
 
When the RUF combatants were exerting their authority on the civilian population or their 
captives during the conflict, they were not held in high regard or admiration; rather they 
wanted to demonstrate that they were in high authority and this gave them high status. Since 
the RUF claimed that they were fighting to liberate the citizens of Sierra Leone from the 
brutality of the APC, they claimed to be fighting for the common good. They therefore felt 
that they deserved to have more privileges than the rest of the civilian population. The former 
fighters’ status is the result of their interactions with society, while their identity is the way 
the Sierra Leonean society perceives them and how they perceive society. The recognition of 
a different status for the former combatants accentuates the division between them and the 
civilian population. Identity, in this case, is linked to society’s perception of the group 
recognised by names such as ‘old killers’, ‘old rebels’, ‘former combatants’, ‘spoilers’ or 
‘bad guys’. 
 
During fieldwork in Sierra Leone, I noticed that former combatants who have not been able 
to find their place in the ‘new’ Sierra Leonean society, created a kind of self-defence 
mechanism as a means of survival. Self-exclusion, sometimes generated by former 
combatants themselves or by society, defending other members in case of an outbreak of 
trouble, associating with other former combatants and blaming society for the difficulties 
they face, is among some of the instruments they use to shape their new identity. For them, 
working together as a unit, for example as Okada Riders,25 or as a group of young men and 
women who sit in ghettos and discuss politics or daily issues that society faces, is a result of 
the individual necessity for people to assimilate and share the same or similar experiences in 
order to feel a sense of belonging to the ‘new’ Sierra Leonean society. 
 
But as Paul Higate explains, the exclusion of some former combatants from society usually 
arises as a result of the violent behaviour associated with them as individuals.26 Thus, the 
                                                          
25It is estimated that 90 percent of Okada Riders across Sierra Leone are former combatants. See for example 
Laurence, M. (2013) ‘Bottom up DDR’: Sierra Leone’s Okada Riders, Centre for Security Governance. 
Document Available on line at: www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2013/03/19/bottom-up-ddr-sierra-leones-okada-
riders. Document Accessed on line on: 10/10/2015. 
26 Higate, P. (2004) Gender and Peacekeeping Case Studies: The DRC and Sierra Leone, ISS Monograph 91. 
Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Document Available on line at: http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive. 
Document Accessed on line on: 03/04/16. 
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difficulties involved in being a former combatant in civilian environment were on every 
respondent's lip during fieldwork in Sierra Leone. As Munda Sannoh, a former RUF 
combatant explains:  
 
‘People in Torwama community27 (the community in which the respondent now 
lives) dislike me, because of my past involvement with the RUF. I don’t know 
why, maybe because the fighting did really destroy much of the infrastructure in 
the area, but the people of Torwama were resistant to the movement. It is still 
very difficult for some of us to live normal life.’28  
 
 
Munda Sannoh’s narrative above was also supported by another anonymous respondent, who 
remarked:  
‘Life is difficult being a former female combatant in a civilian environment, 
because you know little about how to work in the house as a woman... Since I 
was abducted aged ten, I did not know how to manage a household, and certainly 
I am still struggling to do so even now.... It is a big problem for most of us - no 
husband, no boyfriend, nothing of such, because society sees us as violent or 
rebel women. Even now, some people still call us ‘old rebels’ or ‘old killers’. 
Living in civilian environment for former fighters like me is extremely difficult. 
When you compare between women who were not involved in the fighting and 
those of us who were, most of the time, the keeping and leading of the household 
is difficult for those of us who were involved in the conflict as compared to those 
who did not.’29  
 
 
The two narratives presented above suggest that there is a direct relationship between violent 
conflict and its implications for domestic life of former combatants following their 
demobilisation.  
 
CBD initiatives are regarded as key mechanisms to achieving transformation of bonding 
social capital into bridging social capital because of their inclusive and participatory nature. I 
have in addition argued that CBD approaches can bring about meaningful reintegration in 
societies emerging from violent conflict including Sierra Leone. Former combatants’ sharing 
of a group identity and a ‘place of belonging in the local structure’30 could have significant 
                                                          
27 Towama was, until recently a small village near the city of Bo. It has now amalgamated into the city of Bo 
and is where Njala University is situated. 
28 Author’s interview with Munda Sannoh, a former RUF fighter, Towama, 2nd June 2015. 
29 Author's interview with Yatta Mansaray, a former female combatant, Bo, 7th May 2015. 
30  Higate, P. (2004) Gender and Peacekeeping Case Studies: The DRC and Sierra Leone, ISS Monograph 91. 
Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, pp. 6 -7. 
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impact for society as a whole. Accordingly, group identity has an impact on ‘civil conflict’,31 
and being part of a group can help the individual to gain a positive self-image and transcend 
stigmas and negative identities and labels. 
 
Nonetheless, there is a sense that being a former combatant in Sierra Leone is not something 
that people who directly took part in the conflict had relegated to the past; rather it remained 
an active part of their existence and their identity, perhaps for the rest of their lives, due in 
part to their experience as armed actors. There is a stigma attached to being part of one of the 
most devastating conflicts that Africa has witnessed in recent history, a conflict that killed 
between 30,000 and 75,000 people; displaced around fifty percent of the country’s population 
and destroyed about half of the country’s infrastructure.32 Inevitably, this differentiated them 
from the rest of the civilian population as many people still struggle to find the mechanism to 
adequately deal with the past, especially at community level. 
 
This section has discussed the construction of self and the relationship that exist between 
status and identity within the framework of post-conflict reintegration. The section has, in 
addition argued that former combatants’ sharing of a group identity and a “place of belonging 
in the local structure could have significant impart for society as a whole. 
 
The next section discusses factors that force former combatants into a state of disillusion and 
confusion about their role in their own reintegration following the end of a conflict. It 
discusses the lack of trust, marginalisation, discrimination, and inequality and how they can 
lead to anger and high emotions experience by formal combatants in their new civilian 
environment.  
 
5.4 Former Combatants’ Emotional Well-Being: Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder 
The previous section analysed the (re)construction of ‘self’ by former combatants, the 
relationship between status and identity in their new civilian environment, which are affected 
by the DDR process that they went through. This section, on the other hand examines the 
common perceptions, sensations and feelings experienced by formal combatants in their new 
                                                          
31 Ibid, pp. 6 - 7. 
32 See Kaldor, M., and Vincent, J. (2006) Evaluation of UNDP Support for Conflict - Affected Countries. 
United Nations Development Programme. Document Available on line at: 
web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/thematic/conflict/ConflictEvaluation2006.pdf. Document Accessed on line 
on 12/12/2015. 
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status as civilians, which has contributed to the state of uncertainty and confusion on their 
part. For many former RUF combatants who took part in this study, isolation, betrayal, 
abandonment, loneliness and discrimination are among some of the key reasons for their 
failure to reintegrate back into civilian society following their demobilisation. During 
fieldwork and through some of my interviews and informal conversations with respondents, I 
was able to understand the feeling of isolation, mental and emotional difficulties, 
discrimination and the feelings of abandonment that they are presently going through. The 
purpose of this section is to examine the common traits experienced by many former 
combatants, which hinder their reintegration and contribute to their position of ‘neglected 
former combatants’. 
 
In a conversation with Saddam, one of my respondents, I noted the following: 
 
Interviewer: How do you feel now that the war is over and you now live in a civilian 
environment? 
 
Saddam: Yes, the war is now over, and we live in civilian environment, but there remain 
many problems in this country. All of the problems that caused the war are still around - 
poverty, inequality, corruption, greed and grievance are still embedded in our society despite 
the violence conflict we went through.   
 
Interviewer: What do you mean? 
 
Saddam: Because since the conflict ended in 2002, we were promised many things such as 
job opportunities, houses, even money, and ‘good life’ but until now, nobody cares for us, 
and we as ex-fighters are suffering and struggling for our living. The only way we survive is 
by riding Okada. 
 
 Interviewer: Can you explain this further please? 
 
Saddam: During our time in the DDR camp, they told us that the international community 
will provide money, jobs and houses for us when we give up our arms. I was attached to 
General Augustine Gbaw’s33 regiment in Makeni, in the north. During our stay in Makeni, 
General Gbaw was given a lot of money by the ‘big people’ (the international community) to 
be distributed among those of us who were under his command, so were other Generals 
across the movement. But he kept all of the money for his own personal use. After the war 
ended, some of us who survived went and asked him about the money, but he told us that 
there was no money for us because he knew the war was over. So, some of the men decided 
to go to his house and kill him at night. But he was lucky; it was the following week that he 
                                                          
33 Augustine Gbaw was a senior commander in the RUF movement from 1991 until his arrest in 2002. He was 
one of the most ruthless and most feared commanders in the RUF movement. Gbaw was convicted by the Sierra 
Leone Special Court in February 2009 for war crimes and crimes against humanity. He was sentenced to 25 
years in prison. 
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was arrested and indicted by the Special Court. Now we are left with nothing except extreme 
poverty. We struggle to even feed our family. 
 
Interviewer: What do you think about this situation? 
 
Saddam: General Gbaw and other senior commanders in the movement as well as the 
government and the international community betrayed us because since the war ended, 
everybody turned their backs on us - no jobs, no money. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think you are marginalised or discriminated against because of your 
involvement with the RUF? 
 
Saddam: Yes, it is very difficult for us to get job, we are left by ourselves, and nobody care 
for us except our close relatives and friends, and those of us who fought for the common 
cause - former fighters occasionally when we meet in the ghetto.34 
 
My extended discussion with Saddam who fought under the command of General Gbaw in 
Makeni summarises explicitly, not only the feelings of most former combatants across the 
board, but also the position they are now in after their demobilisation. Some of them had 
violent reactions from members of their community, some forgot about their past, and others 
just did not integrate with society. But most of them had feelings of resentment against some 
individuals especially their own commanders or society as a whole. In terms of feelings and 
emotions, this gap generated different reactions among former combatants. From the 
respondents and the discussions so far, it is clear that some of the common feelings are the 
sense of abandonment and inequality created by the authorities, former commanders, 
organisations and society in general.  
 
The disarmament and demobilisation (the first two stages of the DDR process) forced some 
former combatants into a state of disillusion and confusion about their role in the new Sierra 
Leonean society. Questions then arose about both new and old relationships, which generated 
inner doubts on the side of the RUF. For some, this confusion is temporary, while for others it 
is permanent. Labelling them as old killers, old rebels, former combatant or ex-fighter carries 
with it negative associations, and thus creates a sense of disapproval by society, aggravating 
their condition, that then modulates into stigmatisation. As Saddam further explains: 
 
‘Some people in my community sometimes call me old killer, old rebel or old 
assassin, all sorts of names. But what we need to do as former combatants is to 
                                                          
34Author’s interview with Saddam, Bo, 29 May 2015. 
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change our attitude and behaviour completely, because we now live in a different 
environment - the civilian environment.’35 
 
The reintegration of former combatants is linked, in some ways to individual behaviour, and 
how well they try to adjust to their new civilian environment. Other factors such as identity, 
the level of destruction that took place in a particular community, and perhaps most 
importantly, the level of sensitisation that took place in a given community about the 
reintegration project following the termination of the conflict are also important. It is also 
obvious that some community members, in places such as Kailahun and Pujehun, where the 
rebellion started in March 1991, saw former RUF combatants as revolutionary heroes, idols 
or ‘liberators’, whose main aim was to free them and their country from the brutality of the 
APC regime. In other places, where destruction of properties was high, they were described 
as ‘old killers’ or ‘old rebels’.  
 
In this section, I have examined the common perceptions, sensations and feelings experienced 
by many former combatants in the civilian environment after they were demobilised, which 
have contributed to the state of uncertainty, betrayal and confusion on their part. I have also 
pointed out that some former combatants who took part in this study pointed to isolation, 
betrayal, abandonment and discrimination as some of the key issues responsible for their 
failure to reintegrate back into civilian society after the termination of the conflict.  
 
The next section looks at the difficulties faced by the NCDDR commission to attract funds, as 
well as the difficulties to manage the very large number of former combatants. This resulted 
in the delivery of poorly structured short-term training opportunities for former combatants. 
 
5.5 Evaluating the Success and Failure of Reintegration 
Compared with other dimensions of post-conflict reintegration such as economic and political 
reintegration, social reintegration focuses mainly on the degree to which former combatants 
adapt local customs, social relations, and daily practices of the communities into which they 
are to be reintegrated. Social reindentation is usually measured through social network, 
language, and intermarriage.36 One of the most commonly used indicators of social 
reintegration is social network, which refers to the connection that former combatants build 
                                                          
35Author’s interview with Saddam, Bo, 29 May 2015. 
36 Vigdor, J. (2008) Measuring Immigrant Assimilation in the United States. New York: Manhattan Institute, 
Civic Report No. 53. 
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with others in the host community. While some scholars use the total number of former 
combatants’ friends as a measure, others use the frequency of interaction with friends and 
community members.  
 
Language is another important variable some scholars use to access the degree of former 
combatants’ social reintegration. A higher level in grasping local language results in more 
chances to communicate with community members and a better understanding of local 
culture. A typical question I adopted during data collection is as ‘Do you understand the local 
people’s language’? In south and eastern Sierra Leone for instance, the fluency of Mende 
dialect is a widely used indicator as a successful social reintegration, while the fluency of 
Temne dialect in the North is an indicator of successful social reintegration. 
 
Intermarriage is also an indicator of social reintegration in a post-war context. In some cases, 
young women who are unmarried are asked the following question: ‘Would you consider 
marrying a former combatant? For those already married, question will be like ‘Would you 
like your children to consider marrying former combatants?’ Answers to these questions are a 
good predictor of former combatants’ willingness to be integrated into the host community. 
 
The internationally supported NCDDR commission was faced with problems of limited funds 
and facilities available for the reintegration project. One of the problems was due to the very 
large number of former combatants, who had completed the disarmament and demobilisation 
phase. There was also the lack of adequate funding for the reintegration project through the 
Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), as well as the lack of capacity of implementing partners. 
This resulted in the delivery of poorly structured short-term training opportunities, usually 
between three to six months, and lack of apprenticeships or on-the-job training opportunities 
across existing workshops or businesses. Moreover, the vocational trainings that were offered 
by the NCDDR focused mainly on jobs such as carpentry, masonry, hairdressing, tailoring 
and metal works among other skills, but as further post-conflict analysis suggest, there are 
limited employment opportunities for such trades anywhere in the country even for the 
already qualified civilian population.37  
 
                                                          
37Kargbo, A., H. (2014) Post-Conflict Governance in Sierra Leone. London: Author House, pp.168 -169.  
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Apprenticeships training programmes should have been an excellent means of economic 
reintegration process, as well as the appropriate means of rebuilding social capital as it offers 
insertion through association with a mentor or trainer into an already existing socio-economic 
network, consisting of groups and communities of people who are not former combatants. 
This should have resulted into sustainable employment and reintegration for most 
demobilised combatants. However, the lack of education among RUF combatants and the 
poor training coordination, plus the shortage of experienced trainers who could provide rigid 
and instructor-oriented methodologies turned the training programmes into a ‘quick-fix’ 
endeavour38 with little impact on the beneficiaries - the former combatants.  
 
As one former staff member of one of the implementing institutions remarked: 
 
‘...During the training exercise, we were told to tell them (former combatants) 
that upon completing the training exercise, they will become mechanics or 
vehicle engineers, carpenters, hairdressers or plumbers, depending on their 
training programmes, although we very well knew it was almost impossible, 
because the short trainings provided was almost irrelevant and insufficient for 
them to be able to successfully compete with their civilian compatriots, most of 
whom were well-trained and well experienced professionals of these jobs or 
trades’.39 
 
 
Without any significant access to microcredit schemes and few job opportunities available 
across the country, the training schemes former RUF combatants, and indeed other former 
combatants from other factions underwent, and the skills they acquired over the years have 
lost any potential value. Some of them used their reinsertion benefits to buy basic diamond 
mining equipment, and are presently in mining areas in Kono, Tongo and other 
diamondiferous areas40 around the country. Others bought motorbikes and run them on a 
commercial basis as Okada. The majority of those who did not make good use of their 
reinsertion benefits are now in a deplorable and frustrating state of affairs,41 like Saddam, T-
Boy and many others with little or no hope for the future. They believe that they did not 
achieve anything from the decade long conflict, nor did they benefit from the reintegration 
programme. 
                                                          
38 Author’s interview with Francis Kai-Kai, former NCDDR Executive Secretary, Freetown, 3rd September 
2015.  
39 Author’s interview with a former DDR service provider, Bo, 12 June 2015. The former trainer's name remains 
anonymous upon her request. 
40 Updates on the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone by PRIDE. December 2010. 
41 Author's interview with Solomon Berewa, former Vice President of Sierra Leone, Freetown, 9th June 2015. 
145 
 
 
Tigana’s narrative below highlights the failure of these reintegration expectations. He says:  
 
‘We had high hope of living good life after given up our arms. Some of us who 
were young were expecting to continue with our education, or at least get good 
jobs, but we were just told to go home and nothing else...’42 
 
 
These disgruntled former combatants are convinced that they have been let-down and 
neglected by society and that there has been a violation of confidence and trust by society. 
This type of expectation is common in many societies emerging from conflict and among 
many warring factions in Africa and elsewhere. But for most RUF combatants, the outcome 
of the eleven years of conflict was disappointing. One of the reasons for this is that 
dissatisfied former combatants who are not serving in the national army pose the long-term 
threat to the stability of the country. This is particularly true in regions, such as Kailahun and 
Pujehun where groups of these men and women were present during the civil war. The 
Government of Sierra Leone set out to enlist only a small number of them into the national 
army. The majority of them were supposed to go through a regular DDR programme, which 
was designed to remove weapons from combatants and take them out of military structures 
by helping them to reintegrate socially and economically into society. However, in 2002, 
which serves as the official benchmark for the end of the conflict, saw the state of affairs in 
the country as an unresolved civil-conflict, the loss of privileges by the former combatants 
and their perceived sense of insecurity. For most of them, the end of the conflict brought 
everyone (combatants and non-combatants alike) to the same level, identifying them as ex-
killers, and ex-thieves, coupled with the negative memories associated with their status. As 
such, this failure of reintegration expectations was evident among most of the respondents 
who took part in this study. It is thus indicative that some of the factors have led to the 
widening gap in society. It has in addition, led to further socio-economic and political 
exclusion. This is indicated on the following dialogue: 
 
Fawundu is 34 years old from Koidu town in Kono, eastern Sierra Leone. He fought with the 
RUF from 1994 until he was disarmed and demobilised in late 2001. He explains: 
 
Interviewer: Does inequality and discrimination exist for all Sierra Leoneans or it is 
only for former combatants like yourself? 
                                                          
42 Author’s interview with Tigana, a former RUF fighter, Pendembu, 21st March 2015. 
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Fawundu: Inequality and discrimination exist across the board, but it is highest for 
former combatants, especially for those of us who were associated with the RUF. 
Because many people think that we killed many people during the war, so they look at 
us differently. We are on our own most of the time; we are discriminated against. 
 
Interviewer: So how do you feel about your current situation or the general situation in 
the country? 
 
Fawundu: We are being discriminated against. Even some employers will refer to us as 
old killers or old rebels. So, they will not want to talk to us, neither do they want to give 
us job.43  
 
 
Contrary to Fawundu’s narrative, a survey undertaken by Arson and Zartman in Sierra Leone 
in 2005 concluded that most former combatants who were with the RUF for long period had 
little exposure to formal education;44 and therefore they did not have any skills that would 
enable them to compete with the already qualified civilian population in the job market. 
Although some form of orientations towards skills, job training and other income generating 
schemes were undertaken by the Interim Care Centres for the former combatants following 
their demobilisation, it was not robust enough to enable them to compete in the post-conflict 
job market with the already talented civilian population.45 As such, most of them have 
resulted to Okada and Keke riding across the country.46  
 
The findings from this chapter underline a gap between former combatants’ present 
perceptions of what it means to be civilians and their current opportunities to become such 
civilians. Among the many challenges faced by them as they seek to reintegrate back into 
civilian life are their lack of education and job experience, the social stigma against them, and 
the reluctance of their family members to accept and share property upon their return. These 
factors collectively create serious challenges for returning fighters in dealing with and 
moving past their high levels of emotional stress and mental health issues. 
 
This study thus highlights the need for continued psychosocial support for former combatants 
and their families. In addition, economic opportunities are essential for successful 
reintegration, as are programmes that promote the active participation of former combatants 
                                                          
43 Author’s interview with John Fawundu, Koidu town, 30th April 2015. 
44 Arnson, C., J. and Zartman, W. (2005) Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, 
and Greed. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press Series, pp.100 - 110. 
45 Kargbo, A., H. (2014) Post-Conflict Governance in Sierra Leone. London: Author House, pp.168 -169. 
46 Lawrence, M. (2013) Bottom Up DDR: Sierra Leone’s Okada Riders. Ontario: Centre for Security 
Governance.  
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and community, approaching reintegration as an interactive process between former 
combatants and their social environment. All of these necessary services must also include 
attention to help them construct non-violent and positive notions of citizenship. 
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
As seen from the narratives, discussions and analyses in this chapter, there is the sense of 
discrimination, inequality and anger included in the emotions of most respondents who took 
part in this study. The negative view of society towards former combatants as a ruthless and 
cruel group of people is still visible in the ‘new’ Sierra Leone. Former combatants who, 
during the conflict committed gross atrocities against members of their own communities or 
their family members strike the most violent blow to social unity and social cohesion. These 
sets of former combatants are disliked by many people in society regardless. This is true in 
cases where the act of violence was directly associated with the perpetrators. However, most 
of the individual former combatants are not known by the communities to be violent, but are 
instead stigmatised for violent acts they are assumed to have committed by participating in 
the conflict. This generates a general stigmatisation for the former combatants. 
 
Common feelings such as discrimination, friction between communities and abandonment 
experienced by many former combatants who took part in this study suggest that they lost 
faith in society, the government and the international community. These thoughts and 
feelings jeopardise their sense of belonging to the RUF armed group, at least in some ways. 
The motivational properties of collective identities are systematically analysed in Baumeister 
and Leary’s literature in support of a comprehensive evidence that is fundamental for the 
‘need to belong’ as an innate feature of human nature.47 Accordingly, therefore this 
detachment from the armed movement and the community, and the loss of a sense of 
belonging then generated a sense of lost, guilt and frustration among the former combatants. 
Thus, societal resentment and the exclusion from community is seen by former combatants as 
a reaction to the dissolution of their supporting networks.  
 
These feelings and reactions to the end of the conflict represent the theoretical evidence of 
what has been discussed in chapters one and two about destroyed trust, destroyed social 
unity, destroyed social relations and destroyed social fabric within formal and informal social 
                                                          
47 Baumeister, R., F. and Leary, M., R. (1995) The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a 
Fundamental Human Motivation. Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 117, No. 3, pp. 497 - 529. 
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institutions across the Sierra Leonean society. Isolation for former combatants, in the sense of 
abandonment and feelings of betrayal are evidence of the disintegration of supporting societal 
network. The feeling of discrimination confirms the dissolution of the status of former 
combatants, and negative labelling and categorisation. All these feelings provoke the state of 
confusion and neglect shared by former combatants.  
 
There is no easy roadmap for reintegration and reconciliation, and certainly there is no simple 
prescription for healing the wounds and divisions of a society in the aftermath of sustained 
violence. Building trust and understanding between former combatants and the civilian 
population is a difficult challenge. It is, however, a crucial one to address in the process of 
achieving sustainable peace. Examining the painful past, acknowledging it and understanding 
it, as well as transcending it together, is the best way to guarantee that it does not - and cannot 
- happen again. 
 
As other post-conflict societies such as South Africa and Rwanda suggest, Sierra Leone 
discovered its own route to reintegration and reconciliation. Both reintegration and 
reconciliation cannot be imposed from outside; they must be ‘nurtured’ at community level. 
This involves a very long and painful journey, understanding the motivations of offenders, 
addressing the pain and suffering of the victims, bringing together former combatants and 
community members, trying to find a path to justice, truth, and ultimately sustainable peace. 
Sierra Leone has travelled a long way down the road of reintegration and reconciliation, but 
as revealed in this chapter, there are still issues to be addressed. Reintegration and 
reconciliation are long-term processes and they must - and will - continue for many years to 
come. Since the end of the conflict, a lot has been achieved, but there is still more to be done. 
In Sierra Leone, truth was at the heart of reconciliation: the need to find out the truth about 
the violent past, the better to ensure that they never happen again. And that is the importance 
of reintegration and reconciliation. Without it people have no sense of safety, no trust, and 
certainly no confidence in the future.  
 
The next chapter argues that building trust between former combatants and their receiving 
community indicate that trust, reconciliation and peace are achievable following the end of 
conflicts. The chapter, in addition argues that social reintegration of former combatants helps 
improve social capital in a post-war society like Sierra Leone, which inevitably promotes 
peace and reconciliation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Former Combatants, Reconciliation, Social Capital and their Implications 
 
Introduction 
 Chapter five analysed the sense of discrimination, inequality and anger among the former 
combatants following the end of the conflict in Sierra Leone. It also analysed the negative 
views of some sections of the civilian population towards the former combatants; views that 
have continued to create a divide between some sections of the population and the former 
combatants. This chapter now looks at sustainable social reintegration of former combatants, 
and how it impacts on the general peace-building process that affects individual former 
combatants, their family and the community into which they are reintegrated. The chapter 
argues that building trust between former combatants and the community into which they are 
reintegrated indicate that trust, reconciliation and peace are achievable following the end of 
conflicts. Whilst trust may not be immediately forthcoming between certain groups or 
individuals, the examples discussed in this chapter show that trust can be built over time. 
Building on the narratives and analyses in the previous chapter, this chapter argues that social 
reintegration of former combatants helps improve social capital in Sierra Leone, which 
inevitably promotes peace and reconciliation in the country. 
 
The chapter concludes that for sustainable social reintegration to take hold, it has to be driven 
by community involvement and activity, which indicates one of Putnam's dominant theses of 
social capital, ‘the prosperous community’.1 It also concludes that with increase in the 
restoration of social capital also comes increase in reconciliation, especially at community 
level, and that establishing trust between former combatants and the general civilian 
population following demobilisation promotes the regeneration of bridges and bonds that is 
compose of social capital.  
 
This chapter is particularly important if we are to both examine and understand the 
implications of social capital on the social reintegration in a post-conflict environment 
following the demobilisation of combatants in the context of the RUF in Sierra Leone. It is 
important first to acknowledge how such reintegration takes place and under what 
circumstances. As evidenced in chapter five, the reintegration of former combatants into 
                                                          
1 Putnam, R., D. (1993) The prosperous community. American Prospect, Vol. 4, No.  13, pp. 35 - 42. 
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civilian environment is multidimensional, and therefore the impacts of such a process on 
rebuilding social capital and promoting reconciliation and peace will be multifaceted.  
 
6.1 Post-Conflict Reconciliation in Sierra Leone 
Whilst investigating reintegration following the end of the conflict in Sierra Leone, one 
would question whether it is really possible to achieve sustainable or absolute peace in a 
society that witnessed sustained violence; a conflict that killed between 30,000 and 75,000 
people, displaced about half of the country’s population and destroyed around half of the 
country’s infrastructure.2 In other words, we are looking at a post-conflict reintegration and 
reconciliation programme in a country that experienced violence at all levels, and where the 
functioning of formal civic institutions was weak. In addition, these processes begin in a 
climate of great suspicion, distrust, hatred and fear. 
 
There is a simple way to assume, define or analyse reconciliation, i.e., to allow or bring back 
together formerly conflicted parties following the end of a particular conflict, and allowing 
them to reconcile their differences through the establishment of trust, truth telling and 
forgiveness. But as was pointed out in the previous chapter, peoples’ involvement in violent 
conflict changes their behaviour and identity over time.3 The way in which they relate to 
other people, and the actors involved in the process will undergo obvious transformation over 
time. However, traditional DDR literature4 regarding post-conflict reconciliation, especially 
in the context of Sierra Leone, focuses particularly on transitional justice, mainly the TRC. 
Thus, I discuss community justice through which reconciliation is pursued by linking the 
analyses to the narratives of former combatants in the previous chapter.  
 
Following the end of the conflict in Sierra Leone in 2002, the Tejan Kabbah SLPP 
government in power saw reconciliation 5as an important component in peace-building effort, 
as did regional and international communities. As such, a number of measures were 
introduced in pursuance of this by the government and its regional and international partners. 
To be able to accurately evaluate their success, I first need to evaluate the position of the 
                                                          
2 Kaldor, M., and Vincent, J. (2006) Evaluation of UNDP Support for Conflict - Affected Countries, p. 6. 
3 Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T and Huyse., L. (2003) Reconciliation After Violent Conflict. International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Document Available on line at: www.un.org/.../Reconciliation-After-
Violent-Conflict-A-Handbook-Full-English-PDF. Document Accessed on line on: 05/10/2016. 
4 Ibid. 
153 
 
government, as well as the position of the international community. The eleven years of 
continuous conflict destroyed bridging social capital as well as vertical social capital in the 
country. Thus, reconciliation and the general peace-building effort is difficult to achieve in 
the country between the former combatants and their civilian victims.  Achieving sustainable 
peace and total reconciliation is a very complex phenomenon. However, as Francis Kai-Kai, 
the former Executive Secretary of NCDDR points out: 
 
‘The reconciliation effort in Sierra Leone is working towards various facets - it is 
not only the RUF versus the civilian population. During the height of the conflict, 
there were big division; sometimes at family level, at community level and even 
at national level. This led to the ‘us versus them’ rhetoric. Then you have the 
aspect of victims and perpetrators of violence. Then, there was the aspect of 
people who did not migrate during the conflict and those who fled the war - the 
returnees/refugee population. There was lots of hatred and grievances at 
village/local or community levels, and the conflict became so complicated at one 
point that nobody knew exactly who was fighting against whom. I know a family 
of four brothers in which the last son joined the RUF, two joined the national 
army and the eldest joined the Kamajor militia.... So, imagine how complicated it 
became for most Sierra Leoneans... Sometimes the conflict was at household 
level, very complicated to understand. Therefore, it is not only about rebels 
reconciling, it is far more complicated than that.’6 
 
 
The conflict was experienced at all levels, including at household level, so it is easy to 
understand why reconciliation and the general peace-building effort has been, and still is, 
difficult to achieve. In addition, when we consider all the different factions that were 
involved in the conflict - the national army, Kamajors, The West Side Boys, Donsos, 
Tamaboros, and the Kapras, plus the IDPs or the returnees, the general refugee population, 
the amputees and other disabled people, reconciliation in the country becomes even more 
complex. Hence, there remains the question of whether or not reconciliation is important in 
the context of Sierra Leone.  
 
Stovel points out in her book ‘There is no bad bush to throw away a bad child’,7 the general 
feeling in Sierra Leone today is that whether the people of Sierra Leone like each other or 
not, they have to live together following the end of the conflict. This is because there is the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5 This thesis defines reconciliation as the restoration of peaceful or amicable relations between former members 
of armed groups and the civilian population who were previously in ‘conflict’ with one another. Reconciliation 
is used interchangeably with conciliation. 
6 Author’s interview with Francis Kai-Kai, former NCDDR Executive Secretary, Freetown, 3rd September 2015. 
7 Stovel, L. (2008) 'There is No Bad Bush to Throw Away a Bad Child': Tradition-Inspired Reintegration in 
Post-War Sierra Leone. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 305 - 324. 
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need for all citizens to accept one another and to leave the past in the past simply because 
they are all the same people in the same field, living in the same community, almost in the 
same house, living in the same neighbourhood.8 There was, in addition, a conflict between 
perpetrators of violence and survivors, between those who returned and those who managed 
to stay during the civil-conflict. People had to rebuild their lives and to live together and 
become one people as in pre-war society. Responding to the need for reconciliation in the 
country, the government and the international community established the TRC in 2002 with a 
particular mandate to promote the unity and reconciliation of the Sierra Leonean people 
following the end of the conflict.9 
 
While the TRC had the responsibility to promote reconciliation and unity, and to encourage 
people to live together, it lacked the mandate to investigate human rights abuses or hold 
people to account for atrocities they committed either before or during the conflict. However, 
the creation of the internationally supported Special Court was mandated to carry out these 
functions, as well as strengthening the existing national court system.  
 
Following the disarmament and demobilisation of fighters, reconciliation in a post-conflict 
environment appears to be difficult and unpredictable process, which depends on a number of 
interrelated factors. In the context of Sierra Leone’s, level of reconciliation, two main factors 
should be considered. Firstly, at the time of fieldwork for this thesis, it was fifteen years since 
the conflict officially ended, which is relatively a short period of time if we take into account 
the degree of reconciliation one might expect. Secondly, the nature of the conflict, had 
devastating effects on the Sierra Leonean society as a whole thus making any attempts at 
reconciliation complex and difficult.  
 
Over the last decade, reconciliation in Sierra Leone has taken place slowly. In the last phase 
of the conflict, the RUF controlled about 70 percent of the country. During this time, there 
was serious insecurity and suffering around the country.10 At the same time, in the immediate 
aftermath of the conflict, general insecurity caused by RUF activists and sympathisers 
continued to destabilise the country. Hatred, distrust and fear were prevalent across the 
                                                          
8 Ibid. 
9 See Kerr, R, and Lincoln, J. (2008) The Special Court for Sierra Leone Outreach, Legacy and Impact, Final 
Report. War Crimes Research Group, Department of War Studies, King’s College, London. Document Available 
on line at: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/.../slfinalreport.pdf. Document 
Accessed on line on: 13/12/15. 
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country. Therefore, one of the key objectives of the government and the international 
community was to ensure the security of the country and attempt to get the economy 
functioning again. 
 
In some communities prior to the return of IDPs and refugees, relations between the civilian 
population and former combatants differed according to location. In some communities 
where the impact of the conflict was not very high, cooperation was relatively good, with 
people sharing and helping each other. However, in other communities, people no longer 
trusted each other, because of what they went through during the conflict.  As one former 
RUF member explains: 
 
‘When I first came here, many people were afraid of me because they did not 
trust me, even to speak to me, let alone to have anything to do with me. There 
was a great deal of fear, which was generated by the war. It was also very 
difficult for the civilians because some people in the community still had bad 
feelings for us. But later on, they started trusting us, and slowly we started getting 
involved in community activities like road building. Today, relations are getting 
better and better. To come from the war-zone and start a new life in a civilian 
environment depending on yourself was not easy.’11 
 
Some former combatants were scared that the civilians might harm or kill them even before 
peace was achieved in the country. After security was re-established or strengthened as a 
result of the presence of ECOMOG, UN peace keepers and the British military, as well as the 
government of Sierra Leone kept sensitising the civilian population about the importance of 
unity and reconciliation in a post-war environment.12 In the east and southern regions, for 
instance, where the conflict began, and where there was greater destruction, the level of trust 
was low and communities did not immediately cooperate with reconciliation methods. 
However, as security was established and more reconciliation messages were sent out by the 
government and NGOs, citizens started to accept and cooperated more fully with the DDR 
process. 
 
Informal networks of exchange and various associations such as youth networking, football 
clubs and dance groups began to develop, especially at local level, which became wide spread 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 Keen, D. (2005) Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James currey. 
11 Author’s interview with John Kangoma, a former RUF fighter, Mandu, 22nd March 2015. 
12 Author’s interview with Francis Kai-Kai, former NCDDR Executive Secretary, Freetown, 3rd September 
2015. 
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in many communities. This indicates a high incidence of behaviour born out of a need for 
mutual assistance and reciprocity that helped foster and reinforce solidarity, cooperation and 
trust between former combatants and community members. Such behaviour developed over 
time and was actively encouraged and supported by the government, and NGOs who 
implemented various programmes such as tradition-inspired reintegration projects,13 and the 
TRC. As will be discussed in the following paragraphs, for most of the respondents who took 
part in this study, it was the general observation that life after the war had improved 
dramatically, that people were living well and that society was functioning well as compared 
to the war period and the period that immediately followed the end of the conflict. 
 
In general, many civilians, especially community leaders who took part in this study 
described ongoing relations with former combatants as cooperative and ‘workable’. As the 
narratives of Pa Abu and the Paramount Chief of Tonko Limba, Paramount Chief, Kandeh 
Kogba III indicate, it was widely felt that forgiveness and reconciliation had been important 
steps and that the goal now was simply to move forward and to rebuild a new and a better 
Sierra Leone. Brima Kallon, a primary school head teacher in Njala Komboya, Southern 
Sierra Leone, explains his approach to former-combatants as that of a good neighbour, and 
accepting them as a partner in the community. As Kallon further remarks:  
 
‘We have to call them up, we live together, we drink palm wine together, and we 
do everything together, why not? We have many of them here passing up and 
down. We continue to do goodness to them. We are all brothers and sisters, what 
can we do?’14 
 
In similar circumstance, Mohamed Kargbo, a senior community worker in Mattru Jong 
similarly stated:  
 
‘If everybody accepts what happened to them and forgive the perpetrators (the 
former combatants), I believe that there will be no more conflict in this country, 
because we are now living together with those who perpetrated this act on us. We 
have become brothers and sister again because they said we should do so, and we 
have accepted them and moved on’.15  
 
Similar stories were echoed by others. Like Ramatulai Jalloh, a 32-year-old mother of three 
pointed out that it was important to encourage former fighters. She said:   
                                                          
13 See for instance Stovel, L. (2008) 'There is No Bad Bush to Throw Away a Bad Child': Tradition-Inspired 
Reintegration in Post -War Sierra Leone. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 305 - 324. 
14 Author’s interview with Brima Kallon, a primary school head teacher, Njala Komboya, 22nd July, 2015. 
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‘We have to encourage our brothers and sisters who went to the bush. Now that 
they are here and the war is over, we actually need to encourage them again so 
that things will go forward, because if we do not encourage them maybe that 
would lead into another problem... So, we just need to leave them so that we will 
continue to enjoy the peace that we have worked so hard to achieve’.16 
 
It is evident that in each of the narratives given above, there is the willingness on the side of 
the civilian population to accept former combatants and to live together again in the same 
community as Sierra Leoneans, even to work together with those who perpetrated violence 
against them. There was little evidence identified in the narratives that identified former 
combatants as enemies or the unwillingness on the part of the civilian population to accept 
them back into society. 
 
Although some progress has been made so far in terms of reconciliation, reintegration and the 
general peace-building effort in the country, as noted above in the commentary of Brima 
Kallon, a primary school head teacher in Njala Komboya, and Mohamed Kargbo, a senior 
community worker in Mattru Jong for example, there remain a number of problems to be 
addressed. First, there remains some degree of social exclusion, inequality, and high levels of 
poverty; unemployment and underemployment remain high among former combatants in 
particular. One former female combatant who survived but lost her husband during the 
conflict described how she has been excluded and rejected by her community following her 
demobilisation. She says: ‘My husband was killed, and now I am rejected by even my own 
people and the rest of society, it is really difficult for me to understand.’ In the middle of our 
discussion, she became shaken and agitated and directed her frustration towards me, ‘You are 
all the same, if I tell you all of my problems, what can you do for me? Will you bring back 
my husband? Will you give me job? Will you improve my living conditions or provide food 
for me? By the way which government institution are you from? You are one of those people 
hurting me? My husband used to do everything for me. Please ask those who sent you here 
(referring to the government and the international community) why they are only helping 
some people and leaving the rest of us in poverty, there are lots of poor people here like 
me.’17 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
15 Author’s interview with Mohamed Kargbo, Mattru Jong, 1st May 2015. 
16 Author’s interview with Ramatulai Jalloh, Kenema, 10th June 2015. 
17Author’s interview with Hawa Kamara, a former female combatant, Bo, 19th May 2015. 
158 
 
I tried to control my emotion by first, trying to understand the respondents that I was 
interviewing by familiarising with them, their moods, emotions and feelings in order to 
respond to them appropriately. In so doing, I maintained professionalism by managing, 
adapting and controlling the state of my own emotion. I always reminded myself about the 
state and strengths of my emotion, knowing very well that I needed to act accordingly. 
Finally, I tried to manage my interactions with the participants by encouraging and building 
trust and respect with them. I also tried to utilise empathy to take control of my 
communications and ensure a positive resolution. 
 
Although the problems in Sierra Leone today are not widespread in terms of the willingness 
on the side of the civilian population to accept former combatants and to allow them to live 
together in harmony, as indicated earlier, reconciliation is still ongoing in Sierra Leone. 
Evidence from the Genocide in Rwanda18 and the emergence of the Post-Apartheid State in 
South Africa19suggest that sustainable reconciliation takes place over a long period of time. 
As such, complete reconciliation could not take place in Sierra Leone just fifteen years 
following the end of one of the most brutal conflicts the continent has witnessed in recent 
memory. Given the level of destruction, the level of suffering and the total number of people 
maimed or killed across the country, it would be unreasonable to expect total reconciliation to 
take place in this short period of time. Nevertheless, significant progress has been made 
following the end of the conflict. One of the respondents I spoke to held a more optimistic 
view. 
 
‘One of the key factors for holding the Sierra Leonean society together, and for 
such remarkable progress so far is the strong social fabric that is present across 
the country, even though it was destroyed during the civil-war. One of the big 
advantages has been that group thinking and not individualistic thinking, which 
has worked well in terms of rebuilding post-conflict Sierra Leonean society. No 
one is left behind at community level even if you hated them. It was not the case 
that everyone loved everyone else during the conflict, they probably still do not. 
Nevertheless, because you are together in one community, and because you think 
you belong to the same society as Sierra Leoneans, you stay in a house next to 
each other, you live in the same community, you speak the same languages, you 
still see each other as brothers and sisters, and you still talk to each other is a 
remarkable achievement in a short period of time’.20 
                                                          
18 Clark, P. (2011) The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justices and Reconciliation in Rwanda. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
19 Wilson, A., R. (2001) The Politics of Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimising the Post-Apartheid State.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
20 Author’s interview with Abass Bundu, former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Bedford, UK, 5th 
November 2014. 
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There is consensus that conflict dynamics do not end abruptly. There is never a clear 
transition from conflict to post-conflict.  Rather, low level or sporadic fighting may continue; 
violence may persist in other forms, such as violent crime, organised crime and violence 
based on gender issues; and peace agreements and the general post-war reintegration 
programmes be derailed. Moreover, compromises made to appease belligerents in order to 
secure peace agreements may, in some cases institutionalise conflict dynamics. Many conflict 
analysts have critiqued the Lome Peace Agreement, for example, for not addressing most of 
the structural issues that caused the conflict in the first place. Given the complexities of ‘post-
conflict’ settings, it is important that actors seeking to engage in recovery efforts conduct 
comprehensive assessments. The aim of such assessments is to assist actors to understand the 
environment in which they will be operating, to determine local priorities and needs, and to 
plan reintegration strategies and activities.   
 
6.2 Social Capital, Former Combatants and Reintegration 
In this section, I begin by analysing the restoration of social capital following the 
disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants in Sierra Leone. I combine the 
analysis with the macro, meso and micro level elements of former combatants’ social 
reintegration as discussed in chapter two. This will help the reader to understand how the 
social reintegration of former combatants’ impact on the restoration or renewal of vertical 
social capital in Sierra Leone. First, I begin by analysing the transformation in social capital 
in the post-conflict era. I will then go on to analyse how former combatants’ social 
reintegration affects vertical social capital, and how bonding and bridging social capitals have 
been rebuilt following the end of the conflict. 
 
This section begins by reminding the reader about bridging, bonding and linking social 
capital, as discussed in chapter two. Immediately following the end of the conflict in Sierra 
Leone, restoring the social capital that was destroyed by the conflict proved immensely 
difficult. Not surprisingly, in a society that was full of insecurity, distrust and fear, there was 
still division, and hence the usual rhetoric of ‘us versus them’. Due to the conflict, Sierra 
Leonean society has been fundamentally distorted and immensely fragmented. Following the 
displacement of and the death of many Sierra Leoneans,21 the challenge that the then SLPP 
                                                          
21 Kaldor, M., and Vincent, J. (2006) Evaluation of UNDP Support for Conflict - Affected Countries. United 
Nations Development Programme. Document Available on line at: 
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government which was in governance faced was huge. Bridging social capital had been 
destroyed by the previous APC government, which had ruled the country for almost three 
decades.22 Many scholars have identified this as one of the causal factors of the conflict, 
mainly through the discriminatory vertical social capital practices the path that the SLPP 
government chose following the conclusion of the conflict in 2002 would be very important 
to analyse here. 
 
In the years immediately following the end of the conflict, the RUF still had some support, 
especially in the rural areas. As such, the attention of the government, ECOMOG forces and 
UN peace keepers was to ensure security throughout the country and to eliminate war 
ideology among the citizens. At this particular time, the level of trust across society was low; 
people feared each other, because they did not know who was who and who was supporting 
which faction. Inter-communal and inter-group trust and collaboration were still very low. 
 
As David Francis of the Department of Peace Studies and UNESCO Chair in African Peace 
and Conflict Studies at the University of Bradford points out:  
 
‘At this particular time, you could not tell if this one had killed, not killed or 
supported the rebels, or was a rebel himself, at least secretly. You couldn't tell if 
the war was finally over, or if there was going to be a resumption of violence. 
When the war came to an end, at first people were very emotional, some people 
had lost their relatives, their houses and all their belongings, as such it was really 
very difficult for most of the population emotionally. Therefore, as far as the 
government, regional and the international community were concern, security 
was paramount which was as well important in restoring social capital’.23 
 
At the same time, bonding social capital at community level was weak. In the rural areas, 
there were a large proportion of people who had lost at least one relative.24 This led to high 
volume of disabled people, widows and orphans,25 all of whom experienced different levels 
of suffering and trauma. In addition, all of them had different levels of trust. Moreover, a 
large number of those who fled the conflict returned to find their belongings destroyed, 
looted, burnt down, and/or their relatives killed. Whilst this may have initially added to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/thematic/conflict/ConflictEvaluation2006.pdf Similar. Document Accessed 
on:28/04/2016. 
22 Abdullah, I. (2004) Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War. Dakar: CODESRIA. 
23 Author’s interview with David Francis, Department of Peace Studies and UNESCO Chair in African Peace 
and Conflict Studies at the University of Bradford. [Telephone interview], 13th November 2014. 
24 Gberie, L. (2005) A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press.  
25 Ibid. 
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complexity of bonding social capital among the civilian population as discussed earlier in this 
thesis, over time these networks became more established. The ties that bound people 
together, began to develop. In this same period bonding social capital between and among the 
rebels was also weak. To begin with, many former combatants who took part in the conflict 
fled the country before even the Lome Peace Accord was enforced.26 This, coupled with the 
fact that the rebels did not have any political say in the country, despite the transformation of 
their armed movement into a political party, meant that bonding social capital was 
weakened.27  
 
The following figures show national public attitude surveys of democracy and governance in 
Sierra Leone between 2011 and 2013 in relation to the level of trust the general public have 
for their own relatives or family members, their neighbours and other people they only know. 
 
Figure 5: Trust own relatives 
         
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 See for instance literature on Lome Accord for further clarification. Document Available on line at: 
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/lom-peace-agreement. Document Accessed on line on: 29/12/14. 
27 Mitton, K. (2008) Engaging Disengagement: The Political Reintegration of Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary 
United Front. Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 192 - 222. 
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Figure 6: Trust neighbours 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Trust other people 
                      
Source: Afrobarometer R52011/2013, the online data analysis tool. Available on line at: 
http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online. Accessed on line on 01/01/16. 
 
 
Losing levels of thin trust in the Sierra Leonean society, and indeed in other societies 
emerging from violence conflict is a great loss to community spirit, social cohesion and the 
general peace-building effort. It is important because thin trust is one of the key foundations 
for rebuilding social capital that was destroyed by the conflict. As Putnam points out: 
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‘In short, people who trust others are all-round good citizens, and those more 
engaged in community life are both more trusting and more trustworthy…[while] 
the civically disengaged believe themselves to be surrounded by miscreants and 
feel less constrained to be honest themselves’.28 
 
The community loyalties and a shared sense of belonging were important in the resilience of 
a positive community spirit and development across the country. The norms of reciprocity 
and the strong dense and supportive ‘bonding’ that emerged in the post-war Sierra Leonean 
society typified the present Sierra Leonean state. Components of community life across the 
country were able to nurture well-being by providing access to mutually supportive 
relationships and also by enabling both former combatants and the civilian population to 
maintain ‘Ontological Security’29 through meeting needs for a sense of local identity, 
belonging and security. The substance and sense of community in Sierra Leone, although less 
strong than it was in the pre-war rea, had been sustained and slowly rebuilt into the present. 
 
The Afro Barometer data shown in figure five above suggest that 60 percent of the population 
in the country trust their own relatives, while 21.5 percent (figure 6) reported that they trust 
their neighbours. This suggests that bridging social capital has been somehow re-established. 
Further evidence in UNDP report30 also suggest that human security in the country has 
improved and that most communities and individuals across the country engaged in the 
reciprocal exchange of food, information, labour and work tools. Together, these indicate a 
good level of trust in and across communities in the new Sierra Leone. Although these 
exchanges of items were not very frequent in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, - at 
least in some communities - exchanges increased over a period of time. With increased 
communication and interaction, trust developed and exchange took place, based upon the 
relationships that became established. Trust was established particularly because of a 
combination of social cohesion, associations, and community events that included former 
combatants, informal networks, and most importantly collective action and responsibility. 
Social events like community feasts, traditional child naming rites, wedding and playing 
football together all provide a platform on which members of the community become familiar 
                                                          
28 Ibid, pp. 136 - 137. 
29 Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
30 Kaldor, M., and Vincent, J. (2006) Evaluation of UNDP Support for Conflict - Affected Countries. United 
Nations Development Programme, p.9. Document Available on line at: 
web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/thematic/conflict/ConflictEvaluation2006.pdf. Document Accessed on line 
on 12/12/2015. 
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with other people and develop relationship with people they did not know before. 
Associations based on socio-economic activities help to develop support networks, increase 
reciprocal exchange and strengthen social cohesion and solidarity among community 
members. Ultimately these associations stimulate self-help, mutual-help and interdependence, 
thus assisting in the re-establishment of bridging social capital across communities in the 
country. 
 
Although steady progress has been made since the end of the conflict, there still remains 
much work to be done. But as this quote from a local Imam (an Islamic scholar or preacher, 
who is also a community leader) from Daru in eastern Sierra Leone shows, there is hope for 
achieving sustainable peace and re-establishing social capital in the country: 
 
‘Immediately after the end of the conflict, there was a lack of trust among the 
people. There was also a great deal of fear, which was generated by the war. 
When citizens saw that the war had finally come to an end, they started trusting 
one another slowly, and getting involved in activities together like playing 
football and other community activities. Even refugees who were returning 
started working together with those who stayed behind, as well as with former 
combatants and things started improving slowly. And today, when you see people 
working together - civilians, former fighters, refugees, IDPs, JCs etc., without 
trying to point fingers at people or associate people with a particular group, I 
think that the country is getting closer and closer to unity and total reconciliation. 
Although there still remains huge work to be done, but we are getting somewhere 
at least’.31 
 
 
Social capital in Sierra Leone which was severely damaged during the conflict has been at 
least partially restored. Bridging social capital, the variant of social capital damaged the most 
throughout the conflict, is slowly evolving among the people of Sierra Leone. Although the 
situation in the country is not perfect at present, the progress that has been made since the end 
of the conflict is huge and cannot be discounted.  
 
The next section examines how the process of social reintegration of former RUF combatants 
caused such a huge transformation in social capital in Sierra Leone through bridging, bonding 
and linking social capital. 
 
 
                                                          
31Author’s interview with Abass Bundu, former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Bedford, UK, 5th November 
2014. 
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6.3 Social Reintegration and the Renewal of Social Capital 
Successful reintegration of former combatants back into civilian society following the end of 
a particular conflict has a very important effect on bridging social capital. In the case of 
Sierra Leone, the civilian society into which former combatants returned from where they 
have been absent for long time, is diverse and complex, consisting of other armed groups 
such as Civil Defence Forces (CDF), RSLAF, Donsos, Tamaboros and Kapras. It also 
consists of other units such as IDPs, refugees, widows, orphans, and other war victims and 
perpetrators. However, the social reintegration of former combatants is believed to have 
facilitated and empowered the re-establishment of social networks and linkages between 
various groups, linkages that are essential for bridging social capital. When former 
combatants claim that they have been reintegrated back into civilian society, it means that 
society has accepted them, and thus ensures linkages between various units to form a single 
formidable civilian society comparatively free of violence and respecting the rule of law.  
 
To achieve sustainable reintegration and the renewal of bridging and bonding social capital, 
the TRC was important, as it is organised at national and local levels, and thus has its 
branches across the country. It heard the voices of a number of victims, perpetrators and 
others who witnessed terrible events during the conflict. In particular, women were 
systematically targeted by all factions, and victims who came forward to testify displayed 
considerable bravery in order to relate their stories to fellow Sierra Leoneans and the rest of 
the civilised world. Among such stories was one former so-called ‘bush wife’, Yatta 
Mansaray. She says: 
 
‘‘I was in my village of Tonkia when the rebels attacked us. Following the attack, 
one of the men who led the attack asked my father to become their representative 
(or town chief) in Tonkia town. However, the commander, Mohamed ‘badblood’ 
resisted, and said that my father was a bad man because he (my father) had in the 
past refused him to married me, and instead gave me to a teacher in the nearby 
town. So, he (‘badblood’) killed my father together with my husband and my 
three-year-old son. He ordered other members of the group to beat and rape any 
members of my immediate family. I witnessed the beheading of my father, I was 
given my father’s blood to drink, my mother was badly beaten and molested, she 
was shaken badly…I was raped several times before the general public in Tonkia. 
He then took me as his wife and later abandoned me in the jungle to be repeatedly 
rape by other members of the group. So, that was how I became his wife, and 
eventually a member of the RUF… I had no choice but to join them’’.32 
 
                                                          
32 Author’s interview with Yatta Mansaray, a former member of the RUF movement, Bo, 7th May 2015. 
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Former combatant attendance at the TRC, whether as victims or as perpetrators or both, as in 
the case of Yatta Mansaray, aids the establishment of bridging social capital, by enabling the 
community to adjust to the presence of those who perpetrated violence against them, whether 
willingly or forcefully. This testimony also illustrates the complexity of identity for both 
victims and perpetrators. The TRC also served as a platform on which former combatants can 
show their willingness to be accepted by indicating that they are trustworthy, ready to move 
away from their past and to ready forge a new positive direction. This issue is concisely 
captured in the following account from Samuel George, a former RUF strongman in Pujehun 
region: 
 
‘During the conflict, I did many bad things to many people in Pujehun town and 
the surrounding areas. My command and actions caused death to many people 
including women and children. Women were raped, and property looted, 
therefore, I am asking for forgiveness from the people of Pujehun and Sierra 
Leone as a whole, because ‘there is no bad bush to throw away a bad child’. 
Therefore, I want the people of Pujehun to forgive me for all the bad things that I 
did and accept me again’.33 
 
In similar circumstance, Jonh Kangoma a renowned former RUF fighter in Mandu chiefdom 
in Kailahun district says: 
 
‘When I first came here, many people were afraid of me, even to speak to me, let 
alone to have anything to do with me; it was very difficult for them also because 
some people in the community still had bad feelings for us. However, through 
TRC, people started to get close to us, especially young people. We started going 
to poyo bar [poyo is the common name for palm wine in Sierra Leone] to drink 
palm wine together. We played football together. Before that there was no way to 
talk to us or play with us, drink poyo together and do many other community 
activities together. TRC enables us to demonstrate our ability to live in the 
community, and over time we came to be accepted by the community’.34  
 
Undoubtedly, some former combatants I interviewed said the community trusted them. Some 
of them have taken up leadership positions in institutions like the Vegetable Crop 
Rehabilitation and Income Generating Programme in Fonikoh District in Kenema for 
instance. As argued in the previous chapter, social reintegration is a two-way process. On the 
one hand, the individual former combatants have to be ready, willing and committed to be 
reintegrated back into society. On the other hand, the community people have to be willing 
                                                          
33 Author’s interview with Samuel George, a former RUF fighter, Pujehun, 27th June 2015. 
34 Author’s interview with John Kangoma, a former RUF fighter, Mandu, 22nd March 2015. 
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and ready to accept them. As Pa Joe Samu, a community leader in Koribondo who took part 
in this present study says: 
 
‘When they come into the community they live like other civilians, they do 
community work such as road brushing and road maintenance, they go to 
town/community meetings, they play and drink poyo together with us. We do 
everything together, no difference... They now see themselves like the rest of the 
community members... At this point, you see that trust is being rebuilt slowly 
because the TRC, which works on the idea of building trust, togetherness, unity 
and reconciliation, teaches us these values’.35 
 
 
The full participation of former combatants into community events, contributes to feelings of 
improved communication and solidarity and thus promotes civic-mindedness. Although 
former combatants are not expected to lead or monopolise leadership positions in many of 
these community events, their attendance and full participation in these programmes 
contributes greatly towards their successful reintegration and the process of bridging social 
capital renewal. 
 
One typical example is explained by Pa Joe Samu, a community leader in Koribondo. 
 
‘Anytime there is any functions like child naming rite, burial ceremony or 
traditional wedding ceremony, everybody in the community get involve - your 
neighbour, IDPs, former combatants and even JCs,36 and everybody feel they are 
part of it more than even your own family members. Everybody comes with the 
little they can afford and also help in their own little way’.37  
 
Over a period of time, such community activities have the effect of galvanising community 
spirit and facilitating the development of community networks. Like in many other African 
societies, weddings and naming ceremonies in Sierra Leone involve many people in the 
community and bring together those from different communities. Former combatants 
reintegrating into their communities of birth or integrating into ‘new’ communities are 
encouraged by the TRC to engage in such communal activities in an effort to form 
community cohesion and togetherness. Invariably they do, and this has shown to be a 
particularly powerful way of connecting with the community. What is also remarkable about 
the role of former combatants in the development of society is the organisational skills they 
                                                          
35 Author’s interview with Pa Joe Samu, a community leader, Koribondo, 14th May 2015. 
36 JCs refers to people or someone who just arrived from abroad. It literately refers to people who have just 
arrived into the country/ community from outside of the country. In other words, it refers to Sierra Leoneans 
who left the country during the war and have been residing abroad. 
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bring with them after they are disarmed and demobilised. As a result of their extensive 
training programmes whilst they were still fighting, it is possible they are more organised and 
have a higher capacity to undertake more difficult tasks than civilians. 
 
‘Because the Sierra Leonean society was completely broken, people were forced 
to stick together, to do things in common and to work together as a unit. In this 
sense, most communities were looking for the advantages that former combatants 
will bring with them following their demobilisation, especially after the TRC had 
sent messages of trust, forgiveness and reconciliation. As former armed men, they 
are well organised because they have been used to structure. Although they might 
not have the necessary skills to compete with the already qualified section of the 
civilian population in the job market, they may well be useful in terms of working 
as a unit’.38 
 
When former combatants are fully engaged in community activities, they do not only build 
stronger ties and trust with community members, they also demonstrate that they do not place 
a burden on to the community. This makes it easier for them to be accepted by the 
community more quickly. There will be a greater chance for their swift reintegration into 
society if they can positively contribute to the development of the community. 
 
The aims and objectives of former combatants with regards to reintegration, rebuilding trust 
and social capital renewal are the same as those of the civilian population. This enables 
former combatants to live with the civilian population as [social capital becomes based more 
around] those common goals and values rather than divisive practices. As trust, reciprocity 
and social cohesion continue to take hold, they do so in many ways. Security Sector Reform, 
rebuilding the broken national economy, rebuilding the shattered infrastructure, organising 
the resettlement of IDPs and the refugee population among others, there will also be the need 
to improve the basic living conditions for the host community.  
 
6.3.1 Bridging and Bonding Social Capital at Community level 
As shown in Chapter Five, whilst the reintegration of individual former combatants are 
largely individualistic affairs, their elevation to leadership positions show a high level of 
acceptance and cooperation of those individual former combatants. It also serves as an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
37Author’s interview with Pa Joe Samu, a community leader, Koribondo, 14th May 2015. 
38 Author’s interview with David Francis, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of 
Bradford. [Telephone interview], 13th November 2014. 
169 
 
indication to other former combatants that there is a chance they will be accepted and 
reintegrated too. 
 
Following the end of the brutal conflict in Liberia for instance, Youth Education for Life 
Skills (YES), a Community Based Organisation, was launched by USAID to enable IDPs, 
refugees, former combatants together with the local people to facilitate the reintegration 
process following the end of fourteen years of violent conflict. The project was designed 
specifically to address issues of socio-economic exclusion and to enhance lasting peace in 
Liberia.39 The project was launched in thirty-seven different communities across the country 
targeting more than 2,300 former combatants.40 It provided life skills training to youth, most 
of whom were former combatants, to be economically and socially responsible following the 
end of the conflict. The training programmes were conducted by international trainers and 
learning facilitators with management committees that constituted former combatants, who 
served as role models. On the whole, the project achieved its aims and objectives of 
facilitating the reintegration process by encouraging more former combatants to take up 
leadership positions in other programmes around the country. 
 
At the end of the conflict in Tajikistan, UNDP tried to involve former combatants in local 
decision-making and policy implementation aimed at stabilising the socio-economic situation 
of former combatants - which benefited them and the community as a whole. The 
Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Programme (RRDP) guided former 
combatants in the establishment of associations, and coordinated local authorities, 
communities and former combatants alike. This ensured effective dialogue and provided a 
role for all in the decision-making and policy implementation process.41 
 
Following the end of the armed conflict in Kosovo, UNDP was involved with DDR in the 
country since 2008, and was the lead implementing partner of the Kosovo Protection Corps 
Resettlement Programme (KPC). The KPC programme was divided in two components with 
separate budgets, both financed by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The first was 
the ‘Transitional Financial Assistance (TFA) in the form of severance payments,’ which was 
directly implemented by the UNDP. The second was a ‘Comprehensive Assistance to create 
                                                          
39 USAID (2005) ‘Community-Focussed Reintegration’. Document Available on line at: 
http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNADF305.pdf. Document Accessed on line on: 13/04/ 2015. 
40 Ibid. 
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sustainable livelihoods’ through counseling, training, further education, placement and small 
business assistance, which had a particular focus on sustainability. The employment and 
business assistance were implemented by the Employment Promotion Agency in Kosovo 
(EPAK). Many of the recipients benefitted from business assistance, mainly in agriculture for 
traditional/geographic reasons, while others opted for the job placement support, mostly in 
the public sector. However, a small number of former combatants benefitted from the 
professional training and further education. As Bonard and Conoir write, there were 1,464 
eligible former combatants involved in the programme, including forty-three women and 
girls.42 UNDP worked alongside the resettlement programme investing Kosovo’s justice and 
security sectors. The programme strategically targeted community members, as well as 
former members of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) through some eligibility criteria. 
Beneficiaries were satisfied with their new or strengthened skills that they received and the 
overall support.43 Although one of the highest ‘budget per beneficiary’ ratio for any DDR 
project to date, with an average ‘unit investment’ per beneficiary of $11,000, the results of 
the programme proved to be satisfactory and targets were met. The evaluation of the 
programme states that almost one hundred percent of the eligible beneficiaries completed the 
scheme.44  
 
Another project that enhanced social reintegration was one implemented in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) for a period of eighteen months, from January 2001 to July 2002.45 The project 
was known locally as ‘Imagine Coexistence’, and encompassed twenty-six projects focused 
in two regions that experiences the highest level of post-conflict minority returns and 
persistent segregation of communities: Drvar (Federation) and Prijedor/Kozarac (RS).46 The 
initiatives included cultural, psychosocial, educational and income-generating projects, which 
aimed at ‘overcoming deeply entrenched mistrust, promoting cooperation and rebuilding 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
41 Ibid, p. 49. 
42 Bonard, P. and Conoir, Y. (2013) Evaluation of UNDP Reintegration Programs, Vl. 1, Final Evaluation 
Report. Document Available on line at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/8080. Document 
Accessed on line on: 20/01/17. 
43 Ibid, p. 19. 
44 Ibid, pp. 19 - 20. 
45 Babbitt, E., F. et al (2002) Imagine Coexistence. Assessing refugee reintegration efforts in divided 
communities. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Tufts University: USA. 
46 Bradly, M. (2015) Forced Migration, Reconciliation and Justice.  Ontario: McGill-Queen’s Press. 
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community relationships’,47 namely rebuilding and bridging social capital between former 
armed or disputed groups. The projects emphasized non-ethnic issues that participants had in 
common, providing a safe space for a renewed dialogue and challenging the divisive, 
collectivizing perceptions. The sharing of constrains and successes of the projects created a 
bond among individuals of different ethnicities, often bringing them together for the first 
time.48 Moreover, as the institutional solutions increased a sense of social insecurity,49 those 
initiatives became vital in constructing local ‘webs of social support’.50 One of the key 
initiatives involved was opening a café run by multi-ethnic staff. The cafe proved to be the 
first social, ‘family-friendly’ venue of this kind in Drva and attracted large number of people 
from the two ethnic groups: young and old, men and women of both ethnicities, showing 
their mutual needs and support.51 In addition, sports activities, music, and other education 
functions aimed at inter-ethnic groups of different ages proved successful in establishing 
lasting interconnectedness between them,52 strengthening the inclusive social capital. 
Twenty-one out of the twenty-six projects continued to function after ‘Imagine Coexistence’, 
positively affecting societal attitudes and inculcating patterns of inter-ethnic cooperation in 
daily activities and in a variety of social domains.53  
 
A similar social reintegration initiative was run in Rwanda following the end of the 1993 
Genocide. The World Bank’s Community Reintegration and Development Project (CRDP) in 
Rwanda was particularly designed towards fostering inclusive social capital in the local 
communities. Targeting all communities and pursuing ‘community-based reintegration’, the 
project was run from 1998 to 2003. 
 
As the World Bank’s report points out, ethnic reconciliation was not among the stated goals 
of the project as it was focused on rebuilding social capital and diminishing cleavages among 
                                                          
47 Heider, H. (2011) Initiatives and Obstacles to Reintegration in Divided Communities: UNHCR’s Imagine 
Coexistence Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Divided Cities/Contested States, Working Paper No. p.21 
48 Burns, C. et al (2003) Imagine Coexistence Pilot Projects in Rwanda and Bosnia. In A. Chayes, M. Minow 
(Eds.). Imagine coexistence. Restoring humanity after violent ethnic conflict. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, p.94. 
49 Kostić, R. (2007) Ambivalent Peace: External Peacebuilding Threatened Identity and Reconciliation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet.p.332. 
50 Korac, M. (2009) Gender, Conflict, and Social Capital: Bonding and Bridging in War in the Former 
Yugoslavia. In M. Cox (Ed.). Social Capital and Peace-Building. Creating and Resolving Conflict with Trust 
and Social Networks. London: Routledge, 108. 
51 Babbitt, E., F. et al (2002) Imagine Coexistence. Assessing Refugee Reintegration Efforts in Divided 
Communities. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Tufts University: USA. p. 26 
52 Ibid, p. 40 
53 Dowley K., M. and Silver B., D. (2002) Social Capital, Ethnicity and Support for Democracy in the Post-
Communist States. Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 505 - 527. 
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groups.54 Moreover, the project was conducted in agreement with the Rwandan government 
and faced ‘high levels of political resistance’.55 However, the territorial and social proximity 
between former enemies in daily life in Rwanda enabled the projects to develop cooperative 
inter-ethnic relations.56 Aimed at fostering an appropriate environment for socio-economic 
reintegration, as well as (re)building communal trust in post-genocide context, the project 
was structured according to the needs identified by participants themselves. It included 
infrastructure projects (rebuilding schools, roads, hospitals and other community health 
centers), income-generating projects, and capacity building.57 Such productive, apolitical 
engagement encouraged conflicted groups to accept one another as members of the same 
community and restored communication between them, gradually promoting coexistence.58 
The project also enabled the creation of a budding ‘network of reciprocal social relations’.59 
Such projects, if tailored to micro-dynamics of communities, are mostly important in 
ensuring sustainable reintegration and reconciliation in countries emerging from violent civil 
-war like Sierra Leone, which experienced high levels of violence, of greatly ‘intimate’ 
nature and leading to the disruption of communal and social bonds and trust.60 Following its 
completion, the World Bank’s Community Reintegration and Development Project in 
Rwanda was considered ‘a best practice example of promoting the socio-economic 
integration of the poor amid ethnic tensions in a post-conflict situation’.61 The project also 
helped to overcome a sense of victimisation and increase the sense of security by means of 
socio-economic empowerment. In some cases, the Hutu and Tutsi voiced the wish to continue 
                                                          
54 World Bank (2002) Bosnia and Herzegovina: Local Level Institutions and Social Capital Study. Washington: 
World Bank. Document Available on line at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/12/2460906/bosnia-herzegovina-local-level-institutions-social-
capital-study. Document Accessed on line on 22/2/15. 
55 World Bank (2003) Rwanda - Community Reintegration and Development Project. Implementation 
Completion and Results Report. p. 10. 
56 Buckley-Zistel, S. (2008) We are Pretending Peace. Local Memory and the Absence of Social Transformation 
and Reconciliation in Rwanda. In Clark, P, and Kaufman, Z., D. (Eds.). After Genocide: Transitional Justice, 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond. London: Hurst and Company, p.138. 
57 World Bank (2003) Rwanda - Community Reintegration and Development Project. Implementation 
Completion and Results Report. pp. 4 - 5. 
58 Chayes, A. and Minow M. (2003) Introduction. In Chayes, A, and Minow, M. (Eds.). Imagine Coexistence. 
Restoring Humanity after Violent Ethnic Conflict. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, p. xx. 
59 Putnam, R., D. (2000) Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon 
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Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, p.3. 
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working together on initiated projects, such as school projects and housing developments,62 
which indicates the existence of socio-economic networks that permeate ethnic divisions in 
communities that participated in the project. 
 
In the context of Sierra Leone, a Vegetable Crop Rehabilitation and Income Generating 
Programme in Fonikoh, Kenema town, eastern Sierra Leone was launched in 2004 by 
CARITAS. The project targeted mainly former female combatants who were struggling to 
reintegrate into society following their disarmament and demobilisation. CARITAS provided 
the women with tools, seeds, fertilisers and other materials, as well as other technical 
assistance for vegetable production. Vegetable production had been the main occupation for 
many women in the Fonikoh district of Kenema even before the war breakout, but the 
destruction and looting of agricultural land during the war, made it difficult for them to 
reactivate the activity. However, following the end of the conflict, CARITAS re-launched the 
programme. The programme was headed and directed by former female combatants. It also 
benefited former female combatants and their dependants, child mothers, and war widows 
among other beneficiaries. The targeted beneficiaries quickly recovered from the effects of 
the conflict as they benefited from sustainable income-generating activities. Community 
participation enhanced the sustainability of the programme because beneficiaries, including 
former female combatants were involved in the planning and direction of the programme. 
 
As one member of the Vegetable Crop Rehabilitation and Income Generating Programme in 
Fonikoh, Kadie Kamara remarks: 
 
‘By working together, former combatants sometime show their leadership quality 
and skills. They also show to the Fonikoh community and the rest of society that 
collective action is possible. when you see people from CDF, refugees, widows, 
former fighters and members of the general population come together to 
undertake a particular project, and where former fighters plan and direct projects, 
it must be acknowledged that they have leadership quality. It is a nice example 
for the population to see that armed groups that used to fight against other armed 
groups are now living and working together as a unit. It is a very nice thing to 
witness’.63  
 
 
                                                          
62 Afzali A. and Colleton L. (2003) Constructing Coexistence. A Survey of Coexistence Projects in Areas of 
Ethnic Conflict. In A. Chayes, A, and Minow, M. (Eds.). Imagine Coexistence. Restoring Humanity After 
Violent Ethnic Conflict. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, p.11. 
63 Author’s interview with Kadie Kamara, member of the Fonikoh Vegetable Crop Rehabilitation and Income 
Generating Programme, Kenema, 12th April, 2015. 
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In similar circumstance, The Vocational Training for the Rehabilitation and Resettlement 
Project in Bumpe Township, southern Sierra Leone was implemented by the Sierra Leone 
Opportunities Industrialisation Centre (SLOIC) for Bumpe and its surrounding villages. 
Sponsored by NCRRR during the reintegration phase of the DDR programme, it aimed to 
train former combatants in the region in carpentry and masonry to help rebuild the war-
ravaged communities in the Bumpe area, and to facilitate the reintegration process. At the 
beginning of the programme, SLOIC conducted sensitization programmes via local radio 
stations and organised meetings to inform the community about the importance of the 
programme. Thereafter, interested members of the community also got involved in the 
project. In total, 109 former combatants, ninety-two members of the community, and sixty-
five IDPs were trained in both masonry and carpentry in and around the Bumpe community. 
SLOIC provided all of the resources. 
 
Through the implementation of UN ‘Stop-Gap Programme’,64 the UN Mission in Sierra 
Leone (UNAMSIL) averted a potentially volatile and dangerous situation in the country when 
it employed thousands of former combatants in short-term projects to rebuild their 
communities. The programme employed some 6,000 former combatants as well as 1,500 
community members in labour intensive, quick impact community infrastructure and 
agricultural development projects.65 The projects were implemented in a sociable 
environment of communal meals and organised sport. The fact that the former combatants, 
together with community members, rebuilt infrastructure that were destroyed during the 
conflict had a positive impact on peace-building effort. These projects also became the 
starting point for the creation of several Community-Based Organisations across the 
country.66 
 
The willingness and the general behaviour of former combatants to work together with 
community members remain crucial in ensuring their own individual acceptance within the 
                                                          
64 A Second-Generation Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations 
(2010) A Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities for UN Peacekeeping. 
Document available on line at: 
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community. It also acts as a 'roadmap' for how newly returning former combatants can be 
reintegrated back into society. In the overall picture, this can serve as an effective model that 
provides evidence to the community and proves to them the benefits that former combatants 
can bring with them after their demobilisation.  
 
The creation of former combatants’ associations, and indeed their involvement in Community 
Based Organisations is often promoted as a means of ensuring adequate representation of 
former combatants in a DDR process. These associations are also considered to be an early 
warning and response system for spotting dissatisfaction among former combatants and for 
confidence building between discontented groups and the rest of the civilian community. 
However, as Bonard and Conoir point out, such associations, especially when set up 
nationally and in a top-down manner, can sometimes be problematic.67 For instance, Veterans 
Associations can delay or prevent the effective reintegration of former combatants by 
perpetuating their identity as former armed actors and their adherence to previous command 
structures. Following the end of the conflict in Guatemala for instance, the Fundacion 
Guillermo Toriello (FGT) was formed as an association of demobilised combatants.68 It 
implemented different projects for former combatants, and also advocated for the 
reintegration of demobilised former armed actors into society. With limited capacity and no 
previous experience, its performance in project implementation was problematic. The FGT 
pursued political aims to the detriment of its programme commitments. This had implications 
on cooperation between former combatants and the civilian population. 
 
Ignoring the military rank of former combatants can sometime be destructive and can have 
negative effects on reintegration process. High-ranking ofﬁcers and leaders who have 
achieved status and political inﬂuence during the war have the most to lose. Their 
organisational and managerial skills, resources, and higher expectations warrant them special 
attention. It is common for high-ranking former combatants and commanders to become 
disgruntled if they are given similar beneﬁts as their subordinates. Alden69 found out, that the 
reintegration of demobilised former government ofﬁcers in Mozambique proved to be 
problematic. Following their demobilisation, many of them became offended when they were 
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Accessed on line on: 20/11/16. 
68 Ibid. 
176 
 
given start-up kits of seeds, hoes, machetes, buckets and Food for Agriculture and were 
expected to become small-scale farmers like their former subordinates. As Aiden further 
points out, this is one of the reasons why many former combatants today run many of 
Mozambique’s criminal organisations as they were not properly reintegrated back into 
society.70 The high-ranking ofﬁcers of government forces have proven especially difﬁcult to 
appease. These high-ranking former government officers often have more education and 
skills training than their guerrilla counterparts. Therefore, they tend to have higher demands 
that are difﬁcult to meet.71 
 
Although limited in time frame and scope and affecting limited number of people in the 
population, the projects in Tajikistan, Kosovo, Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone achieved something that national reconciliation processes did not attempt to do 
in neither of the cases - they brought the conflicting groups together and encouraged them to 
work towards mutual goals, building inclusive social capital and reinforcing the hope for 
common good and community development. 
 
6.3.2 Social Capital as the Prime Focal Point in the Community 
With the focus on communities rather than divisive national politics, family issues become 
important. Although in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, and in some cases, up till 
now, trust and cooperation were not evident at community level, and bonding social capital 
was based around tribalism and regionalism. This has changed over time. Family re-
establishment and friendship played a key role in this. After the conflict ended, one of the 
common factors that emerged was that there was almost nobody who had a ‘normal’ family 
structure anymore, especially in the rural areas where the impacts of the conflict were felt the 
most. Some families were so devastated and traumatised that the entire social fabric was 
destroyed. Hardly any community, village or town in the country had what can generally be 
termed as ‘true family structure’.72 
 
This had a significant impact on the peace-building effort, and indeed the general 
reintegration process in the country. In such a complex post-conflict society, peace and 
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stability were expected to start with the (re)establishment of family unity, the composition of 
which was not ‘normal’. There was a need to rebuild trust, and families were therefore 
‘created’ from widows, IDPs, orphans, and other survivors of the conflict. In a very difficult 
time, people were obliged to bond together, and they needed to trust each other to work 
together so as to be able to restart their social life. Thus, the post-war development drive of 
the community required the whole population to work together as a unit to start the rebuilding 
of a new Sierra Leonean society. As the civilian population gradually returned to their 
communities, they slowly started to engage in such familial renewal process, and the 
community grew together out of this situation. Over time this has continued to contribute to 
the general development of bonding social capital based around community as the prime 
focal point. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that although tribalism currently plays an important role in 
social relations in Sierra Leone it does not however play any significant role in the way in 
which people bond in the country today, nor did it during the civil-war.  
 
As one former RUF combatant explains: 
 
‘We did not know about tribalism at the time when we were fighting, it never 
existed among us. Whether you were Mende, Temne, Limba, Mandingo, Susu, 
Fullah or Kissi, we were all the same, we lived together, we fought together, and 
we struggled together. Even though the ‘Papay’ (referring to Foday Sanko, the 
leader of the RUF) was from the Temne tribe, but most of his main commanders 
were from other tribes like Mende and Kissi. For that matter, my own commander 
was from the Fullah tribe. Even when we were being disarmed and demobilised, 
there was no signs of tribalism among us’.73 
 
As highlighted in the previous section, the interrelated nature of the elements that combine to 
make social reintegration possible also ensure that these elements are equally reinforcing. As 
such, this has had significant impact on the restoration of bridging social capital in the new 
Sierra Leonean society following the end of the conflict. The level of trust that individual 
former combatants establish by different means shown in the social reintegration process 
explains bridging social capital through the roles that former combatants play in the 
development of their new community, into which they appear to have slowly been 
reintegrated.  
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6.4 The Implications of Social Reintegration 
Violent conflict is generally seen as the result of a failed society, which results into social 
disintegration. As a result, post-conflict reintegration and the general peace-building 
programmes are often aimed at social reintegration so that the destroyed social fabric is 
rebuilt or reconstructed. But as Hazen points out, civil-conflict is not purely the disintegration 
of society; it is instead more about the disintegration of the broad social community, and the 
social integration of certain members of the community into a new social fabric: the war 
family. In other words, civil-conflict is both a destructive and constructive process; 
disintegrating broader social bonds, while constructing smaller more exclusive ones.74 As 
discussed in the previous chapter, social reintegration is not only a positive process with a 
peaceful outcome, but can also provide a foundation for the formation of competing group 
identity.  
 
Thus, the challenge after violent conflict is not only to reintegrate former combatants into 
society, but also to address the social bonds of the war family and combatant society. And as 
Whittaker points out, reintegration and reconciliation promote hope that material benefits will 
grow as a product of peaceful transitions and independence.75 However as evidence from the 
fields suggests, Sierra Leone is not at this stage a fully reconciled society. Nevertheless, as 
reconciliation is both a process and a goal as such, I am convinced that the country is on track 
for reconciliation and sustainable peace so far. According to my respondents, peace in Sierra 
Leone is, first and foremost, associated with the absence of war, i.e. the cessation of hostility, 
insecurity, and destruction. The principal connotation with peace then is non-violence. 
Against the backdrop of this conceptualisation of peace, the first picture emerging from a 
look at day-to-day communal relations, informed by both respondents’ observation as well as 
the views provided by former combatants, shows exactly this situation of non-violence, while 
the specific relationship between the wider community and former fighters can be described 
as a state of mutual toleration or ‘peaceful coexistence’. 
 
In addition, looking at the relatively short period of time since the conflict ended in 2002, the 
general consensus amongst regional and international institutions, including the UN and AU 
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concludes that Sierra Leone has made 'significant progress'.76 At the termination of the 
conflict, the country was considered by many as a fragile, broken, destroyed, or failed 
society.77 The then SLPP government faced a very daunting task. First, it needed to secure the 
country from the aggression of the RUF remnants, resettle the IDPs and the refugee 
population, rebuild the economy that was destroyed by the decade long conflict, rebuild the 
country’s infrastructure, 50 percent of which were destroyed by the conflict, re-establish and 
uphold the rule of law as well as undertaking reintegration and reconciliation processes.  
 
The end of various peacekeeping missions in the country, including ECOMOG and 
UNAMSIL’s operations follows what many have viewed as ‘successful’78 presidential, 
parliamentary and local council elections in 2002, 2007, 2012 and again 2018. During this 
same period, the country was able to restore and consolidate state authority, implement 
national recovery programmes, including extension of public services, as well as undertake 
reforms in the governance and security sectors.79 
 
The security sector reform is seen as another example of success story in the peacebuilding 
process in Sierra Leone. In March 2013, the International Military Training and Advisory 
Team (IMATT) ended its mission in the country. The mission was aimed at reforming the 
RSLAF) after the civil-conflict. It had been established in 2002 in the country following the 
cessation of violence. IMATT's mandate was to provide basic training and specialised 
courses, as well as improving professional military culture that sought to sever the close ties 
between military officers and politicians. The newly transformed national army is also 
expected to embrace social responsibility. IMATT is now being phased out, and replaced by 
the International Security Advisory Team (ISAT) which has a new role to play, with a new 
civilian Foreign and Commonwealth Office Head taking over in May. 
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6.5 Positive and Negative Peace 
The recurrence of conflict after the signing of Peace Agreement has been a cause for concern 
in the sub-region, which makes the perceived success of Sierra Leone post-conflict a model 
of achievement. Until the outbreak of Ebola in May 2014, Sierra Leone was on track to 
become a transformed nation with middle-income status. In 2012 for instance, the World 
Bank named Sierra Leone as one of the world's top reformers using the Bank’s Doing 
Business index.80 Real Gross Domestic Growth (GDP) is projected to recover from -20.6 
percent in 2015 due to the Ebola outbreak81 in the country to 5.4 percent in 2017 with 
increased iron ore mining. Despite the perceived trend of ‘success’ and reform, social 
indicators such as social well-being, high youth unemployment, widespread rural and urban 
impoverishment and institutionalised corruption are still some of the worst in the world, 
which has undermined national cohesion. The country continues to face the daunting 
challenge of transparency in managing its natural resources and its fiscal policy.  
 
The country has not yet achieved the imperative recommendations of the TRC 
recommendation that would allow ‘positive’ peace through long term structural change. The 
2010 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report listed West Africa as the 
key transit hub for cocaine being smuggled from Latin America to Europe, with Sierra Leone 
being used for transhipment.82 This would undermine state institutions, foster corruption and 
create the possibility of an influx of small arms and light weapons in the region. All of these 
factors contribute to the possibility of conflict recurrence. 
 
The work undertaken by UN agencies in relation to upholding the peace around the country 
has been successful, to the extent that it risks damaging the legitimacy of the Sierra Leone 
government, with the former being more trusted to maintain peace and stability. Once the 
international guarantees are removed, it is not clear whether civil society organisations would 
be trusted or strong enough to bridge the gap between the populace and the government in 
order to prevent a recurrence violence. 
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The distinction between positive and negative peace is important when looking at Sierra 
Leone, because the general opinion of it as a model of peacebuilding could be misleading in 
the long term, after international attention and aid moves out of the country. These concerns 
must not be overlooked; otherwise there will be a risk of reversing the current progress due to 
‘inflated perceptions of successes. 
 
Further Analysis 
Given that Sierra Leone has experienced one of the most brutal conflicts in the sub-region in 
recent memory, the country has moved comparatively fast to peace and stability. Similar to 
other studies in the field such as Humphreys and Weinstein;83 Shaw;84 and Stovel,85 this 
thesis finds that many former combatants reintegrated back into civilian community very 
swiftly. At first glance a picture of peaceful coexistence at the community level emerges - 
undoubtedly a considerable accomplishment. Considering which of the micro-level that are 
responsible for this achievement, I argue that reconciliation and reintegration together with 
coexistence are grounded in a collective effort based on pragmatic motives. Reintegration 
was the ‘price the people of Sierra Leone paid for peace’, one of the best ways to sought state 
of non-violence. As Shaw86 points out, ‘the people of Sierra Leone were tired with violence 
and ready to conclude the civil-conflict and start reconciliation’.87 Most respondents for this 
study pointed to several factors interacting with reintegration and reconciliation, which were 
perceived as facilitating the handling of these difficult processes on the individual level. The 
fact that the conflict did not take a tribal or ethnic dimension, reintegration and reconciliation 
are mostly individualistic processes. Therefore, in many cases, victims directed their anger 
against specific perpetrators not the armed group as a whole. In addition, strong social ties 
mean that former combatants are often accepted back in society as ‘brothers, sisters and 
children.’ Furthermore, resilience coupled with a high propensity to forgive were seen as 
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internalised in people’s behaviour supporting the peace process. Lastly, credit was given to a 
multitude of institutional efforts. In this respect, initiatives on the local level are of great 
importance in the new Sierra Leone. The example of youth organisations such as sports, 
dance and drama clubs organised for both civilians and former combatants showed how 
actors within the community were not only working towards mending relations between 
former combatants and the civilian society, a consequence of the civil-conflict, but also target 
one of the root-causes of the conflict, the relationship and power-balance between youth and 
elders. What emerges then is a truly national effort on multiple levels to forge forward. 
 
Exploring the characteristics of the state of reintegration and reconciliation, considering that 
reintegration could not successfully occur without reconciliation built on trust, a mixed 
outcome emerges. Looking closely at communal relationship suggests that peaceful 
coexistence in the new Sierra Leone is based on three key factors. Firstly, as Peters88 and 
Shaw89 reveal, the freedom of movement and choice of residence is limited for former 
combatants in so far as they cannot reside in places where they have committed atrocities, in 
some cases in their own communities and against members of their own families. Secondly, 
experiences of extreme violence undergone during the civil-war lead to greater rejection 
towards the reintegration of former combatants. Rejection is mitigated for those who were 
abducted or behaved positively during the conflict. While in line with Shaw’s90  data, my 
findings differ from that of Humphreys and Weinstein91 who discover that abductees have 
greater difficulties reintegrating after their demobilisation. Third and perhaps most 
importantly, peaceful relations in a post-conflict environment depend on stability. Within a 
tense context, like the 2007 and 2012 Presidential and parliamentary elections, former 
combatants, especially from the AFRC and RUF are singled out under high public scrutiny, 
displaying continued distrust and also fear of renewed violence.92 On a daily basis the 
misconduct of former combatants is severely sanctioned. 
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Both Kelsall93 and Shaw94 emphasise the importance of apologies offered by perpetrators at 
TRC-hearings for the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Some participants who took part 
in this study exposed feelings of vengeance, asking for accountability of former perpetrators, 
while others perceived a gap between the request to ‘forgive and forget’ and the absence of 
displays of repentance. The levels of grievances pertaining from the conflict - violence and 
loss experienced as well as unresolved demands for apologies and punishment - guide the 
final assessment of emotions of ‘War Don Don’.95 Communal interactions between former 
combatants and the civilian population reflect these grievances. My interviews with former 
combatants and community members revealed socio-economic and political constraints to 
post-conflict reintegration faced by former combatants on daily basis, leading to heightened 
vulnerability and marginalisation of some former combatants. In some cases, former 
combatants are still not seen as ‘normal’ citizens and, henceforth, not treated like true 
citizens. Strategies to deal with this rejection include moving to more anonymous places and 
manufacturing lies about their own identity, such as ‘I was not involved in the fighting’. 
Humphreys and Weinstein,96 Stovel,97 and Shaw,98 all report discrimination in their research, 
and suggest that only small progress towards true reconciliation and peaceful coexistence has 
been achieved in the new Sierra Leone. 
 
However, the interpretation of what emerged from this present study is that discrimination 
serves as a form of subtle punishment. It expresses mundane, local justice within a society 
that for the most part is overwhelmed by the request to ‘forgive and forget’ and needs 
pathways of venting feelings about the past. In this line of interpretation, the reaction of 
former combatants who for the most part quietly accept discriminating acts is seen as subtle 
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acts of repentance. Therefore, achieving successful reintegration can be seen as a process of 
continuing contestation and negotiation between former combatants and the wider civilian 
population. 
 
The analysis given here reveals a connection between post-conflict reintegration and 
violence. As Humphreys and Weinstein point out, social reintegration and peaceful 
coexistence mainly depend on the ruthlessness of the armed faction in which a particular 
combatant fought. I find that the same holds for experience of violence. Civilians who 
experienced higher levels of violence and destruction, found it difficult to forgive and forget 
their perpetrators, and therefore voiced louder calls for punishment, and showed greater 
rejection towards reintegration. As a result, my findings are in opposition to those of Bellow 
and Miguel,99 whose study suggest that greater experience of violence leads to higher 
community engagement and political activism following disarmament and demobilisation.   
 
But what is the way forward for the new Sierra Leonean society? Many participants who took 
part in this study formulated their peace needs primarily around the provision of employment 
opportunity especially for the youth. Providing employment opportunity for demobilised 
combatants is an important way to reduce renewed marginalisation and their involvement in 
crime, as well as a means to provide a future perspective and generate an acknowledgement 
of their usefulness in society. The provision of employment opportunities for former 
combatants has shown to be important in the cases of Okada Riders Association100 in the 
country. In addition, those who suffered great losses during the war need building blocks for 
a new life. This become especially important in light of the connection presented between the 
ability to rebuild one’s life, and the process of ‘War Don Don’. In this context, my finding 
lends support to that of Shaw’s101 findings and underlines the significance of analysing post-
conflict situations in a holistic manner to understand local linkages, like the one between 
economic development, overcoming of traumatic experiences, and reintegration at the 
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individual level. In line with other studies such as Peters,102 Shaw103 and Humphreys and 
Weinstein,104 my findings suggest the importance of social and economic interventions in a 
post-conflict society. In the context of Sierra Leone, the provision of employment for former 
combatants in particular and also for youth more generally remains important in achieving 
sustainable peace and successful reintegration. Sufficient access to employment opportunity 
serves as an important means to correct grievances that caused the conflict. It is important to 
emphasise that academics, researchers, NGO workers, community members, politicians and 
former combatants pointed to the negative effects the failures of DDR programmes have on 
the new Sierra Leonean society. Many believed that the problem of current unemployment or 
underemployment, it related crime and frustration is linked to insufficient and uninformed 
training during Disarmament and Demobilisation.   
 
While economic development can go a long way to stabilize social reintegration and 
reconciliation, the findings in this thesis also suggest that there is the need for long term 
interventions that focus on coming to terms with the past. As opposed to Kelsall’s105 and 
Shaw’s106 research, this thesis found that there is the need for a continuous dialogue and 
interventions bringing together former combatants and civilians to forge links and to cohabit. 
 
While in many cases, this takes place in daily interactions and has supported the peace in the 
new Sierra Leone, the level of discrimination and rejection of former combatants as well as 
the grievances voiced by civilian population points to the fact that there is scope for more 
formalised interventions. Reintegration and reconciliation are thus not only multifaceted 
processes but, importantly, develop slowly demanding long term and focused support. 
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The peace in Sierra Leone is sustained to a good part by the rejection of a violent past and the 
acceptance of cohabiting. None of my respondents supported a return to conflict in any way. 
Nevertheless, it is important that peace is further fed by a positive outlook into the future. 
This can only be generated by targeting those grievances, which fed the conflict in the first 
place, as well as those, which resulted from it. 
 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have examined the social reintegration of former combatants following their 
demobilisation. After the conflict ended in Sierra Leone, many former combatants have re-
entered civilian life, and are now living in their original or ‘new’ communities with their new 
neighbours. Most of them are in some way stable, and are together with the rest of the 
civilian population re-building the ‘new’ Sierra Leone. Cohabiting with the civilian 
population appeared to be initially difficult, but as time passed, the situation appeared to be 
smoother and more successful.  
 
Secondly, the chapter has highlighted the role of the macro and meso elements of former 
combatant’s reintegration in the ability of such reintegration in promoting reconciliation and 
reciprocity. The expansion of vertical social capital through former combatants’ reintegration 
shows an important facet in reintegration and subsequent developments of other forms of 
social capital. In addition, the chapter has emphasised the role social reintegration play as a 
means for the restoration of social capital following demobilisation. Vertical social capital is 
enhanced through social reintegration, because as social reintegration takes place, 
government support increases. Reintegration occurs when government, NGOs and the 
international community remain committed to DDR process. In this sense, vertical social 
reintegration is created through governmental desire for social reintegration. Thirdly, the 
chapter has argued that for successful social reintegration to take place, it has to be driven by 
community involvement and activity, which indicates one of Robert Putnam's dominant 
theses of social capital, The Prosperous Community.107 During violent conflict, ‘us versus 
them' rhetoric often emerges; in the case of Sierra Leone, this was mainly between the rebels 
and the civilian population. Successful reintegration restores, (at least to certain degree) the 
trust destroyed throughout the conflict. This facilitates the strengthening of bridging social 
capital. 
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The reintegration of former combatants has positive impacts for the renewal of social capital 
both at community level, as well as national level because such reintegration process 
increases the restoration of social capital. With increase in the restoration of social capital 
also comes increase in reconciliation, especially at community level. Establishing cooperation 
and cohabitation between former combatants and the general civilian population following 
demobilisation promote the regeneration of bridges and bonds that is embedded in social 
capital.  
 
For any social reconciliation to be meaningful there has to be first the establishment of 
cooperation and the willingness of former enemies to coexist and to be ready to build and 
‘preach’ trust. Without these, it will be difficult for sustainable peace to take hold. Moreover, 
where former combatants get involved in community activities positively, they may well 
serve as role model for the community into which they are reintegrated. They can, in addition 
be effective in disseminating the message of peace and reconciliation through their good 
behaviour. As former combatants reintegrate into community and actively engage and 
contribute to the management and development of that community, they also facilitate the 
generation of trust between the community and government, and this can have positive 
implications for political reconciliation as well.  
 
Building on the foundations constructed throughout this thesis, this chapter has endeavoured 
to provide an analysis of the ways in which the social reintegration of former combatants 
promotes enhanced social capital in Sierra Leone and the implications of such a promotion 
for the general peace-building effort in the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
107 Putnam, R., D. (1993) The prosperous community. American Prospect, Vol. 4, No. 13, pp. 35 - 42. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Peaceful Coexistence: At What Cost? 
 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the sustained violence that affected all sectors of the Sierra Leonean 
society during and after the conflict. Given that the reintegration of former perpetrators would 
be particularly difficult following the end of the conflict, two particular questions are worth 
asking. Firstly, what are the nature and characteristics of the state of reintegration that has so 
far been achieved? Secondly, which factors at the micro-level are responsible for this 
reintegration success at the local level? 
 
Most respondents who took part in this study reported that peace is associated with the 
absence of war and violence in Sierra Leone, i.e. the cessation of hostility, insecurity, 
violence, and destruction. The prime connotation with peace then is the absent of war and 
violence. Against the backdrop of this conceptualisation of peace, the first picture that 
emerged from a look at everyday communal relations in Sierra Leone, informed by the 
author’s observation and the views of participants, shows exactly this situation of absent of 
war and violence, while the relationship between former combatants and the wider Sierra 
Leonean community can be seen as a peaceful coexistence or mutual toleration. As the town 
Chief of Daru, eastern Sierra Leone David Kallon explains: 
 
‘Those three young men drinking palm wine in that Veranda (he pointed to the 
direction towards the three young men), they were all with the RUF rebels. 
Presently, two of them work in the secondary school as cleaners, and the other 
one works as a security guard at the community bank; they are all here now.... 
They are in good condition, talking nicely, cracking jokes and living with us in 
harmony. Since the end of the conflict, there has been no problem in this town. 
Many of them are here but they have not done anything bad to us. Perhaps, this 
relationship will continue.... We trust them, in my view. Community relation is 
good here because of intermarriages, because of the good behaviours of former 
combatants and because of their economic engagement in the town’.1 
 
This positive view is also confirmed by many former combatants who took part in this study, 
who stated that they felt they were members of the civilian community like everybody else.  
 
                                                          
1 Author’s interview with Pa. David Kallon, town chief of Daru, 23rd March 2015. 
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As one former female combatant explains:  
 
‘Me and my husband decided to stay here because it is peaceful for us here. We 
experienced peace and harmony here, and so we stayed. We socialise with a 
mixed group of friends - former combatants and civilians. Some of our friends got 
married to civilians after the war and were somehow accepted in the community. 
Some former combatants are also employed in their places of residence and, 
hence, are peacefully reintegrated. Now the test is that it is difficult to 
differentiate between us…Our behaviour does not stand out anymore’.2  
 
Given that Sierra Leone experienced sustained violence that affected all sectors of society, 
which gives the assumption that the reintegration of perpetrators would be particularly 
difficult, two particular questions are worth asking. First, what are the characteristics of the 
state of reintegration that has so far been achieved, i.e. what is the nature of this success? 
Second, which factors at the micro-level are responsible for this reintegration success at the 
surface? Plunging deeper below this surface reveals, not surprisingly, more complex detail 
realities, which show that reintegration and reconciliation in the Sierra Leone are not yet 
complete. Rather than invalidating the success that has been achieved on the surface of 
everyday life, however, this more comprehensive view points to the fragility of peace, and 
assesses how Sierra Leoneans deal with the memories of the war, shape paths of 
reconciliation, forgiveness, justice, revenge, and punishment. 
 
Which micro-level factors, then, are responsible for the reintegration success at the surface? 
First, my data suggests that reintegration was made possible by desperation of Sierra Leones 
wanting to end the war and violence in the country. Therefore, Sierra Leoneans accepted 
‘peace at any cost’ and allowed coexistence with former perpetrators. Considering Peter’s 
observation: 
 
 ‘It is through the general desire for peace and reconciliation that former 
combatants are forgiven and allowed to settle in civilian communities following 
the end of the war.’3 
 
Certainly, the conflict in Sierra Leone is a powerful memory to all its people. None of my 36 
participants, including policy makers, community leaders, academics and former combatant 
alike expressed any wish for a resumption of violence. And on the bases of the narratives 
                                                          
2 Author’s interview with Hawa Kamara, a former female combatant, Bo, 19th May 2015. 
3 Peters, K. (2006) Footpaths to Reintegration. Armed Conflict, Youth and the Rural Crisis in Sierra Leone. PhD 
Thesis. Wageningen Universiteit, p.145.  
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given by participants, there is the willingness on the side of the civilian population to accept 
former combatants and to live together again in the same community as Sierra Leoneans, and 
to work together with those who perpetrated violence against them. There was little evidence 
identified in the interviews that pointed to former combatants as enemies.  
 
As the town chief of Daru, David Kallon remarked:  
 
‘As long as the guns have been withdrawn from them [the rebels], we are happy. 
When the barrel was active, there was nothing to do but to save your life. They 
told us, we have to forgive and forget, and we just accepted it…... there were no 
alternatives for us’.4 
 
The Lome Peace Agreement was upheld by the SLPP government. President Kabbah and his 
government pleaded to all Sierra Leoneans to ‘forgive’ and to forge ahead with rebuilding the 
new Sierra Leonean society. By doing so, the government’s initiative was to prevent a post-
conflict cycle of revenge and further destruction due to ill feelings from the civilian 
population towards the former armed actors.  
 
As evident by the former Vice president Solomon Berewa: 
 
‘We as government had to beg communities to accept these people [the rebels] 
back. We brought together all stakeholders and community people and preached 
to them: We want you to allow your children, friends, nephews and wives, who 
were fighting, to be accepted back in society. Do not point fingers at any of them. 
Do not abuse them. Do not revenge. If that happens, the peace we have fought for 
will not be sustainable.’5  
 
On the bases of these narratives, it appears that post-conflict reintegration in Sierra Leone 
rests on pragmatic decisions rather than on emotional ones. One of the reasons Sierra 
Leoneans accepted former combatants within their communities is because reintegration 
enabled transition to peace. However, the decision to accept these former combatants was not 
an easy choice for most Sierra Leoneans to make. Most community leaders who took part in 
this study did admit that for the sake of peace and stability, they accepted to forgo revenge 
and suppress feelings of rejection and vengeance. However, some participants, in particular, 
older women admitted that they would like to see former perpetrators punished or held 
                                                          
4 Author’s interview with David Kallon, the town chief of Daru, 23rd March 2015. 
5 Author’s interview with Sierra Leone’s former Vice President, Solomon Berewa. Freetown, 9th June 2015. 
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accountable for crimes they committed during the conflict. Some people also expressed 
distaste for living together with former combatants in the same community. Nevertheless, all 
participants acknowledged that revenge and rejection of former combatants would cause new 
tensions and potential violence that would affect reintegration and reconciliation, and hence 
cohabiting remains key in achieving durable peace in Sierra Leone. 
 
Although Sierra Leoneans have accepted former combatants back into their communities for 
the sake of peace, successful reintegration and sustainable peace rest on a number of factors, 
which came together in the post-conflict period enabling the country to move forward. Each 
individual experienced these components differently. However, from my data, four main 
factors emerged, which intersected with the reintegration and reconciliation process in such a 
way, that they were described as facilitating the handling of this difficult process on an 
individual level. They include but not limited to: Institutional interventions and local 
initiatives and social ties. 
 
Institutional Interventions and Local Initiatives  
Many participants who took part in this study pointed to institutionalised efforts as one of the 
key factors interacting with the reintegration and reconciliation process. Initiatives on the 
national level mentioned most often were DDR-programmes, the TRC, the Special Court, and 
other range of projects brought in by the donor community and NGOs, as well as local 
religious institutions. My own interviews did not include specific questions regarding these 
institutions; rather they included terms like ‘reconciliation’, ‘justice or punishment’, 
‘forgiveness’ or ‘revenge’. It must be pointed out that few participants made a direct link to 
the Special Court or TRC, when talking about these topics. This allows for two main 
observations: Firstly, some of my participants expressed discontent with a lack of apologies 
from former combatants and formalised events, bringing together victims and perpetrators to 
forge reconciliation, the task of the TRC. Secondly, others did not see the Special Court as a 
sufficient answer to their desire for punishment of perpetrators. In this sense, my limited data 
questions the effectiveness of these institutions while affirming that the purpose they were set 
up for initially - retributive and restorative justice, respectively- is what people had expected 
and therefore still demand. 
 
196 
 
Presently, initiatives fostering reintegration and reconciliation are mostly located at the 
community level, as the donor community and most NGOs have moved on to other 
intervention areas than reintegration. One important area that worth pointing out is the youth 
organisations, responsible for organising youth (including former combatants) at the local 
level. During my research visit to Lumbely, western Freetown for instance, I observed the 
important role, these organisations play in mediating disputes between youth and older 
community people, negotiating petty crimes with the police, and bringing together civilian 
youth and those of former combatant youth. This shows that cooperation and coexisting 
peacefully might be an alternative to trust in the aftermath of violent conflict. 
 
Social Ties 
The fact that the conflict in Sierra Leone did not take any tribal or ethnic dimension suggest 
that achieving durable peace does not involve reconciling two or more tribes or sections of 
society, as was the case in Rwanda or Kosovo, which turned against each other. Instead, it 
was the patrimonial system that created cleavages along class, age and gender lines within 
every community in the country, especially in the rural areas. Therefore, in Sierra Leone, 
reintegration and reconciliation are more individualistic process. Two key facts emerge here: 
First, the fact that the conflict did not take any tribal or ethnic lines made it easier for former 
combatants to come back from the bush and give up their arms. They were basically their 
children, and they had to take them back6 on the basis of ‘there is no bad bush to throw away 
a bad child’, meaning that if it is your child, you cope with any kind of misbehaviour. 
Arguably, the conflict in Sierra Leone put family bonds to an extreme test. Many recruits 
were forced to commit atrocities against their own family members7 in particular to invoke 
feelings of shame and fear of return. The saying is nevertheless reflected by my interviews.  
 
As Samuel George, a former RUF commander in Pujehun explains:  
 
‘Because I am from this soil, my people have to encourage me; because I am a 
family member. Family plays the greater role. Whatever bad you do; the 
community will accept you. You are part of the community’.8 
 
                                                          
6 Author’s interview with Sierra Leone’s former Vice President, Solomon Berewa. Freetown, June 2015. 
7 Mitton, K. (2015) Rebels in a Rotten State: Understanding Atrocity in the Sierra Leone Civil War. London: 
Hurst and Co Ltd. 
8 Author’s interview with Samuel George, Pujehun, 27th June 2015. 
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Second, in several instances those victimised by rebel forces during the conflict, direct their 
anger and revengeful thoughts against those individual rebels who harmed them, not against 
the armed group they belong to, allowing for the reintegration of those who did not do them 
direct harm.  
 
7.1 Unfinished Reconciliation and Reintegration  
I now turn to the second research question which was posed earlier in the introduction, 
namely, ‘What kind of relationship do former combatants form with the community in order 
to coexist’? A deeper probing of respondents’ account and a critical evaluation of community 
relations reveal that peaceful, non-violent coexistence and tolerance of reintegration depends 
on a number of factors. One of the key factors that emerged from my data and participant’s 
narratives include former combatants residing in places other than those where they had 
committed atrocities. Residing in a stable society that is violence free is another factor. 
 
It must be recognised also that successful peace-building process depends on daily 
circumstances. In a case where instability or tension occur, former combatants are easily 
implicated because of their past involvement in the civil-conflict. This is true on the mundane 
level of everyday interactions as well as events of larger scale.  
 
In line with the above assertion, many of my participants pointed out that during the 2007 and 
2012 parliamentary and presidential elections for example, political parties deliberately 
employed former combatants as private security guards, which scared the population as they 
remembered war nicknames like ‘operation kill everything’, ‘operation pay yourself’, 
‘Bomblast’, ‘Leatherboot’ and ‘Mosquito,’9 that were connected with serious violation of 
human rights abuses in the past. In addition, there was uncertainty about the course of the 
electoral process, especially party rallies in the run up to the actual vote. Although political 
violence was limited to a few occasions during the 2007 and 2012 elections, the atmosphere 
of uncertainty and potential violence created rumours about former combatants returning to 
violence. This fear was translated by some into accusations against former combatants. 
Therefore, peoples’ memories were remobilised to identify former combatants as ‘bad guys’, 
                                                          
9 Sam Bockarie, also known as ‘Mosquito’, was one of the most feared RUF fighters during the Sierra Leone’s 
civil-war that lasted for more than a decade. Bockarie was (in)famous for his brutal war tactics, which included 
mutilation, rape, amputation and killing of large number of people.  
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and thus set them aside from the rest of society. Former combatants were aware of the fearful 
and hostile perception of the community.  
 
Two important themes emerged from the above narrative. First, if a former combatant 
becomes prominent in a particular aggression or violence, they will remind them of their past 
involvement in the armed conflict. Fingers are pointed at them if violence occurs in a given 
community. As the remark below suggest: 
 
 ‘People in our community cannot distinguish them (the former rebels) from the 
rest of the population if they behave well by remaining calm and peaceful’.10 
 
Second, in a context of tension and insecurity, people remember those former combatants 
who were involved in serious crimes. A community leader in Kenema agreed with this 
narrative and added: ‘We know all of them, but as long as they remain quiet and peaceful and 
do not get into any violent act, they will stay with us peacefully and happily.’11   
 
Different communities experienced the conflict differently and, therefore, have a different 
memory of attitude towards former combatants. This unfolds in various ways. Similar to 
Humphreys and Weinstein’s12 conclusion that those former combatants who fought in violent 
units have greater problems reintegrating back into civilian society, from my selection of 
participants, those who suffered most from the aggression of the rebel forces are most vocal 
against the reintegration of former combatants. As one retired female teacher in Koribondo 
pointed out:  
 
‘If I have the opportunity to drive them [former combatants] out from our 
community, I will certainly do so without any hesitation, because they are 
responsible for the death of many people in this country, including members of 
my own family. But our government and the international community said we 
should cohabit with them for the same of peace.’13  
 
                                                          
10 Author’s interview with Musa Jusu, a community leader, Towama, 12th June 2015. 
11 Author’s interview with Usman Sesay, a community leader, Kenema, 10th June 2015. 
12 Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. (2007) Demobilization and Reintegration. In: Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol.51, No. 4, pp. 531 - 567. 
13 Author’s interview with Jattu Idris, a retired female teacher, Koribondo, 20th April 2015. 
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However, participants who claimed to have experienced little or no violence, in contrast, 
expressed less radical rejection of former combatants, and therefore favoured their 
reintegration. 
 
Nevertheless, a different perception of former combatants emerged from my interviews, 
which not only depended on their experience of violence. One of the strongest theme that 
emerged from my interviews, is the importance of the method of recruitment in to armed 
groups. Combatants who were abducted or forcibly recruited into armed organisations 
appeared to receive the benefit of the doubt from much of the population. As a community 
leader in Kenema pointed out: 
 
‘It is easier to accept back into society those who were forcibly recruited into 
armed groups because they did so against their will. They did not do so willingly; 
they were forced to comply and to save their own life. Therefore, community 
people need to sympathise with them’.14  
 
And as Shaw15 points out, not only pity makes the reintegration of those forcefully recruited 
into armed organisations easier but that communities in many cases conceptualised individual 
combatants as mere vehicles for the agency of their commanders, thus, shifting responsibility 
from them. Greater lenience towards those who were forced to fight, has led to a strategy 
among former combatants to claim that they were forcefully abducted, couching their history 
of fighting in terms of coercion. 
 
Given that most communities experienced sustained atrocities, peaceful coexistence seems to 
be conditional in the sense that the population expects those former combatants who have 
committed serious atrocities, to settle in places other than those where the crimes were 
committed. This supports the point I made earlier on the individualisation of anger and 
rejection. Communities seem to reject mostly to live together with their perpetrator, i.e. the 
very persons who caused them harm rather than individuals who were part of destruction and 
violence in other incidents. The fact that peace partly rests on the limited freedom of 
movement and choice of residence for former combatants cannot be stressed strongly enough.  
 
The following statements were narrated by almost all community members I interviewed:  
                                                          
14 Author’s interview with Usman Sesay, a community leader, Kenema, 10th June 2015. 
15 Peters, K. (2006) Footpaths to Reintegration. Armed Conflict, Youth and the Rural Crisis in Sierra Leone, 
PhD Thesis. Wageningen Universiteit, pp. 7 - 8. 
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‘Those who committed serious atrocities in our community are not here 
anymore... You are not allowed to settle here if you committed grave atrocity here 
during the conflict. There is no one here who killed a single person in this 
community, or set alight any single house. The ones who are here, cannot go back 
[home] because of what they did there.’16 
 
Given that many teenagers were forcefully recruited by the RUF and other armed groups, at 
the same time they were forced to commit atrocities against their own families or 
communities. Therefore, the rejection of those who committed crimes runs counter to the 
notion that friends, children, brothers or sisters are accepted back as part of the family. Here, 
a more complex picture emerges with no clear-cut solutions but individually different paths 
of tolerance acceptance, forgiveness or rejection.   
 
While some former combatants were killed through mob justice in the immediate post-
conflict era, it has not widely been reported in the DDR literature.17 As a result, many former 
combatants were afraid to go back to places where they might have committed serious crimes 
during the conflict. As Peters18 further says, this is one of the reasons why many former 
combatants who fought in the eastern part of the country, for instance can be found settled in 
the north, while those who committed serious atrocities in the north are settled in the eastern 
part of the country. This has led to an implicit deal within the country, i.e., communities 
accept those who have not committed atrocities in that particular community.  
 
7.2 Former Combatants and their Interaction with the Community 
What kind of relationship do former combatants form with the community in order to 
coexist? My interviews, interaction and discussion with former combatants and community 
members revealed the difficulties former combatants are faced with on daily basis. These 
difficulties sum up to socio-economic and discrimination on various levels, leading to 
heightened vulnerability and marginalisation.  
 
My own observations in places such as Koribondo, Kenema, and Daru for instance deviated 
somehow from the narratives of the former combatants. In many occasion, I only experienced 
true socialisation (interaction) between civilian youth and former combatant youth in those 
                                                          
16 These types of narratives were given by almost all community members/leaders who took part in this study. 
17 Peters, K. (2006) Footpaths to Reintegration. Armed Conflict, Youth and the Rural Crisis in Sierra Leone, 
PhD Thesis. Wageningen Universiteit, p. 26. 
18 Ibid, p.141. 
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locations mentioned above. My supposition therefore is that the interaction between former 
combatant youth and civilian youth was bridging relations. As the chairman of the youth 
organisation in Samami section in Bo explained: 
 
‘Our community is now a new one. Over 70 percent did not live here before the 
civil-conflict. Many come from different places. That is the reason why the 
interaction is peaceful. Since people came from different places, nobody knows 
about the history of the other. It is actually a new start for everyone here’. 19 
 
 
In big towns and cities like Freetown, Bo and Kenema and Makeni foe example, former 
combatants kept to themselves. They lived together and hangout in groups, rarely mixing 
with other people. Listening to a narrative of a University student in Freetown, it becomes 
clear that interaction between former combatants and civilians in the younger generation 
comes down to individually different cases. There is no clear-cut acceptance or rejection of 
former combatants per se. Within the older generation, interaction appears to be more 
difficult. This is because many adults and the older generation have a more vivid memory of 
the atrocities perpetrated by the rebel forces. In addition, former combatants are often seen by 
the older generation as youth, a group that has not fully matured and, therefore, cannot be 
interacted with. This appears to be a subtler form of discrimination and labelling. Usually, 
gossip takes place among civilian women who target former female combatants. The former 
female combatants whom I interviewed, spoke of humiliation, discrimination and rejection 
within their communities: ‘The people in my community always discriminate against me. 
They provoke me by calling me names such as ‘old rebel’ or ‘old killer’. Sometimes they say 
to me, ‘You have many children like a bush rat. You have been with the rebels for long time, 
but the only profit you have is many children like a bush rat’….20 Such level of sustained 
discrimination leads to vulnerability of former combatants compared to other groups of 
people in society. While some vulnerability is palpable, in economic and political 
marginalisation, social stigmatisation is more difficult to assess or measure. In this case, 
former combatants are vulnerable to abuse, discrimination and rejection.  
 
However, it is important to recognise that former combatants have many ways of dealing 
with abuse, discrimination and rejection in society. Some of the strategies they adopt include 
lying about their personal story and history. Some of them are known to have turned to more 
                                                          
19  Author’s interview with Aruna Mambu, chairman youth organisation, Samami district, Bo, 17th May, 2015. 
20 Author’s interview with Hawa Kamara, a former female RUF combatant, Bo, 19th May 2015. 
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shady lives, becoming criminals, while others moved to places where abuse, rejection and 
discrimination are low. Such places include big towns and cities and mining towns like 
Tongo and Kono.21  
 
Paul Richards22 discusses a more positive way through which former combatants counter 
economic discrimination in particular, i.e., through the creation of a new niche in the job 
market such as Okada riding23 across Sierra Leone. An interesting result of this initiative has 
been greater social acceptance of those who engage in this useful activity. Another important 
strategy to divert attention from their past and, henceforth avoid discrimination is lying about 
their past. Nearly all the former combatants I interviewed, concealed at least part of their 
identity, either throughout the entire interview process or at the beginning. The strategies 
included altering their role in the conflict, downplaying responsibility for crimes they might 
have committed in the past. Many former combatants who used this strategy also lied to me 
about their relationship with their family, stating that they could and did return home after the 
war, but in reality, they did not.  
 
In particular, women tried to conceal their past. I found it difficult to recruit former female 
combatants for my interviews and once they volunteered, I had to meet them in a quiet place. 
Those who did volunteered mostly lied about playing active role in the conflict, because 
accepting their involvement in the conflict will stigmatise them even more than only being an 
abducted ‘bush-wife’. In the case of those former female combatants who volunteered, I had 
learned that ‘bush-wives’ who did not fight usually stayed in bush-camps away from the war-
front, while female combatants would move around with their fighting husbands actually 
went to the frontline to fight. All those I interviewed denied that they had fought actively. 
However, two of them accepted that they followed their husbands to the frontline 
occasionally to fight. The overwhelming majority of former combatants I interviewed 
contended that lying about their past or hiding their past identity will help them to avoid 
harassment and discrimination. 
                                                          
21Peters, K. (2006) Footpaths to Reintegration. Armed Conflict, Youth and the Rural Crisis in Sierra Leone. PhD 
Thesis. Wageningen Universiteit, pp. 60 - 62. 
22 Richards, P. (2004) No Peace, No War. An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. Oxford: James 
Currey. 
23 Riding Okada (or motorbike taxi) in Sierra Leone has become an important emerging economic sector since 
the end of the conflict in 2002, especially in big towns and cities. The Okada industry has offered many former 
combatants avenue through which to achieve economic security and social support. The industry has proved to 
be important especially for the economic reintegration of many former combatants in the ‘new’ Sierra Leone.  
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By keeping to themselves, as mentioned earlier, former combatants usually interact with their 
former comrades. I observed many cases where former combatants shared homes and 
gathered in groups. The lack of trust of community people towards former combatants 
tightens networks between former comrades. I observed from the fieldwork that in the 
context of Sierra Leone, with regards to successful reintegration, discrimination is a form of 
subtle punishment; mundane local justice within a society that for the most part is 
overwhelmed by the request to forgive, cohabit, reconcile and build a ‘new’ Sierra Leonean 
society. In this line of interpretation, the reaction of former combatants to discrimination is 
that of subtle act of repentance and apology. 
 
7.3 Concluding Remarks 
Achieving sustainable reintegration in Sierra Leone is still on-going 15 years following the 
end of the conflict. Due to high level of violence in the country, resentments are still present 
and large numbers of people are still traumatised.24 Hence, peaceful cohabitation and 
rebuilding social relationships remains a challenge in the ‘new’ Sierra Leonean society. In 
order to achieve sustainable peace, the government of Sierra Leone, supported by the 
international community implemented programmes and policies in two particulars areas: 
reconciliation and reintegration of former combatants.  
 
One of the key findings shows that the government of Sierra Leone and the international 
community are committed to both reconciliation and reintegration. Important institutions 
such as NCDDR work together to maximize successes. On a programmatic level, connections 
were found in various areas. First, through economic reintegration activities such as the 
engagement of former combatants in Vegetable Crop Rehabilitation and Income Generating 
Programme in Fonikoh, and the Vocational Training for the Rehabilitation and Resettlement 
Project in Bumpe Township, reintegration and reconciliation are fostered through 
cohabitation, respect and cooperation. Second, psychological issues, due to stigmatization 
and impaired social abilities, militate against the reintegration and reconciliation process. 
Therefore, social reintegration is as important as economic reintegration. Third, the TRC, in 
contrast to traditional justice systems, aims at forgiveness, cooperation and social cohesion.  
 
                                                          
24 Winter, D., Brown, R; Goins, S. and Mason, C. (2015) Trauma, Survival and Resilience in War Zones: The 
Psychological Impact of War in Sierra Leone and Beyond. London: Routledge. 
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Reintegration cannot be separated from reconciliation; they must accompany each other, with 
society seeing to the needs of former combatants, while relief, resettlement and rehabilitation 
programmes take care of other war-affected populations like IDPs. In that way, it may be 
possible to achieve a ‘balance of the individual former combatant and the community.’ 
Ultimately, the success of reintegration and reconciliation are marked by the point at which 
former combatants are no longer labelled as lazy, ex- killers or violent youth. They become 
identified instead as youth, farmers, or small-business owners, like the rest of the population. 
All of these will point towards collective responsibility to address the root causes of the 
conflict and to transform social structures in the country accordingly. 
 
The next section is the conclusion of the thesis. It provides an overall conclusion to the thesis. 
It seeks to draw together a comprehensive answer to the main research question. It 
summarises and cements the outcome of the fieldwork.  
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CONCLUSION  
This research began with an extract from an interview with a former combatant during an 
interview with this researcher in Sierra Leone. The narrative demonstrates some of the key 
difficulties faced by former combatants when they returned to civilian environment. Various 
concerns such as the need for identity transformation, distrust or low level of trust towards 
former combatants by civilians, the changed and changing environment to which former 
combatants returned, and the need to build one's own life being self-reliant combined to 
ensure that social reintegration is a difficult process. 
 
This conclusion begins with a summary of the thesis so as to provide a concise review of the 
most relevant literature covered. It then goes on to draw together the conclusions of the study 
and provide an answer to the research question posed earlier in the introduction. From here 
the thesis moves on to the provision of thesis outputs that: offer recommendations that 
develop our methodological ability to conduct research of this nature; advance our theoretical 
understanding of social reintegration, reconciliation and social capital; and provide 
recommendations to facilitate our capability of designing and implementing effective DDR 
programmes. The final section will then examine potential future research in this area. 
 
Thesis Summary 
The aim and objectives of this thesis was to offer an alternative perspective from which to 
view the process of reintegration of former combatants which does not rely on conventional 
measures of reintegration such as economic indicators. Instead, it assesses the impact of 
conflict on social capital and explores ways in which the effective social reintegration of 
former combatants may facilitate the restoration of social capital destroyed during the course 
of the civil-conflict in Sierra Leone.  
 
Thus, the aims and objectives of this thesis were: 
 
1. To explore the linkages between reintegration, reconciliation, trust and social 
capital through the analysis of data obtained from the Sierra Leone case study and 
compare them to linkages identified within the wider DDR literature. 
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2. To investigate ways in which civil-conflict transforms social capital and how the 
successful social reintegration and reconciliation of former combatants may restore 
social capital in a post-conflict society. 
 
3. To show that where reintegration occurs without reconciliation built on trust, 
peaceful coexistence is an alternative. It thus emerged that bridging and bonding 
social capital has evolved in the absence of trust, and that trust appeared as some 
kind of transitionary mechanisms that initiated with peaceful coexistence at the 
community level. Thus, even without trust peaceful coexistence was possible, 
which operated through a number of mechanisms at the local level. 
 
The aim and objectives are reflected in the following research questions, which was the basis 
of this research: 
 
How does the reintegration of former combatants link in with the reconciliation process in 
Sierra Leone? 
What kind of relationship do former combatants form with the community in order to coexist 
peacefully? 
 
 
The thesis starts with a personal note on how and why the research was undertaken, why it is 
important, and how it can add to our understanding of post-conflict reintegration and 
reconciliation. It then stated the aims, objectives and scope of the study, as well as the 
problematic research subject. This was particularly important as rationale for the study, as 
well as demonstrating the originality of the work and the insights it offers on the topic under 
investigation.  
 
Conclusion 
When considering the contribution social reintegration of former combatants makes to social 
capital renewal and reconciliation, it is first necessary to consider the overall picture in post-
conflict Sierra Leone in terms of social capital and reconciliation as this represents the 
environment into which former combatants reintegrate. 
 
Before the outbreak of the decade long civil-conflict, the process of undermining social 
capital had already begun in the country. Following the establishment of Freetown, the 
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capital of Sierra Leone by the British in 1787 to serve as a settlement for freed slaves, who 
later became known as the Creoles, it was a century later before the hinterland could become 
a British protectorate.1 Since then, there was an emergence of tension between the Creoles of 
Freetown, who saw themselves as direct British subjects, and the indigenous peoples of the 
hinterland, whom the Creoles saw as ordinary locals. Prior to the arrival of the Creoles, there 
were already indigenous people living along the Freetown peninsula, but these indigenous 
people were ignored an excluded by the settler community. This differentiation and 
segregation of ethnic or tribal groups during this period formed a platform for ‘us versus 
them’ mind-set and for the future ethno-politicisation of the state of Sierra Leone, as different 
tribes lived in close proximity. 
 
As independence approached in 1961, there was a fundamental increase in socio-political 
divide based on ethnicity or tribal lines and regionalism. While the Mendes from the 
southeast supported the SLPP, the Temnes and Limbas from the north were drawn to the 
APC. This tribal and regional divide and the resultant political setup continued to affect the 
social capital and thus led to persecutory vertical social capital between those in power and 
the various social groups within the population. The effect of this was to create overly strong 
bonding social capital within the population whilst bridging social capital became eroded 
over time. In the period leading to the outbreak of the conflict, social cohesion and 
cooperation were based on regional boundaries and the development of 'us versus them' 
attitude.  
 
With the outbreak of the conflict, the transformation of social capital continued. Furthermore, 
trust became depleted to the extent coordination and cooperation between those in power and 
the civilian population became almost impossible thus rendering bridging social capital 
effectively non-existent. Within the population, especially at local level the bonds that 
defined the population and held it together grew in strength in the face of the perceived threat 
from those in power and was reinforced through continuous inequality and increased poverty. 
Among the powerful elites and the minority in power, bonding social capital dwindled and 
was now located in small social groups such as Ekutay2 and family members. As 
                                                          
1 Porter, A., T. (1963) Creoledom: A Study of the Development of Freetown Society. London: Oxford University 
Press. 
2 As Jimmy Kandeh writes of the era leading to the outbreak of the conflict in Sierra Leone, the ethno-
politicisation of the army, palpably evident under president Momoh’s APC regime (all top officers continue to 
be northerners, and especially from the Limba tribe), occurred largely within the context of continued attempts 
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communication was made increasingly more difficult, and the uncertainty as to who could be 
trusted increased, the cohesiveness of this group was diminished. 
 
The end of the conflict in 2002 saw the return of IDPs, refugees and J.Cs, who had fled to 
neighbouring countries. This led to greater confusion in the country with bridging social 
capital remaining absent and bonding social capital within each group becoming more and 
more complex. In addition, the change in government, first from APC, who had ruled the 
country for nearly four decades, to NPRC, AFRC and SLPP further altered vertical social 
capital with most members of the former governments being fearful and distrustful of the new 
SLPP regime which had been out of governance for more than three decades. At this point 
the situation in Sierra Leone was unprecedented with the combination of a multitude of 
groups such as IDP, perpetrators, widows, returnees, J.Cs, refugees, orphans and the disabled, 
into a post-war society that was full with trauma, fear, distrust and hatred. At this point, the 
new SLPP government was faced with transforming a society that was almost unrecognisable 
from its former self into one in which reintegration, reconciliation and cohabitation were 
difficult to achieve. 
 
Since the end of the civil-conflict in 2002, social capital has steadily been re-established. 
Reintegration and reconciliation have also largely been achieved taking into account the level 
of destruction that took place in the country. Although there is still more to be done, lots have 
been achieved in terms of reintegration, reconciliation, cohabitation, cooperation, and social 
capital renewal. Due to the increased discriminatory policies that existed in Sierra Leone by 
those in power prior to the outbreak of the conflict, the restoration of non-discriminatory 
vertical social capital was urgently needed by the people of Sierra Leone. However, non-
discriminatory vertical social capital was difficult to achieve in the new Sierra Leone. 
Through the policies of the central government and the responsiveness of the people of Sierra 
Leone, vertical social capital gradually transformed so that the discriminatory vertical social 
capital practiced by the previous regime did not define relations in the new Sierra Leone. 
Although there are still problems and the elites can still be criticised for inequality and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
at power consolidation…. (The Limba) ‘Ekutay’, President Momoh himself was a staunch member. So was the 
chief of police (Bambay Kamara), the minister of trade and industry (Ben Kanu) and the ruling APC party 
affairs minister (Edward Kamara), all of whom were from the Limba tribe. For more on Ekutay and the ethno-
politicisation before the onset of the conflict in Sierra Leone, see for instance Kandeh, D., J. (1992) 
‘Politicisation of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone’, African Studies Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 81 - 99.  
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corruption, the general view is that relationship between the people and those in power has 
significantly improved. 
 
The renewal of bonding and bridging social capital has also taken place in the post-conflict 
Sierra Leone. In the beginning bonding social capital was evident between small, close knit 
groups perpetually based on kinship with bridging social capital being the links between 
these micro groups. As the process of cohabiting increased via proximity, familiarity and 
reciprocity that were part of the effort to survive, so too did the bridges between these groups 
got stronger. With the reconstruction of the country and the (re)integration of different 
identity groups bonding social capital gradually came to be based on ties other than tribe and 
region bridging social capital thus occurs between various groups. Such a transformation in 
the three elements of social capital facilitated the establishment of social cohesion and 
enhanced the probability of reconciliation and successful reintegration. 
 
Reconciliation is a long, difficult and a gradual process which goes through different stages. 
However, as the restoration of social capital takes place in a post-conflict environment, it 
positively impacts reconciliation. The key fundamental principles that underpin social capital, 
such as coordination, trust, cooperation, and communication among others, can only be 
realised when people cohabit. Therefore, social capital and co-existence are mutually 
reinforcing. It must be pointed out that co-existence is the precondition for the successful 
reintegration, reconciliation and the general development of the new Sierra Leonean society 
today, to the extent that war victims can live in close proximity and engage in community 
development with former perpetrators. Whilst some former combatants were intimidated, at 
least in the immediate aftermath of the termination of the conflict in some communities, there 
exists a relatively sustained level of peace throughout the country. 
 
 Given the period between the end of the conflict and now, it would be difficult for anyone to 
assume that Sierra Leone is totally a reconciled society. A lot has been achieved in terms of 
reintegration, reconciliation and the general peacebuilding effort as the people of Sierra 
Leone have accepted to co-exist and move on. The process of reintegration and reconciliation 
which are ongoing are building on these gains made thus far in terms of co-existence and will 
take time. However, the renewal of social capital serves to demonstrate to the people of 
Sierra Leone the possibility and benefits of durable peace. As members of communities 
engage together in activities that facilitate the physical development of the community, so too 
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do they cultivate the restoration of the social fabric that was destroyed during the conflict. In 
comparison with other societies emerging from conflict, reconciliation and reintegration in 
Sierra Leone is relatively in its early state; nevertheless, 16 years since the conflict ended, 
Sierra Leone as a society has made significant progress. Cohabiting and social reintegration 
of former combatants has made significant contributions to this advancement. 
 
In order to fully understand the ways in which the reintegration and reconciliation of former 
combatants contributed to the renewal of social capital in Sierra Leone, it is important to first 
understand how such process took place. Hence, we must understand the situation of former 
combatants upon their return to the community. As noted throughout this thesis, the new 
Sierra Leonean society that emerged following the end of the conflict was weak and fragile, 
and former combatants were faced with many problems in terms of their reintegration. The 
starting position of former combatants is perhaps the most serious of these problems. 
 
As pointed out in this thesis, and especially emphasised earlier in this conclusion, the social 
reintegration of former combatants into civilian society is a complex process, and in order for 
it to be successful, actors need to actively engage with the process. Notwithstanding the 
difficulty former combatants are faced with during their reintegration, when such social 
reintegration is achieved the renewal of social capital and reconciliation is facilitated, through 
both the process and its attainment. This is due to the fact that, as a process, it affects the 
community as a whole and can only be accomplished with the involvement of the entire 
community and the state. In order for the social reintegration to be successful the requisite 
commitment from the state must help to restore vertical social capital, which in turn 
facilitates the renewal of bridging and bonding social capital. 
 
Following their return to civilian community, the social reintegration of former combatants 
essentially depends on cooperation and cohabiting processes that begin with their micro 
group. As trust and cooperation are established within the immediate family, they gradually 
increase to include the neighbour and other networks in the community. The exchange of 
food items and other household resources also become necessary as a result of poverty-
induced interdependence. This takes places over a period of time that on average lasts 
between six and eight months, during which the cooperation that develops between former 
combatants and their families and neighbour expands further as the community in general 
becomes used to their presence within the community and in the various associations and 
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community activities they engage in. As noted in 6.3.1, the mutually beneficial nature of 
community development endeavours and exchange such as The Vegetable Crop 
Rehabilitation and Income Generating Programme in Fonikoh, Kenema, The UN ‘Stop-Gap 
Programme’ and The Vocational Training for the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Project in 
Bumpe Township serve to increase collective responsibility, civic mindedness, 
interdependence, solidarity and cooperation between former combatants and the civilian 
population. Therefore, the various interactions that occur within the process of former social 
reintegration help in cooperation, coordination and the rebuilding of trust through the 
familiarity that develops as a result of the proximity between former combatants and civilians 
when former combatants engage in community activities. 
 
The social reintegration of former combatants has an important impact on the renewal of 
social capital. Former combatants facilitate the re-establishment of cooperation and 
coordination in the community when they socially reintegrate. In this way, they act as drivers 
for social capital restoration, especially bridging and vertical social capital. If, however, 
former combatants are not successfully reintegrated, social capital renewal cannot be said to 
be inclusive of all groups in society and, as a result, bridging social capital between former 
combatants and community members will be weak. As a result, coordination and social 
cohesion within the community will reduce and could lead to instability and insecurity. 
 
If the reintegration of former combatants in Sierra Leone is successful, the ensuing promotion 
of social capital renewal has implications for reconciliation in the country. As noted earlier, 
during the civil-conflict and the period leading to the conflict, there was a development of ‘us 
versus them’ rhetoric between those in position and the citizens. Following the end of the 
conflict, similar situation developed between the civilian population and the former 
combatants. The newly emerging Sierra Leonean society thus became more complex and 
more polarised with citizens belonging to different social groups with different traumas, 
needs and aspirations. There was, therefore the need to build bridges between these polarised 
groups in order for them to be able to live together - bridging social capital. If bridging social 
capital is renewed and strengthened, antagonisms between previously conflicting groups are 
reduced thus building the foundations for reconciliation to take root and develop. This began 
with the development of the ability for members of communities to cohabit and, through the 
acknowledgement of the interdependent nature of life in Sierra Leone, especially at local 
level, the process of reconciliation has continued to develop. 
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The constructive social reintegration of former combatants has had positive implications on 
reconciliation, and such success has been achieved because of the political commitment of 
the government of Sierra Leone. This constructive social reintegration is achieved by the 
positive contribution former combatants make to the management and development of the 
community to which they return, which facilitates the generation of cohabitation even in the 
absent of trust at local level. Through social capital renewal, we can also see the influence 
social reintegration has on social reconciliation, especially at local level. The trust that is 
established between former combatants and the community during the process of their 
reintegration, enables the regeneration of bridging and bonding social capital and facilitates 
the steady developing of social reconciliation. Thus, trust resonates through the community. 
The role model status that is often attained by former combatants through their positive 
involvement in community activities enables them to take a positive role in the reconciliation 
process, however such a role can only be taken if their social reintegration is successful. If the 
social reintegration of former combatants is not fruitful, reconciliation is more likely to be 
unsuccessful as this implies cohabitation has not developed to the desired level. This will also 
affect the security and stability of the community thus affecting social cohesion. Therefore, 
the social reintegration of former combatants has significant ramifications for reconciliation 
and cohabitation.  
 
In sum, the successful reconciliation and social reintegration of former combatants enhances 
cooperation, and coordination through cohabitation even in the absent of trust. As trust, social 
cohesion, cooperation and coordination are re-established; vertical social capital is also 
restored between the local community and the central government while the regeneration of 
bridging social capital occurs between former combatants and the civilian population. 
Bonding social capital during this time becomes based around local communities rather than 
ethnicity and regions. Former combatants contribute to this enhancement of social capital 
through their commitment to and engagement with community development. By actively 
engaging with the community, helping in its development and taking on roles of 
responsibility, former combatants demonstrate trustworthiness between them and the 
civilians. The implications of this promotion of social capital for reconciliation derive from 
the cooperation that is developed that enables the coexistence of such conflicting groups and 
the development of a society in which constructive relations can be built and developed. The 
social reintegration of former combatants has an important role to play in the process through 
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the useful contributions they can make to the community and also by virtue of the fact that if 
former combatants are not positively social reintegrated they can derail the peace process. 
 
Research Reflection  
The section below now highlights a number of contributions that justify this present study. If 
the result of this study can be applied to other post-conflict situations elsewhere, then we can 
say that it adds value to our understanding of social reintegration and DDR in general other 
than only answering the research questions. The section starts with methodological 
recommendations and goes on to the contributions in terms of both methodology and theory. 
 
Methodological Recommendation  
Some of the difficulties encountered during fieldwork whilst conducting this study may serve 
to develop our methodological ability to undertake such an ethnographic study elsewhere. As 
pointed out in Chapter 4, those conducting research in societies emerging from conflict are 
faced with multiple problems. Therefore, there is greater need for thorough preparation 
before one goes to the field. Although one cannot be 100% knowledgeable of the 
environment in any given place at any given time and a great deal of flexibility is required in 
order for researchers to be able to effectively adapt to the environment, it is important that 
great deal of preparation is done before hand. By preparing one's field trip as thoroughly as 
possible, with the awareness that what is being planned, in particular, timetabling and lists of 
desired interviews, which will almost certainly not occur in the way planned, researchers are 
able to be flexible in their approach.  
 
In conducting research in societies emerging from violent conflict, limitations such as 
archival and documentary search always prove challenging. The search for important policy 
documents and other related literature are hampered by the problem of defaced or mutilated 
records, the unavailability of some files and bureaucratic red tape.3 During my research visit 
to Sierra Leone, a member of staff of the Archives who was supposed to help me find 
documents, demand money before he could help. However, due to ethical consideration, I 
decided not to give any financial reward in exchange of information from any of my 
participants. In this particular case, I succeeded in explaining to him that I was just a student 
working on my PhD thesis. In other instances, I was able to use my own networks on the 
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ground without participants knowing that I was actually behind the engagement between 
them and my gatekeepers, which made me to get the information from them without them 
knowing. 
 
Where possible, it is important to conduct the fieldwork over two or more phases. This 
provides time to be reflexive regarding the investigation and to improve where necessary. 
This will also provide space and time to analyse results, and identify particular irregularities 
or themes that are emerging that can be tapped into. Moreover, after returning to the field 
after the first phase you will be more confident having already spent time there and this will 
enhance working practices. Upon your arrival in the field, try to build friendship with 
members of the local community, as well as expatriates. Also, try to be open about meeting 
people, as this will help in gaining access to areas and people that may have previously been 
difficult. During interviews, be prepared for respondents cancelling or turning up late due to 
factors such as travel time and bad weather condition. Undertaking such a research process 
involves a great deal of flexibility. 
 
Methodological Reflection 
The following methodological contributions were made during this study. Firstly, the 
research design used for this study provides a fruitful insight into the short-term effects of re-
establishing social capital - through a participatory intervention - on the manner in which 
former combatants’ features of sociability are integrated into their ‘new’ society and on the 
terms of inclusion that allow them to access and benefit from social resources vis-a-vis the 
class-based relations in which those processes take place. Although the findings and 
conclusions of this thesis are related to a particular geographical, cultural, and historical 
environment in which this work has been undertaking, I am convinced that the methodology 
and research techniques proposed enriches the existing debates surrounding the reintegration 
and reconciliation of former combatants in a post-conflict setting. In this respect, this present 
study could be considered as a starting point for using ethnographic and more in-depth 
qualitative methods that explore more the efficacy of an alternative perspective in the re-
establishment of former combatants as durable peace-building mechanisms in societies 
emerging from violent conflict. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 In most poor countries, especially those emerging from violent conflict, excessive regulation or rigid 
conformity to formal rules (bureaucratic) sometimes hinders or prevents action or decision-making. This will 
216 
 
Secondly, some of the challenges faced in the field almost overwhelmed this researcher, as 
well as the research methods that were adopted. In the bid to overcome some of the 
challenges, various research strategies were applied to manage them, and in the process, a 
pool of relevant data was discovered. In writing up the final thesis, existing literature in the 
field were weighed against the narratives of the former combatants. The results obtained 
through the combination of these research methods and techniques was the presentation of a 
balanced, empirical study, and a well contextualised account of the effects of social 
relationships on the reintegration of former combatants, which added to the already existing 
knowledge in the field. 
 
Theoretical Reflection 
Three main theoretical contributions were made as a result of this study; social capital 
theoretical advancement, social reintegration theoretical advancement, and DDR theoretical 
advancement, all of which enhance our understanding of post-conflict peace-building. These 
three theoretical advancements are examined below. 
 
a). Social Capital 
This study enhances our understanding of social capital in two main ways: (a) through the 
application of the social capital concept in the context of post-conflict societies, especially 
through its application to social reintegration and cohesion and (b) through augmenting our 
comprehension of the link between violent conflict and social capital. 
 
Building on the work of Colletta and Cullen,4 and other authors in the field, this thesis 
provides a detailed analysis as to how social capital can contribute to the outbreak of violent 
conflict and how such conflict impacts on social capital before examining ways in which 
social capital can be restored in societies emerging from conflict. This is potentially a 
significant advancement in our understanding of conflict as it increases our knowledge of 
what leads to conflict, which then enables the development of more effective conflict 
prevention strategies. It also augments our understanding of the conflict process which helps 
in the ways we handle post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation. In addition, the concept 
of social capital could be used to explain other conflict-related social phenomena such as 
spill-over and insurgency. Social capital is a concept that can augment our understanding of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
inevitably have negative influence on researcher’s ability to collect data.  
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the conflict context and should thus be utilised more when attempting to grasp the complexity 
of post-conflict societies. 
 
As argued throughout this thesis, an increased understanding of civil-conflict is one of the 
key benefits of this study. As pointed out in Chapter three, social capital as a concept was 
first developed in the United States and European society to express the essence of communal 
vitality, and to explain social organisation in countries such as Italy. However, due to the 
relative infancy of the concept its application to the context of the developing societies, 
especially those emerging from conflict has been limited, although this has expanded over 
recent years with the creation of the Social Capital Initiative as part of the Social 
Development Department of the World Bank in the mid 1999s. 
 
This present thesis adds to the application of social capital in the post-conflict society in the 
following ways: Firstly, the application of social capital as a concept in this thesis increases 
our understanding to specific areas such as lDPs, J.Cs and refugee reintegration, which are 
concerned with issues of community cohabitation, cooperation, cohesion and solidarity. 
Secondly, the use of social capital as a mechanism through which to better understand 
conflict and post-conflict reintegration and reconstruction adds to the understanding of post-
conflict environment, due to the fact that violent conflict of an intrastate predominately 
occurs in countries that experience poor governance, high inequality and increased poverty. 
Thirdly, though the application of social capital concept in this study is particularly focused 
on the social reintegration of former combatants, the fact that former combatants are 
reintegrating into a post-conflict environment draws on the involvement of the society, both 
at local and national level in such reintegration. This present study enhances our 
understanding of social capital within the context of the mechanisms that help former 
combatants’ reintegration back into society. It also enhances our understanding of community 
development through the contribution of former combatant in community projects as well as 
local and national development. 
 
b). Reintegration and Reconciliation 
Like the theoretical advancements in the previous section, reconciliation and reintegration 
literature is dominated by Euro-centric based literature that understands reconciliation and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 Colletta, N., J. Cullen, M., L. (2000) Violent conflict and the transformation of social capital: lessons from 
Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia. Washington: The World Bank. 
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reintegration from a certain perspective and applies reconciliatory measures that are, in 
theory, appropriate to the understanding of reintegration and reconciliation. However, the 
application of social capital concept into this study enhances our understanding of 
reintegration and reconciliation from a different perspective. Whilst much of the reintegration 
and reconciliation literature propose solutions such as tribunals and TRCs, results from this 
research indicate that this is not necessarily the most suitable for the communitarian-based 
societies emerging from violent conflict across the developing world, especially in the 
African context. Both reintegration and reconciliation in these contexts are about social 
cohabitation, cohesion and reconciliation than internationally sponsored Special Court and 
TRCs that Western-centric literature bases its discussion on, and this is important for the way 
in which reintegration and reconciliation are approached. 
 
As pointed out in chapter two, there is the need for a hybrid approach in societies emerging 
from violent conflict like Sierra Leone, and this syncretic approach to justice in a post-
conflict environment should be incorporated in the model of transformative justice, placing 
transitional justice in the context of conflict transformation, reconciliation and peace-building 
effort. In addition, traditional courts might be more appropriate and more popular as a justice 
model for dealing with crimes committed during the conflict. This is because it involves 
initiatives that engage the community at the grassroots and allow them ownership over their 
own progression as oppose to the internationally supported Special Court or the TRC. 
Reconciliation between neighbours within communities is overwhelmingly personal matter 
and, although projects can be developed to promote and assist in this process, it cannot be 
implemented from outside and has to occur at grassroots. By recognising the importance of 
local justice system and incorporating it into reintegration and reconciliation literature, the 
chances of an understanding of the reconciliation process that both reflects experience and 
has the potential to make a difference is further developed. The way that Catholics reconcile 
in Kosovo or the pro and anti-Franco factions in Spain, or in Northern Ireland where the 
Catholics and Protestants reconcile differ in many ways with the African context; what works 
in the European context does not necessary work in the African context. Therefore, if we aim 
to achieve permanent reconciliation and reintegration, it is important to understand that local 
ownership and knowledge are drafted into designing and implementing reintegration and 
reconciliation initiatives. This present study thus conveys some bearing onto this subject 
through its examination of community-based reintegration and reconciliation endeavours. 
 
219 
 
It is generally argued in much of DDR literature that if former combatants are not efficiently 
reintegrated into society, they may pose danger to peace process. Constructive peace, as 
generally understood includes successful cohabitation, reintegration and reconciliation and 
therefore if former combatants are not successfully reintegrated into society, reconciliation 
will be difficult to achieve. This gives a negative acknowledgement to the potential 
importance of former combatants in the reconciliation process; however, it does not in any 
way recognise how they may positively contribute to it. One of the key findings of this 
research show that, where former combatants engage in community development, as pointed 
out in section 6.3, the social and physical rebuilding of the community can have a significant 
positive influence in the reintegration and reconciliation process. This enhances our 
understanding of how reintegration is achieved at the grassroots by acknowledging that those 
who are part of the problem need to be part of the solution if durable peace is to be achieved. 
Rather than focussing on Euro-centric or state-centric approaches to reintegration and 
reconciliation; this present study is beneficial by way of its contribution to academic 
understanding of the actors involved in grassroots reintegration and reconciliation. 
 
In summary, this present study advances our understanding of reintegration and reconciliation 
by: 
i. Highlighting the inadequacies of current reintegration and reconciliation thinking 
ii. Introducing an important actor in the reconciliation process and explaining how the 
social reintegration of former combatants, through social capital renewal, can 
contribute to the reconciliation process and general peace-building 
iii. Linking the concepts of social capital and reintegration so as to augment our 
understanding of how reintegration and reconciliation are achieved, and how they can 
be generally measured  
iv. Increasing our current understanding of local reconciliation programmes and 
techniques through a consideration of community practices and their application to 
the reintegration and reconciliation processes in general 
v. Situating the process of reintegration in the complexity of the post-conflict 
environment.  
 
 c). DDR 
The findings of this thesis have emphasised a number of issues that can develop further our 
understanding of DDR in post-conflict societies. In terms of DDR, this thesis concentrates on 
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reintegration and reconciliation. As pointed out in section 0.4 and again in section 5.5, social 
reintegration has often been neglected in comparison with other aspects of reintegration such 
as economic and political reintegration due to various reasons. It is thus evident from this 
thesis that there is the need to examine social reintegration in detail. This thesis primarily 
adopts social capital concept to examine social reintegration in a post-conflict context.  
 
Although the application of social capital concept has been contested, especially in terms of 
post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation, due in part to the fact that there is no 
universally agreed way to measure social capital, it provides an ideal starting point from 
which we can work towards designing a more accurate measure of social reintegration and 
reconciliation. As noted in this thesis, social reintegration is a key constituent of DDR 
process because its achievement has significant influence on other key components of post-
conflict peace-building such as community development. Most importantly, its attainment 
signifies that the reintegration stage is complete. There is therefore the need to understand the 
process of social reintegration, factors that propel it and factors that militate against it, which 
this thesis has attempted to do. 
 
In particular, this thesis contributes a detailed understanding of the ways in which former 
combatants reintegrate socially back into community after their demobilisation, both in terms 
of the difficulties they face and the successes they achieve. Therefore, we can better 
understand how social reintegration can be augmented. This is important because it shows the 
significance of DDR as a process we must engage with in order to keep former combatants 
from re-engaging in violence. The economic reintegration of former combatants is important 
because it improves the employability of former combatants through intensive training in 
skills that are in demand in local economies and markets, and through longer-term support to 
new entrepreneurs. At the same time, it creates an enabling economic environment, especially 
in local communities with high return for former combatants by taking a more holistic view 
of DDR process. We can thus, see that the effective reintegration of former combatants has 
an important effect on reconciliation and peacebuilding in general. 
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Future Research 
It has been evident throughout this thesis, especially in chapter one, as well as in the 
empirical section that the Sierra Leone’s reintegration project was directed, managed and 
implemented by external actors, with little input from former combatants themselves and the 
host community. Even when the conflict ended, the post-conflict affair was largely managed 
by external actors - the so-called ‘professional bodies’ such as the donor community, DFID, 
UNDP, the World Bank, the ADB, psychiatrics, psychologists and human rights 
professionals. DFID, UNDP and the World Bank overwhelmingly focused on the Security 
Sector Reform and political dimensions of peace-building, while the IMF and ADB focused 
on the reconstruction of war-ravaged economy, which, as noted in chapter one routinely 
required the implementation of complex economic reform programmes and policies, which 
did not benefit either the former combatants or the local population. Psychiatrics and 
psychologists were interested in the ways people who were affected by the conflict dealt with 
the experience of violence they witnessed, whilst human rights experts focused on justices 
and the promotion of reconciliation.  
 
The central argument of this study was that where reintegration occurs without reconciliation 
built on trust, peaceful coexistence is an alternative. In order words, peaceful coexistence 
might be an alternative to trust. In the context of Sierra Leone, bridging and bonding social 
capital has evolved in the absence of trust, and that trust appeared as some kind of 
transitionary mechanisms that initiated with peaceful coexistence at the community level. 
Thus, even without trust peaceful coexistence was possible in Sierra Leone, and this operated 
through a number of mechanisms at the local level. Having done so, I am convinced that 
further research should be undertaking to explore the relationships between the different 
professional bodies such as those mentioned above, together with other bodies that are 
interested in the welfare of former combatants and their host communities. 
 
Given that this thesis expands our knowledge on social reintegration, reconciliation and 
social capital, there is the need for further research for the reintegration of IDPs, J.Cs, 
refugees and other groups. The fact that most former combatants join armed groups at very 
early age and later demobilised as adults, there is the need to undertake further research on 
the reintegration and reconciliation of this particular group. Fundamentally, there is the need 
to investigate this group separately and to establish the challenges they are faced with upon 
their return into society.  
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Although many questions and challenges for future research remain, the post-conflict 
reintegration and reconciliation programmes in Sierra Leone have had positive experience. 
Sierra Leone's approach to post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation are widely praised, 
and arguably regarded as one of the most successful peace-building programmes in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Today, the people of Sierra Leone coexist peacefully in harmony without 
visible tensions. Therefore, Sierra Leone can be seen as a positive role model for other 
societies emerging from violent conflict.  
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Appendix 1 - List of Interviewees 
 
Former Combatants (Males) 
Amadu Yajah, Kailahun town, 28th July 2015  
Denis Conteh, Freetown, 14th June 2015 
James Dauda (Saddam Husain), Bo, 29th May 2015 
John Fawundu, Koidu Town, 13th April 2015 
John Kangoma, Mandu, 22nd March 2015 
Mohamed Kargbo, Mattru Jong, 1st May 2015 
Munda Sannoh, Towama, 2nd June 2015 
Samuel George, Pujehun, 27th June 2015 
Tamba Lamina, Kono, 4th April 2016 
Tigana Joseph, Pendembu, 21st March 2015 
Turkish, Bo, 29th May 2015 
 
Former Combatants (Females) 
Hawa Kamara, a former female combatant, Bo, 19th May 2015 
Kadie Kamara, former female combatant and member of the Vegetable Crop Rehabilitation 
and Income Generating Programme, Kenema, 12th April 2015 
Massah Joseph, former female combatant, Freetown, 14th June 2015 
Mbalu Tifa, former female combatant, Bo, 12th May 2015 
Yatta Mansaray, former female combatant, Bo, 7th May 2015 
 
Community Members/ Leaders (Males) 
Aruna Mambu, chairman youth organisation, Samami district, Bo, 17th May 2015 
Brima Kallon, primary school head teacher, Njala Komboya, 22nd July 2015 
Pa. David Kallon, Town Chief, Daru town, 23rd March 2015 
Pa. Joe Samu, a community leader, Koribondo, 14th May 2015 
Usman Sesay, community leader, Kenema, 10th June 2015 
 
Community Members/ Leaders (Females) 
Jattu Idris, retired female teacher, Korobondo, 20th April 2015 
Kadie Kamara, member of the Fonikoh Vegetable Crop Rehabilitation and Income 
Generating Programme, Kenema, 12th April, 2015 
Ramatulai Jalloh, Kenema town, 10th June 2015 
 
Policy Makers/Interlocutors/Politicians 
Abass Bundu, former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, now Speaker of the House of 
Parliament of Sierra Leone, Bedford, UK, 5th November 2014 
 
Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Wonie Bio, 2012 Presidential candidate for SLPP, now 
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, London, 15th November 2014 
 
Eldred Collins, former RUF leader and 2012 Presidential candidate, Freetown, 9th June 2015 
Francis Kai-Kai, former Executive Secretary of NCDDR, Freetown, 3rd September 2015 
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Solomon Ekuma Dominic Berewa, Sierra Leone’s former Vice President and 2007 
Presidential candidate for the SLPP, Freetown, 9th June 2015 
 
Academics/Journalists 
David John Francis, Department of Peace Studies and UNESCO Chair in African Peace and 
Conflict Studies at the University of Bradford. Currently Chief Minister of the Government 
of Sierra Leone. Telephone interview, 13th November 2014 
 
Ismail Rashid, Department of International Studies, Vassar College, New York. Telephone 
interview, 1st December 2015 
 
Joe., A., D. Alie, Head of the Department of History and African Studies, Fourah Bay 
College, University of Sierra Leone, April 2015 
 
Lansana Gberie, Africa Conflict Prevention Programme of Institute for Security Studies, 
Addis Ababa. Telephone interview, 12th February 2016 
 
Sorious Samura, Author and Producer, Cry Freetown, London, 1th November 2014 
 
NGO and Civil Society Organisations 
Abu Brima, Executive Director, NMJD, Freetown, 10th June 2015 
 
Ibrahim Tommy, Executive Director, Center for Accountability and Rule of Law. Freetown, 
11th June 2015 
 
Mohamed Gibril Sesay, Chairman of the Board, Center for Accountability and Rule of Law. 
Freetown, 14th June 2015 
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Appendix 2: Participant Consent Form 2015 
 
 I, the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in the study titled 'Lost Voices, 
Fragile Warriors: Social Capital, Reconciliation and the Reintegration of Former 
Combatants in Sierra Leone’. (Version No 2). 
 
 I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided.  I have been given a 
full explanation by the investigators of the nature, purpose, location and likely 
duration of the study, and of what I will be expected to do. I have, in addition been 
advised about any discomfort that may arise as a result of the study on my 
psychological well-being. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions on all 
aspects of the study and have understood the advice and information given as a 
result.                                                                                                             
 
 I shall inform him immediately if I suffer any deterioration of any kind in my 
health or in my psychological well-being.  
     
 I do agree that audio or video recordings made of my participation in this research 
be used ONLY for the purpose of this research.    
 
 I do NOT want segments of the recordings made of my participation in this 
research to be used for education and training of future researchers/practitioners. 
 
 I agree that my comments be used as a citation in this study where and when 
necessary.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
 I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information sheet, 
be used for this study only. I understand that all personal data relating to volunteers 
is held and processed in the strictest confidence, and in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act (1998). 
 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without needing 
to justify my decision and without prejudice. 
 
 I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to 
participating in this study.  
 
  I have been given adequate time to consider my participation and agree to comply 
with the instructions and restrictions of the study.       
 
 
 
                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
228 
 
  
Name of researcher: (BLOCK CAPITALS) ..................ABDUL RASHID KOROMA   
Signed…………….......................................................................................................... 
Date: …………………………………………………...…………….….……………... 
 
 
Name of Volunteer: (BLOCK CAPITALS) ………...…….............................................  
Signed…………………………………………………………………….………..……. 
Date…………………………………………………………………………….………..  
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Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheet 2015 
 
Project Title: ‘‘Lost Voices, Fragile Warriors: Social Capital, Reconciliation and the 
Reintegration of Former Combatants in Sierra Leone’’ (Version No 2). 
 
Introduction 
I am a Doctoral Researcher and a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics at the 
University of Surrey, and I would like to invite you to take part in a research project. Before 
you decide to take part, you need to understand why the research is being done and what it 
will involve for you. Please take the time to read the following information carefully and talk 
to other people about the study if you wish. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This study focuses on social reintegration, broadly understood as a state of reconciliation 
between former combatants and civilian communities. Adopting ethnographic research 
design through semi-structured interview method with participants, and snowballing 
technique for the identification and selection of participants, and using social capital concept, 
the thesis argues that where post-conflict reintegration occurs without reconciliation built on 
trust, peaceful coexistence is an alternative. In order words, coexisting peacefully might be an 
alternative to trust. 
 
 The thesis sought to address the following research questions: 
 
How does the reintegration of former combatants link in with the reconciliation process in 
Sierra Leone? 
What kind of relationship do former combatants form with the community in order to coexist 
peacefully? 
 
Why have I been invited to take part in the study? 
You have been invited to take part in this study because you are one of the key actors who 
may have valuable information to contribute to the success of this study as you directly or 
indirectly took part in the conflict or because you were deeply involved in the negotiation and 
other political processes that finally brought peace in the country.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. You are free to withdraw at any time you wish to do so without giving any reasons for 
your withdrawal from the programme. 
What will my involvement require? 
It is not compulsory that you take part in the study; it is your decision to do so and your 
participation is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time you wish to. The information that 
you will provide will be kept confidential. It will not include your name or any other 
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identifying information. However, if I need to use your direct citation in the research; I will 
get back to you for further clarification. The interview will last between 50 and 75 minutes 
depending on how much information you have or wish to provide. 
 
 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
Potential risks or harm that may occur as a consequence of participation in this research focus 
largely on the possibility of psychological or emotional distress that you as a participant 
could trigger. Less likely threats could conceivably be experienced in relation to security 
fears such as fear of lack of confidentiality, as a consequence of participation in interviews. 
In response to the first, I will be prepared to refer participants to counselling services at 
Surrey University, Sierra Leone Embassy, UK, or Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) in Sierra 
Leone. The major precaution regarding security concerns will be dealt with by (a) showing 
letters of introduction from my Supervisors declaring the bona fide nature of the research 
endeavour; (b) assurances as to anonymity, but (c), if requested, or necessary, by referring 
contacts to my Supervisors at the University of Surrey. MSF has been involved in emergency 
mental and physical health and other post-conflict psychosocial related programmes since the 
end of the conflict in Sierra Leone. Emotional support can also be provided by specialist 
medical staff at Connaught hospital in Freetown if required. But all of these will be discussed 
with participants prior to face-to-face interview. 
 
 
Where will the interview take place? 
All interviews/meetings will take place in public places in Sierra Leone, the study country 
after mutually agreeing on the location/venue with the participant. Before any interviews are 
conducted or meetings held, I will use what is called the ‘seal envelope system’. This is 
where a seal envelope is handed to a third party, usually a friend containing my telephone 
number, name and other details of the participant instructing the third party to open the 
envelope if s/he did not see or hear from me after a set period of time. This is done to 
maintain confidentiality and anonymity of participants involved. 
 
 
How will data collection for this study proceed? 
As pointed out above, data collection for this study will take place in Sierra Leone between 
April 2015 and September 2015. The semi-structured interview process will involve 
approximately 35 - 40 participants; they will include former combatants, academics, policy 
makers, NGO staff, community members/leaders and interlocutors. The would-be 
participants are expected to provide valuable individual information to the success of this 
study because of their direct participation in the conflict and the DDR process, or because of 
their individual knowledge in the reintegration of former combatants following their 
disarmament and demobilisation.  
 
Will my participation in this study be recorded? 
Yes. All interviews for this study will involve voice or video recording. For participants in 
Sierra Leone, the method for data collection will involve some semi-structured interviews. So 
yes, participant’s voices will be recorded and will be stored in accordance with University of 
Surrey’s data storage Act.  
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Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. All of the information you provide will be anonymised so that those reading reports 
from the research will not know who has contributed to it. However, should you disclose that 
you or someone else is at risk, then I as a researcher may need to report this to the appropriate 
authority. And where information is required by authorities, it is beyond me as a researcher to 
withhold such information. All data/information that you provide will be stored securely in 
accordance with the University of Surrey’s policy pertaining to research process, which states 
that all research data must be stored for a minimum of ten years and research project data for 
a minimum of six years before they are dispose of. This process will be strictly followed.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 It is unlikely that you will benefit directly from this study, however it is hoped that the 
research will give ‘voice’ to marginalised sections of people in the community as the voices 
of former combatants will be heard. By listening to their narratives, the research hopes to add 
value to their accounts. You may experience personal benefits as a result of taking part in the 
research, such as having an opportunity to express your views or feeling and that your views 
will influence policy change in your community. However, it cannot be assumed that such 
benefits will occur in this study. 
 
What happens when the research study stops? 
This research hopes to be completed and published by 2018. Therefore, if you would like to 
access any information that you provide for the research, I will make the final PhD thesis 
available in pdf form and on line.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint or concern about any aspect of the ways you have been dealt with during the 
course of the study, please do not hesitate to contact the Principal Investigator: 
 
Professor Mark Olssen, Department of Politics,  
Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences,  
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK, GU2 7XH. 
 Tel : 01483682120.  
Email m.olssen@surrey.ac.uk.  
 
You can also contact the Deputy Head of School: 
 
 Professor Alex Warleigh-Lack  
Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences,  
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK, GU2 7XH 
Tel : 01483683589, 
 Email : a.warleigh-lark@surrey.ac.uk.  
  
Contact details of researcher: 
Abdul Rashid Koroma,  
Doctoral Researcher,  
School of Politics,  
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Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences. 
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK, GU2 7XH, 
Email : a.koroma@Surrey.ac.uk.  
Phone: 01483683142. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research is self-funded.  
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
The study has been reviewed and received a Favourable Ethical Opinion (FEO) from the 
University of Surrey Ethics Committee. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet. 
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Appendix 4: Sample Letter for Snowballing Recruitment 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Thank you very much for your interest in my research: ‘Lost Voices, Fragile Warriors: Social 
Capital, Reconciliation and the Reintegration of Former Combatants in Sierra Leone’. I am 
writing to ask whether you would be willing to pass along the enclosed information to 
friends, colleagues and/or family members who may also be interested in my research. My 
point of asking you is because you have great knowledge and long-term experience 
pertaining social reintegration of former combatants following the end of violent conflict in 
Africa and elsewhere, which is broadly understood as a state of reconciliation between former 
combatants and civilian communities. As such, your willingness to notify others on my 
behalf would greatly facilitate my efforts to seek additional interviewees for my study, should 
I choose to approach them. 
 
As you may be aware, the study which is being conducted is for my PhD where I am 
registered in the Department of Politics, Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences, University of 
Surrey, UK. This study focuses on social reintegration. It adopts ethnographic research 
design through semi-structured interview method with participants, and snowballing 
technique for the identification and selection of participants. By adopting social capital 
approach, this study finds a deeper and a more meaningful explanation of what holds or 
brings society and its people together in order to co-habit and foster social relationship after 
conflict has divided them. Focussing on social reintegration, the study presents a snapshot of 
the social dimension of the overall reintegration process in relation to the receiving 
community members. The study sought to address the following research questions: 
 
How does the reintegration of former combatants link in with the reconciliation process in 
Sierra Leone? 
What kind of relationship do former combatants form with the community in order to coexist 
peacefully? 
 
Any assistance you can offer me would be greatly appreciated. You are under no obligation 
to share this information, and whether or not you share this information will not affect your 
relationship with me and the University of Surrey in any way.    
 
Thank you very much for your time and consideration. 
Yours sincerely, 
Abdul Rashid Koroma 
Doctoral Researcher, School of Politics 
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK, GU2 7XH, 
Email : a.koroma@Surrey.ac.uk. 
